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REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY

DEFENDED IN A

PHILOSOPHIC SERIES

BY

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

REALISM: ITS PLACE IN THE VARIOUS PHILOSOPHIES.

THERE are three marked methods or tendencies in the various philosophic systems, ancient and modern.

There is REALISM, which holds that there are things and that man can know them. In a crude form it is the first philosophy, which is a generalization in an uncritical, undistinguishing manner of what seem primary truths. This is soon discovered to be unsatisfactory, and the speculative intellect adds to it to make it attractive; hence

There is IDEALISM, which is Realism dressed and ornamented by the mind out of its own stores. There are shrewd minds which notice the additions; so

There is SCEPTICISM, which doubts of or denies received doctrines. This may be total, affirming that truth cannot be found, or partial, denying certain truths. Its most prevalent form is Agnosticism, which allows us to follow certain practical maxims, but has no faith in any supersensible truth.

Some thinkers were interested to observe that the NEW PRINCETON REVIEW, in its Prospectus, avowed itself a defender of Realism. This, in a raw form, is the first, in a digested form will be the final, philosophy.

But what is Realism? In answering this question we

may seem to be explaining what does not need, what does not seem to admit of, explanation. Some may resent our statement; they feel as if it were an insult to their understandings, and as if we were addressing them as children. It is true that we cannot give an explanation of reality, which may explain other things, but itself needs no explanation; but we may so enunciate it as to separate it from ideas, imaginations, and everything else.

"We know," which means that we know "things." This is the fact with which the intelligent mind starts, and this is the first position which metaphysical philosophy, as expressing primary facts, should lay down. We cannot explain either of the terms, "know" and "things," to one who does not know them already. Those who know them, as all intelligent beings do, do not need to have them interpreted. We may say "knowing is knowing," and that "things are things," in this or in synonymous phraseology; but this does not add to our knowledge. When we wish to think of them we have only to look to what is passing or has passed in our minds. When we speak of them to others, we have only to appeal to what they, as well as we, have experienced.

While we cannot give a positive definition, we may lay down many negative positions (as Aristotle shows can be done in such cases), as to what they are not, to meet errors which have sprung up. We can say of knowing that it is not mere feeling; of things—say of external things—that they are not the result of reasoning; not only so, we may make some historical assertions regarding them which are not definitions: that they appear in infancy; that we are never without them; that they mingle with all our states of mind, with our thoughts, feelings, and volitions, with even our imaginations, which are all about things which we have in some sense known.

The knowledge of Being, that is, of things having being, is what the intelligence starts with. Knowing and Being are the first objects contemplated in the first philosophy. They are to be assumed, not proven. They may be premises, but they are not conclusions of arguments. If we attempt to prove them, we shall find that we cannot do so. While metaphysics cannot prove their reality, it can show that we may and ought to assume them.

The "thing" and "the knowledge of the thing" are not the same, and should never be confounded. There may be growing, in the depths of a forest, a flower which never fell under the notice of human intelligence. It should be noticed that there is an important class of cases in which the thing is known by itself; thus, the self is known by the self. But the two are different aspects of the one thing.

The thing may be known directly and at once, as we say, by intuition. It is thus we know ourselves as thinking or feeling. But the object may become known mediately, say by induction and classification, as when, knowing that all mammals are warm-blooded, we know at once that the cow before us is warm-blooded; or, when we know that A = B, and B = C, and conclude that A = C. In all such cases we are in the region of Realism. But in this article we are treating of Realism in philosophy, that is, in first or fundamental truth. It is of importance to announce the points which we assume, or, in other words,

The Positions of Realism. There are two which come first and come together: the knowledge of self and the knowledge of the body.

1. The knowledge of self. This is a primary position. It is one maintained by nearly all idealists, who are so far realists. It is denied only by the extremest sceptics, who,

however, always act upon it. It should be formulated as one of the first positions in philosophy.

2. The knowledge of something external, that is, of body as extended, and exercising power. Possibly this is the first cognitive act of the mind, being always accompanied by a consciousness of self, which knows the self as knowing the not-self.

Some have maintained that the knowledge of body is not a primitive act. There is said to be first an impression (a metaphorical and vague word) or sensation, and from this an inference that there is something external. This argument is not logical. We know the external thing as extended, and we cannot prove this from a mere impression or sensation, which has no extension. One who argues in this way may be called a realist, for he proceeds from a fact (illegitimately, I reckon) to a fact, but it is wiser to assume the existence of body as known to us immediately (see the argument infra, p. 22).

3. We know qualities of body and mind. We know these in knowing the things. This is commonly expressed by saying that we know things by their qualities; the proper statement is that we know things, mind and body, as having certain qualities. We know mind as perceiving, judging, resolving; we know body as having extension and resisting energy. These being realities, we can contemplate them, and we make affirmations and denials regarding them, and we can know more of them. He who affirms that Matter has not extension, as Berkeley does, is not a thorough realist. The same may be said of one, a materialist, who does not allow that we are conscious of mind as thinking and feeling.

4. We know space and time. These come in with, and are involved in, our knowledge of mind and body. Every one naturally looks upon them as realities, and cannot be

made to think otherwise. They may not have an independent existence—we have no reason to think that they have—but they have a real existence. But, it is asked, What sort of nature and existence? I answer, What we naturally perceive them to have. Puzzling questions may be asked, but the difficulties cannot unsettle our natural convictions.

5. We know good and evil. According to the view I take, virtue consists in "love according to law." Both of these are realities. Certainly, there is love in all morality, implying a living being. Law is also a reality, implying an agent under authority—some would say also a lawgiver, and reckon this a most satisfactory argument for the existence of God. This law implies obligation or oughtness, which is also a reality.

6. There are realities in relations. Some of these may be discovered intuitively, as in the very nature of the things. We first discover the reality of things, say mind and body, with their qualities, and then we discover the reality of the relation between things, say their identity in different circumstances, or their likeness, or the production of one by another. He who denies the reality of these, and makes them mere forms imposed on things by the mind, is so far a sceptic or agnostic, and is seeking to deliver himself from this by becoming an idealist.

7. There are other realities, about which there are disputes, and which it is not necessary to enumerate. For example, the mind has in the germ an idea of and belief in the Infinite, as was held by Anselm, Descartes, and Leibnitz; it cannot be made to believe that, however far out we go, there is an end of existence. A true realist believes in the existence of infinity. But I do not profess to mention here all our intuitions. The enumeration and defence of them would involve a full system of metaphysics.

Assuming these as the fundamental positions of Realism, there are few systems of philosophy which have really or avowedly followed them out. Indeed, scarcely any system has been pure Realism, thorough-going Idealism, or absolute Scepticism; most have been a heterogeneous mixture of some two, or the whole three, of these methods. Almost all have laid claim to some kind of reality. But some add to nature in order to make it more complete. Others abstract certain encumbrances, as they reckon them, to make it more rational. Most systems indulge in both the addition and abstraction. The additions of the idealist are attacked by the sceptic, who in doing so knocks down the whole fabric. The denials of the sceptic are met by unfounded statements on the part of the idealist, who thereby makes the building top-heavy, and ready to fall. The result is confusion and contradictions; not in things, but in our exposition of them. This must continue till it is laid down as a principle that the aim of all investigation in philosophy, as in science, is to discover facts, and nothing but facts.

The object of philosophy is to state and defend the reality of things.. Believing them to be real, it is the object of the ordinary sciences, physical and mental, to discover their laws.

Though there are few pure systems of philosophic Realism, yet nearly all claim to have reality in them, and most of them have it, in part. It may serve some important purposes to go over the more distinguished systems, ancient and modern, and to ask what Realism each has, which, with me, means to inquire what truth there is in it. This is a difficult and hitherto an unattempted work—to pick the nuggets of gold out of the concrete earth in which they are embedded. No one man can accomplish it. He may begin it, but it will require a number of scholars and

thinkers to carry it on toward completion. It is to be understood that my design is not to discard other philosophies, but to call out of all of them what is true and good, and this not arbitrarily, but according to a principle, that of reality.

Meanwhile it may be interesting, after the manner of American interviewers, to ask each of our great philosophic thinkers what is his opinion as to the reality of things. I cherish the hope that even those who have no special taste for metaphysics may rather be pleased to have a brief interview with those who have ruled thought in ancient and modern times.

The Greek Philosophy. The Greeks, impelled by their clear and penetrating intellect, were ever seeking after reality, the *τὸ ὄν* and *τὸ εἶναι*. This was the grand aim of their philosophy. It was not the German search after the Absolute (which the German historians so often attribute to the Greeks); but it was for something nearer and closer. They perceived that all that appeared to the senses, all that presented itself to the mind, was not a reality. But they were sure that there was a reality, and they were bent on finding it; on finding essential being *τὸ ὄντως ὄν*. So with them the fundamental distinction was not the modern one between a priori and a posteriori truth, but between the apparent and the real (*τὸ φαινόμενον* and *τὸ ὄν*).

With some the reality was merely in the senses, and they had no higher. Others put no faith in the senses as organs of truth, which they thought, however, could be discovered by the higher reason. The former are like the mountains which we have often seen in the Alps, with their base clear and their tops in the clouds; the latter are like those which have their base in mist and their summit in sunshine. Realism seeks to have the mountain clear from base to top.

The *Ionian Physiologists* sought after the origin of things which they found in elements. With the common people, they took things as they found them, and did not inquire specially into the nature of Being.

The *Pythagorean* or *Italic* school sought for a unity and harmony, and found it in numbers and forms which they considered to be as real as, or, rather, more real than, the things they combined. They had no special ethical system, but in conformity with their mathematical conceptions they made virtue a square number.

The *Eleatics*. It is a noteworthy circumstance that the search of the first metaphysical philosophers of Greece was for the nature of existence. "Only Being is, non-Being is not and cannot be thought." Being has not been created, has not been generated, cannot change, and can never cease. The mistake of the Eleatics consisted not in standing up resolutely for Being, but in saying too much about it. They sought for it down in great depths, whereas it lies patent on the surface. Instead of drawing water from the well by just plunging in the pitcher, they penetrated the bottom and stirred up mud. Existence is not a separate thing, like a stick or a stone. It is an abstraction from concrete realities, say of a stick and a stone. The error lay in hypostasizing an abstraction. There is no meaning in the saying that existence exists. The proper statement is that things exist. Of non-Being, of which they discoursed so much, no positive assertions can be made; it is simply nonsense to talk of it being a cause or condition of anything.

The Eleatics formally introduced into the Greek philosophy the doctrine that the senses make known not realities, but appearances, and are the sources of all error. They were right in holding that there is fixed Being, but wrong in arguing that it cannot change, and that there cannot be

motion; change and motion are as palpable realities as the things.

Heracleitos was an offset from the Ionian school. According to him all things are in a perpetual flux, and the reality is a becoming—a truth which the Eleatics did not discover. He believed in a Zeus "who wills and wills not to be known."

Anaxagoras, a profound thinker, believed in all things being made of equal parts, and arranged by a divine νοῦς.

The *Atomists*, such as the Thracian Democritus and the Latin Lucretius, held that the proper realities were atoms with a void between, by their motions producing all things. They were avowed materialists, and represented the soul as consisting in fine smooth and round atoms. They introduced an ideal theory, which, in one form or other, has been held ever since. The soul does not perceive things directly, but their images (εἴδωλα), which proceed from objects and are received by something cognate in our senses. In modern times the theory has assumed a more spiritual form in the philosophy of Descartes and Locke, and the images are supposed to be in the brain or mind. It has taken all the patient observation of Reid and the logical skill of Hamilton to expel this theory from philosophy and bring us to the very borders of Realism.

Hitherto the philosophers had their seats in the various Greek colonies. From the middle of the fifth century B.C., philosophy centres in Athens, "the eye of Greece."

The *Sophists* were professional teachers, who instructed young men to act and speak. They had no faith in truth. They introduced the doctrine of Relativity, that truth is relative to the individual; that what is true to one man may not be true to another. Protagoras said that "man is the measure of all things, both of that which exists and

of that which does not exist." This Relativity led, as it always does, to nescience, and Gorgias is reported as holding that "nothing exists, and if it exists it is unknowable, and granting that it were knowable it could not be communicated to others."

Socrates, as depicted by Xenophon, looks like a realist. Plato often makes him appear as an idealist. He probably never seriously considered the question as between realism and idealism. He certainly believed in the reality of things around him, but could soar into the higher spheres of speculation. He believed in one supreme God, the arranger and governor of all things, and in a providence and final cause. He also believed in the gods of his country, and in a daimonion which exercised a restraining influence upon him. He regarded virtue as consisting in knowledge, by which he meant as I understand him the knowledge of the good, and is thus separated from modern utilitarians, with whom Grote identifies him, but spent his life in showing that virtue ever leads to happiness.

Plato sought to combine the perpetual flux of Heracleitos with the immutable Being of the Eleatics. He was surely right in holding by both doctrines. They do not need to be reconciled, for there is no discordance between them; the two joined constitute the truth.

He allowed to the Eleatics that the senses give us only appearances and not realities, and that they lead to errors and delusions. To counteract these he called in the higher reason, *νοῦς* or *λόγος*, which, being trained by mathematics and philosophic dialectics, gazes directly on the Idea which is in or before the Divine Mind. This Idea is the one grand reality, and other things, such as matter, moral good, and beauty are real only so far as they partake of it. This is graphically represented in the myth of the cave, in which mankind are compared to chained prisoners, who

see only the shadows of things on a wall before them, till, their chains being broken, they turn round and behold realities; so man naturally does not know things, till by philosophic training he is enabled to behold them. Here we have a somewhat incongruous union of Idealism and Realism, which, following Plato, is a characteristic of nearly all later systems. It is Realism not assumed, but reached by a process, which, as not beginning with reality, can never logically reach it. So far as the senses are concerned, he is not a realist, but he is in regard to reason, which is the true organ of reality. He regards it as one of the functions of the reason to correct the deception of the senses. The proper statement is that the senses, internal and external, give us the real, and it is one of the offices of the reason to tell us precisely what the senses reveal, and for this purpose to distinguish between our original and acquired perceptions, and to reject fancies and erroneous inferences.

Mixed always with Idealism, which cannot be separated from it, we have a very elevated Realism in Plato. He believes in the reality of the true, the beautiful, and the good. The highest excellence of the mind consisted in the contemplation of moral good, which derives its excellence from its partaking of the Divine Idea.

The *Alexandrian* school took one side of Plato's philosophy and carried it to an extreme. They represented, as the highest excellence, intuition or ecstasy, which is the immediate gazing on the one and the good. It should be noticed that in all this they had not the living and true God, that is, a personal God, but simply an abstraction.

Aristotle is a thorough and consistent realist. There are scarcely any idealist or sceptical elements in his philosophy. "By nature man is competently organized for truth, and truth in general is not beyond his reach."

He corrected the whole of the early philosophy of Greece by showing that the senses do not deceive, and that the supposed illusions arise from the wrong interpretation of the intimations they give, and inferences we draw from them. He drew an important distinction between common percepts, that is, common to all the senses—which are unity, number, size, figure, time, rest, and motion—and proper percepts, peculiar to one sense, such as color to the eye and odors to the smell. This turns out to be the same distinction, though seen under a somewhat different aspect, as that drawn in modern times between the primary and secondary qualities, used by Locke and Reid to defend the veracity of the senses. He has been quoted as holding the ideal theory of sense-perception when he says that the senses give us "the form and not the matter," but Hamilton shows (Note M, to *Reid's Coll. Works*), that this statement is quite consistent with immediate perception.

While he held that the senses give us true knowledge, he affirms the same of other faculties, as, for instance, the memory, drawing an important distinction between simple memory (*μνῆσις*) and recollection (*ανάμνησις*), in which we hunt after a thought. He allots the highest function to the reason (*νοῦς*), which takes two forms, the passive which simply receives, and the active which acts. His categories, ten in number, are a classification of what may be predicated about realities and their action.

He was called the Thinker of Plato's school, and I can conceive him as he sat for years under the teaching of his great master, indicating unmistakably his doubts of some of his positions, and justifying himself by the principle that much as he loved Plato he loved truth still more. He did not altogether set aside the ideal theory of Plato, but he corrected it, by showing that the Idea was not reality

above things, but in things, which is the true doctrine. He takes the right view of the discussion which has risen in modern times as to innate ideas. He designates Reason as "the repository of principles" (τόπος εἰδῶν), not in actuality, but in capacity. He has a well-known division of cause—which he defines as "what makes a thing to be what it is"—into material, efficient, formal, and final, all of which have a reality and a deep meaning in every object in nature. His views of moral good are not so elevating as those of his master, but they are more definite. His definition of virtue, however, is somewhat complicated. "It is a deliberate habit (or tendency) in a mean relative to us, defined by right reason and as a wise man may declare;" where it should be observed he makes virtue to be an act of the will determined by right reason.

The *Stoics* were materialists, believing only in the existence of Matter. But they gave to Matter, especially to fiery Matter, of which the gods and the souls of men consisted, a power of thinking and moral perception. They had a ἡγεμονικόν, or ruling principle, which determined what was true and false, good and evil. Following Crates the Cynic, they represented virtue as the only good and made it consist in following nature and vice as the only evil.

The *Epicureans* adopted the theory of Democritus as to images floating to the mind in order to perception. They had a canonicon, which guaranteed knowledge. It combined the knowledge given by the senses, and was a kind of loose induction. They regarded pleasure as the only good, and sought to obtain freedom from care. It is justice to add that they gave the mind an anticipation (πρόληψις) which revealed some higher truth, and the existence of the gods.

The ROMAN PHILOSOPHY. I do not dwell upon it. It has not much that is original. Lucretius has given a philosophy to the Epicureans. Cicero, an Academic, has given us interesting views of the ancient Greek sects, and defended truth as probable. M. Aurelius and Epictetus, the Stoics, give us a perception of moral good, and are our sternest heathen moralists.

The MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY. Boethius gives the Stoic morality under a Christian aspect. The great body of the mediævalists had a strong logical tendency, and meant to follow Aristotle—which they did not always do, as they had not his writings in the original. Abelard's maxim was *intellige ut credas;* Anselm's, *crede ut intelligas.* They held that we reach realities, human and divine, both by intelligence and faith, the former primarily by intelligence, the latter by faith. In the midst of them was a body of Mystics, such as Eckhart and Tauler, sprung from the pseudo-Dyonysius and John Scot Erigena, who were Mystic idealists.

Bacon was the freshest thinker of his age, and has had the largest and happiest influence. But he was not specially a metaphysician. Wise man as he was, he took things as he found them, and has shown how we may rise from particular things to minor, middle, and major axioms, and finally to causes and forms. He adopts Aristotle's fourfold division of causes, which were all reckoned by him as real, final cause testifying in behalf of God. The highest aim of science is to discover formal cause, which is next unto God, and makes a thing to be what it is; thus he found motion to be the form of heat, and was ridiculed for ages for saying so. I claim Bacon as favoring the philosophy of Realism. He begins with it, proceeds with it throughout, and ends with it. But he has nowhere expounded it.

Descartes may be claimed as a realist, though I am not sure that he carried out the system consistently. He starts with "I think," which he assumes. This implies the ego, "*cogito ergo sum.*" I think his assumption should have been *ego cogitans*, as a fact of consciousness. From this he derives other truths by what he regards as a rigidly logical process. In the ego there is the idea of the Infinite, the Perfect, which implies the existence of a corresponding object, that is, God. We have all an idea of extension, and the Divine Veracity guarantees the existence of an extended body. It may be doubted whether all the reasoning is valid, but he believed it to be so, and he proceeds from realities to realities. He draws a high ethics from the perfect character of God. It would have been wiser in Descartes to assume, as Reid and Hamilton did, the existence of Matter, instead of seeking to prove it by what is not clearer than what he proves. Descartes has made French philosophy and French thinking generally clear and realistic. It can be shown that Descartes held the ideal theory of sense-perception, that is, that we perceive external objects by ideas in the brain or in the mind.

Malebranche, called the Christian Plato, did not trust sensation or sentiment, but made ideas discover truth. He believed in Matter on the ground of Scripture (being a Catholic, he believed in the Real Presence in the sacrament), when his philosophic principles might have led him into Idealism.

Spinoza has been much lauded for several ages past by those who favor Pantheism and follow the higher German philosophy, on which he has exercised a powerful influence. His method is the mathematical one of Descartes, what I call the joint dogmatic and deductive, a method not applicable to philosophy. He starts with definitions which are ill-defined and with axioms which

are arbitrary. We are not sure whether his deductions are logical or mere logomachies. Like Descartes, whom he so far followed, he had realities both in extension and thinking. But, unlike Descartes, who so widely separated the two, he identifies them in one substance which he calls God, of whom all existing things, including moral evil, are modes.

Hobbes is certainly a superlatively clear thinker and writer. What he sees he sees clearly and expresses it dogmatically. There are persons who are sure that one who asserts so unhesitatingly must be speaking truly. He is not a comprehensive thinker. He overlooks the most obvious facts, as patent and as important as those he notices. He believes in the bodily senses, but does not give them an immediate perception, and he dwells upon extension and motion. But he has no place in his philosophy for self-consciousness, when it gives us an immediate knowledge of self as thinking and feeling.

Locke, a man of profound sense and great sagacity, meant to be a realist. But, following a wrong philosophic principle, he became theoretically an idealist. He declares that the mind is percipient only of its ideas. If this be so, it is difficult to see how it could ever come to know any external object. Idea is defined as "the object of the understanding when it thinks." The true account is that it is the thing without the mind or within the mind which is the object of the understanding, and it is the apprehension of this thing which constitutes the idea.

He reconciled himself to his doctrine by regarding the ideas as representing things. But if the mind did and could not perceive the things, there is no means of proving that there are things, or that they correspond to the ideas. So, while Locke was a realist in his personal convictions, in his philosophy he was an idealist.

In following out his theory he had to define knowledge, not, as is commonly done, as the agreement of our ideas with things, but as the perception of the agreement or repugnance of our ideas with one another. His theory thus shut him up into his own mind, and allowed him no outlet logically. He would have been entitled to assume that the mind perceives things, but he had no proof that the ideas were representative of things.

On one very important point (this has seldom been noticed) Locke was a realist avowedly and truly. He held that the mind did not perceive things, but ideas; but that, having ideas which are representations of things, we can compare them; and when we do so immediately this is intuition. He should have brought in intuition at an earlier stage, and given the mind a direct intuition of things external and internal (he should have given to sensation and reflection an intuition of things). But I rejoice to find him bringing in intuition, even at this late stage. It gives him demonstration in which all the steps are seen to be true intuitively. On the supposition that ideas represent things, he is entitled to maintain that the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of things through ideas.

It is to be lamented that Locke, bent on carrying out his theory that the mind has only two inlets of knowledge, sensation and reflection, does not allow it a power of moral perception—it was left to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson to supply this. According to him, the idea of moral good and evil is given by sensation, with God called in to reward the good and punish the evil.

Berkeley is the representative idealist of the English philosophy. He carried out the idealism of Locke to its logical consequences. If the mind can never perceive anything but ideas, there is no evidence of there being

anything else; and if there were, it could never be known, and could serve no purpose. There is a sense in which Berkeley is a realist, and a determined realist: he believes in the reality of ideas created and sustained by the Divine Being, and in this way (not very wisely, I think) he opposed materialism and irreligion. Ideas serve the same end in philosophy as things do in the vulgar belief, and there is no need of calling in atoms and molecules and extensions, with their materialistic tendencies and their contradictions. Berkeley's philosophy is made attractive by his representing sensible things as a system of signs of divine truths. This may be as true as it is beautiful, but it can become so only by holding that sensible things are real.

Leibnitz. Looking to his mathematics as well as his metaphysics, Leibnitz has always appeared to me to be the greatest genius among the German philosophers. He has this great merit, that he thinks and writes clearly. The defect of many of his speculations, particularly his monadical theory, is that they cannot be proved nor disproved. He has one reality in monads, which have an essential existence and inherent power, but do not act on each other.

Shaftesbury corrected Locke's narrow views of the inlets of knowledge by calling in, besides the two upheld by Locke, namely, sensation and reflection, a sense of beauty, a sense of honor, etc., and especially a moral sense which perceived moral good.

Butler, in his treatise on Identity, stands up for the existence and identity of the soul, and in his Sermons for a conscience which looks at the good, and has authority over all the other powers of the mind.

Hutcheson is the founder of the Scottish school. He adheres to the ideal theory of sense-perception; otherwise he is a realist. He believes in a moral sense, a sense of

beauty, and other senses, much the same as Shaftesbury. His moral system is defective in that it makes virtue consist in benevolence, overlooking law and justice.

Hume wished it to be understood that as a man he believed and acted very much as other people do. But as a philosophic thinker he took up the positions held by the reputed philosophers of his day, especially Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley, and inquired what was their foundation, and the conclusions to which they logically led; and in doing so, found that there were left no real things, but only impressions, without a thing impressed or a thing to impress, and ideas, which are fainter impressions. Ever since, philosophy has been laboring to build up the breach which has been made by the assaults of the great sceptic. Starting with impressions and their fainter reproductions, he could never reach things. Under memory he could get only an identity imposed by the mind. Belief is only an impression of a lively kind, accompanying an idea. He gives mind a capacity of discovering a number of relations. Four of these, resemblance, contrariety, degree, proportion, do not seem to carry us beyond the present impression. Three others, identity, space and time, cause and effect, seem to do so, but do not. He labors to show as to cause and effect that there is nothing in it but invariable antecedence and consequence. The belief in it is the effect of habit and the association of ideas.

In moral good there is only a tendency to promote happiness. There is no valid evidence of any interference with the orderly succession of nature by miracles, which are violations of the laws of nature. The aim of Hume in all this is to undermine the evidence which we have for the existence of things. He is to be met successfully only by a thorough-going Realism, showing that we are justified in assuming the existence of things.

Reid was the first worthy opponent of Hume. He was distinguished by good sense and patient observation. He was a realist in practical belief, and meant to be so in philosophy. He succeeded partially. Hume may be met at two points, as he enters and as he proceeds. Reid met him at both. He saw the danger of allowing the Trojan horse to enter the city. He shows that in perception by the senses we come to know the primary qualities of bodies. I am not sure that his account of the perceptive act is thoroughly correct. He brings in, first, sensation, and then perception; the sensation suggesting (an unfortunate phrase, taken from Locke and Berkeley) the perception. He argues resolutely that the process is instinctive, and is perceived by reason in the first degree, or common sense. But there does not seem to be any proof that the sensation comes before the perception, or that the former suggests the latter; they seem to come together. The doctrine of natural Realism is that the mind comes to know at once the extended object beyond the body or within the body—how far in we may not be able to determine. Reid does not dwell at such length as we might expect on self-consciousness and the knowledge of self imparted by it; but he represents it as revealing to us mind, with its qualities. He meets Hume at all his farther stages. There is memory, which brings up past events as real. Reason has two degrees: reason in the first degree, which is common sense; which looks on truth at once, on contingent truth and on necessary truth, such as causation, which reveals power in cause; reason in the second degree, or reasoning, reaches farther truth by inference. He stands up for a moral power which discerns moral good. All these are realities; we know them by cognitive powers.

Kant is the second great opponent of Hume that ap-

peared. He is not so careful an observer as Reid, but he is a more powerful logician. His philosophy certainly does not start with Realism. He makes the mind begin with phenomena in the sense of appearances, and not with things. In this respect he yielded too much to his opponent, starting, in fact, with the sceptical conclusion which Hume reached. He tried therefrom to reach realities, and believed in the reality of things, but it is generally acknowledged that he utterly failed to do so. No one can legitimately argue real things from phenomena any more than he can from impressions and ideas. Secondly, he supposes that the mind, out of its own stores, superadds forms to the phenomena which it knows: such as space and time to sense; categories such as that of cause and effect, twelve in all, to the understanding; and ideas such as those of substance, conditions, and God to the ideas of the pure reason, the last of these being entirely subjective. In all this he was an idealist, and prepared the way for Fichte, the absolute idealist.

Kant is thus at one and the same time an agnostic and idealist, and is claimed so far legitimately by the supporters of both systems. He is an agnostic in that he does not allow that the mind perceives things. He is an idealist inasmuch as he is ever clothing phenomena with a subjective covering. Ever since his day, philosophy has been swinging between transcendentalism and agnosticism; between the transcendentalism of Hegel and the agnosticism which has culminated in Herbert Spencer.

To counteract the unbelief of the speculative reason, Kant called in the moral or practical reason, whose law was the categorical imperative which necessitates a belief in responsibility, in a judgment-day, and in God—all of which, as I understand, are regarded by Kant as realities. But it has been seen that, after having made so many con-

cessions to Hume at the starting, he is not in a favorable position when he would meet Hume by establishing higher truths. He is right in giving a cognitive power to the moral reason, but he should have given a like power to the understanding, and this would have made his system stable and consistent.

Dugald Stewart was the most eminent disciple of Reid, and a judicious defender of the Scottish school. His philosophy reads as if it were thoroughly realistic, yet it is scarcely so. His doctrine is that we do not know things, but the qualities of things. But can we, from mere qualities, argue the existence of things? The proper statement is that we know the thing, with its qualities. We do not know extension apart from body; we know body as extended. Stewart stood up for the reality of moral qualities and man's perception of them.

Thomas Brown sought to unite the French school of his day with the Scottish, in which he had been trained. He was a realist, in that he believed in an external world. But he got it by inference, and thus belongs to what I call the Inferential School. There are first sensations in the mind, but these are not produced by anything in the mind. However, they must have a cause, and this cause must be external, that is, Matter. I am not sure of the validity of this argument. It can be used only by those who, with Brown, hold by an intuitive conviction as to causation. Without this it would be difficult for the infant mind to argue from these sensations, springing up apparently so capriciously, that they had a cause. But there is a stronger argument against a knowledge of Matter being obtained from a sensation. We always apprehend body as extended, but we can never, from a sensation which is not extended, argue the existence of body, which is extended. He held that the virtues were a class of emo-

tions, and thus set aside that perception which we have of good and evil.

Coleridge studied the German philosophy of his day, but did not very clearly understand it. He sought to introduce the distinction between the understanding and the reason, but it cannot be carried out consecutively. There is an intuitive reason, but it is found in the senses and the understanding, discovering realities and relations among them. His grand views of reason had an elevating influence in Great Britain and in America, as opposed to sensationalism.

Sir William Hamilton, as became a knight, was a powerful champion of what he believed to be truth. He is professedly the most determined of all realists. He has defended the doctrine more clearly than any other. He shows that consciousness testifies in behalf of the immediate knowledge both of mind and body. But unfortunately, as I think, he sought to unite the German philosophy of his day with the Scottish, and was unable to make the two amalgamate. The two philosophies have much in common; both hold by native and necessary truth; but the former reaches it by criticism, the latter by a careful observation of what passes in the mind.

Hamilton maintained resolutely that the mind perceives Matter directly, but that this knowledge is only relative. He maintains that we are not to suppose that we know things as they are; we add elements of our own to them. "Suppose that the total object of consciousness in perception =12, and suppose that the external reality contributes 6, the material sense 3, and the mind 3; this may enable you to form some rude conjecture of the nature of perception." Instead of being the great realist, as he promised to be, he has become the great relativist, and has supplied the nescient doctrine from which Herbert

Spencer starts. That doctrine must be set aside if Spencer is to be answered. Following Hobbes and Locke, he has made our idea of infinity negative. There is surely something more, whether we are able to express it or not, in our belief in infinity. He is constantly calling in faith to save us from the nescience of the understanding, but has nowhere explained what is the nature and province of faith. He does not treat specially of morals, but he regards the moral argument as the impregnable one for the existence of God.

John S. Mill was led by his father, James Mill, to adopt many of the principles of Hume, and, in consequence, could never reach reality. His philosophy, in its ultimate issues, is scarcely an advance on Hume. His definition of Matter is "the permanent possibility of sensations;" of Mind, "a series of feelings aware of itself." The one of these sets aside the testimony of the senses, the other of the consciousness and memory, all of which reveal realities. The fame of Mr. Mill as a philosopher must rest not on his metaphysics, in which he only carries out Hume's principles, but on his logic of induction, in which he has given a completeness to the logic of Bacon.

The A PRIORI PHILOSOPHY OF GERMANY. We have seen that Kant introduced a powerful ideal element into philosophy in his forms of sense, understanding, and reason, under which the mind views all phenomena. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel seized one after the other on this element, and have constructed huge systems by keen dialectic processes. They were men of powerful speculative ability, acquainted with all the forms of logic, and have reared imposing structures with a symmetry which we are constrained to admire. They have elements of truth in their theories (every imagination is formed of actualities),

but the whole is as fictitious as the clouds of the sky, often so massive and apparently solid.

Fichte is the representative idealist of modern times. He had for a time been a pupil of Kant, who in the end disowned him, because he carried out the principles of his master to consequences which the master did not contemplate. Kant made space and time, our deeper judgments and higher ideas, subjective, vainly arguing all the while that there were things. Fichte made the things subjective as well as the forms in which they are clothed; all are projections of the mind, which posits them according to laws of development which he can unfold out of his own mind or brain. If the mind can create time and space, as Kant holds, why not all else, including God? He had an ego and a self-consciousness, which he made universal. This ego posits the non-ego, and is the absolute reality. There is nothing corresponding to this in my consciousness nor in any other body's. He guaranteed it by a kind of faith which is not explained. Speculation could not remain at the place where Fichte left it.

Schelling sought to supply an evident defect in the philosophy of Fichte. Fichte made all subjective. Schelling placed the objective alongside of it. He had an ego, and also a non-ego, but he made both subjective and the two identical. Hence his philosophy is called that of identity. All this is supposed to be perceived and guaranteed by an intellectual intuition to which there is nothing corresponding in human consciousness. It has been subjected to a terrible criticism by Hamilton. To me there is an essential difference between things, say between pleasure and pain, moral good and evil.

Hegel. I am not competent to enter into a wrestling match with this gigantic dialectician. When I have ven-

tured on rare occasions to criticise him, I have been told that I do not understand him, and probably this is true. There is a story told of his saying, "Only one man understands me, and he does not." It is not proven that Hegel ever actually said this, but he might have said it, and the story has been invented by one who knew what Hegel's philosophy was. On several occasions I have made an earnest endeavor to understand him. I am certainly not the individual who understands him, and yet I so far understand him. I understand that his method is not the inductive, which observes what takes place in the mind. It proceeds upon the idealistic element in Kant's philosophy, as carried out by Fichte and Schelling, but subjects it to a process which is declared to be rational and logical. But my reason is not prepared to sanction the processes which he elaborates. His logic is certainly not that of Aristotle, who gives us, I believe, a correct analysis of the discursive processes of the mind. He and his followers have drawn out innumerable triplet divisions on all subjects—which they identify with the Scripture doctrine of the Trinity—by seizing on a quality, putting in one class all objects that have it, in another class all which do not have it, and in a third class what is indifferent; all this without inquiring whether there are such divisions in nature. He finds perpetual contradictions where I can find none, but simply, it may be, mysteries; but where there are real contradictions I am sure that they cannot both be true, as Hegel maintains; the truth of the one implies the falsehood of the other. As seeking to embrace all in his comprehensive system, he holds that it is realistic as well as idealistic, and claims to have reached a Realism not found in Kant. But his Realism does not consist in bodies or in self, as perceived by the senses external and internal, but simply in the dia-

lectic process constructed by his own powerful understanding.

Herbert Spencer is possessed of a comprehensive speculative intellect, like Hegel, the difference being that the one deals with the development of nature, the other with the development of thought. The one is the representative of the agnostics, as the other is of the idealists, of our day. According to Spencer, we do not know the nature or reality of the things within or around us. But by a necessity of thought we are constrained to believe in the reality of a thing beyond the sensible world, which thing is unknown and unknowable. But surely I know that I exist, and so much of my nature and of the things around me. I am not sure of the validity of the argument by which he proves that there is this unknown thing. I do not feel as if I had an intuition to this effect. I believe that I have an intuition or intuitions which carry me beyond sensible things, but Mr. Spencer has not interpreted them rightly. I am sure that from these existing things which I know, the self and the related objects, I can legitimately argue other things as their causes, and in particular that there must be a Cause of the order and purpose I discover in the universe, and that this Cause is known so far from its effects to be intelligent and benevolent—all of which are real.

It turns out that this unknown and unknowable reality is so far known by Mr. Spencer. He knows it as a force, a power, or cause, and as without limit. "The belief in a power of which no limit in time or space can be conceived is that fundamental element in religion which survives all changes of form." All this seems to me to point clearly and explicitly to a God, unknown in his total being, but so far known and having a relation to us. But the Real known to Mr. Spencer is very scanty. It is, first, the unknown

thing necessitated by thought, and, secondly, the development of the things which he represents as unknown, but which I regard as known.

Lotze, in his metaphysics, is so far a reaction against the Idealism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. I am happy to find that his search is the old Greek one for the Real. I am not sure that he always finds it and expresses it correctly. He seems to me sometimes to add to it, and it becomes ideal; at other times to take from it, when it becomes so far sceptical. He is liable to the same charge as I have brought against the Eleatics; he says too much about such simple objects as Existence, Being, and Real.

All that philosophy can do is to discover and express what intuition reveals as to things. When it goes beyond this it is apt to make assertions which have no meaning, or which cannot be proven, or, we may add, disproven, or which cannot be proven except by induction.

He makes space and time subjective, with no objective existence, on somewhat different grounds from Kant, but leading to the same issues. He certainly proves that we are not obliged to give them an independent existence, but surely they have some kind of existence, according to our intuitive perception.

He believes in body and in soul. He acknowledges the reality of force, and has important remarks as to its nature, but raises questions which can be settled only by induction. He believes in self-judging conscience. It is an encouraging circumstance to find the German philosophy seeking the Real, instead of constructing ideal systems.

I am deeply sensible of the imperfections of this account of the various philosophies. Enough has been advanced to show that there is an avowed or latent Realism running through nearly all of them. But in the majority of cases

it is in a raw and undigested form, with excrescences on the one hand and deficiencies on the other. What is needed is to cut off the one and supply the other. When this is done we shall have a discriminate Realism.

In order to do this certain distinctions have to be drawn. I have stated them elsewhere,[1] but they need to be kept steadily before the view in all philosophic inquiry. There is the distinction between our sensations, which are organic feelings, and our perceptions, which are cognitions. We should stand up for the knowledge given in perception, but are not bound to hold to the objective reality of the feelings. Special importance should be attached to the distinction between our original and acquired perceptions. The former are trustworthy, having the sanction of our constitution and the God who gave it to us; but our inferences from these and our added associations may be erroneous and misleading. Thirdly, there is the well-known distinction (often improperly stated) between the primary and secondary qualities of Matter. We know Matter as extended directly; we know heat, which is molecular motion, merely as the cause of the sensations in our nerves. For our present purpose there is a more important distinction. It is that between the realities given by sense and those discerned by a higher power, such as moral qualities. Both are real, but they are different things. Drawing such distinctions, we are able to cast aside mere appearances and irrelevances, and keep firm hold of a Realism or knowledge of things which may be implicitly trusted.

I do not expect that this, our method of philosophy, will meet with an immediate approval. On the one hand, it will be opposed (when it is not ignored) by the prevailing

[1] Psychology, the Cognitive Powers, pp. 27–30.

ideal schools of Germany, which have ramified from Kant. On the other hand, it will be resisted by all who have come within the grasp of Herbert Spencer.[1]

American and, I may add, British students, who have a taste for metaphysical speculation, after taking a degree in their own country, commonly go for a year or two to a German university. The philosophy which they had been taught at home had more or less in it of the Realism of the British schools. In Germany they are involved, without introduction, in the forms and distinctions of Kant and then in the dialectics of Hegel, all with an idealistic tendency, and they soon find themselves in a labyrinth without a clew to guide them out. Some of them remain for a time in Germany, caught in the toils of the profound systems, and then return to their own country to expound them in formidable language to students who wonder and admire, but are not sure whether the tenets taught are as true as they are sublime. Others return sooner, with an incongruous mixture of Realism and Idealism, which, though they do not see it, will not amalgamate, and it is ludicrous to observe in their writings and lectures one paragraph British and American, marked by good sense, and the next Kantian criticism, and the third Hegelian dialectic, without their discovering the inconsistency. It is clear to me that such modes of philosophy will not lead and guide so shrewd and practical a people as the Americans.

But it is asked, Are we unmercifully to cut off every form of Idealism? It is urged that we may commit the

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[1] A friend told us impiously that we are certain to be crucified between two malefactors, to which our reply was, that the two extremes would die and never be heard of again, while the power between would rise again with greater influence.

same mistakes in philosophy as a modern realistic school in art does when it exhibits objects so bare and haggard—skull and bones, wounds and sores—as to make them unattractive, at times horrid. Some feel that if we proceed in this way we are abnegating all that is interesting in speculation. Upon this I have to remark that under Realism the speculative intellect is allowed to discuss all manner of subjects, but its first and its final aim should be out of these to construct a philosophy. When it has done so, it may wander as widely as its feet can carry it, and mount as high as the air will bear it up; but let it know and acknowledge, all the while, the difference between air and earth, and ever be prepared to settle on *terra firma*. It will be proper to continue the discussion as to the atomic and monadic theories, as to a priori and a posteriori ideas, the relative and the absolute, and a hundred other topics, but it has now a test by which to try all hypotheses—Do they agree with facts? The vessel may sail over a wide ocean, but it should always start from land and seek land; go out from a harbor and keep it in view to reach a haven.

Realism may be defended on several grounds, not independent of each other, but conspiring to one end.

1. It is what we spontaneously accept. We are sure we know realities; we seek for them, we cling to them, we follow them, we are not satisfied with anything less, or, indeed, with anything else. Without this we feel that there is something wanting; with this we feel satisfied so far as the object is concerned.

2. Everything falls in with it and confirms it. We start with it as a natural assumption, but we find it corroborated by all that is occurring. We remember a hill of a marked shape on which our eye rested in our childhood, and we are sure that there was such a hill; after being years away, we go back to the same place and find the same

hill. This may be taken as an example of the corroborations which the realist is ever meeting with.

3. Realism as an hypothesis explains every phenomenon more satisfactorily than any other system. This is a mode of testing the truth of a theory often resorted to in the present day. In the first instance, we accept the opinion advanced simply as an hypothesis, and then inquire if it can explain the facts. I believe that Realism, as a theory, can explain the facts more satisfactorily than Scepticism or Idealism. Scepticism, total or partial, will ever be confronted with facts which it cannot but believe. Idealism will ever feel itself floating insecurely in the air, as long as it has not a pillar in facts to which to attach itself. The foundation of Realism is fact, facts are its superstructure, and its copestone is a fact, and thus it stands firm while other systems totter and fall. There may be problems which it cannot solve, mysteries which it cannot clear up; it will leave them in that state for the present, and wait patiently till they are elucidated, which must always be done by other facts.

In this final philosophy all that is established in the previous philosophies will be embraced. But this will not be in the usual eclectic way, by a mere agglomeration of systems. It is not the crude Realism of the first thinkers. It has attended to Bacon's counsel and made "the necessary rejections and exclusions." It believes that there is gold, but not that all that glitters is gold. It finds the true gold by casting out the dross. This test is the magnet which, leaving out everything else, will attract and collect the true metal. The product will be consistent because of the consistency of truth.

The philosophy expounded in this article is Eclectic, but merely in that it accepts the reality from all systems. It is Greek, in that it seeks after things in their true nature.

It is Scottish, in that it proceeds by induction and by it discovers fundamental truth. It is German, in that it stands up for à priori truth, but does not seek it, like Kant or Hegel, by the critical or dialectic method. It is French, in that it is a judicious reduction of other systems. Sooner or later—the sooner the better—we must fall back upon, or, rather, advance forward to, this method. I confess that I wish that America, which has no special philosophy, should favor and fashion it, and make it its own. It is altogether in the way of what it has done in a scattered manner in the past, and should now do in a systematic method.

LOCKE'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, WITH A NOTICE OF BERKELEY

INTRODUCTION.

DIVERS ASPECTS OF FIRST PRINCIPLES.

THE aim of this Part of the Philosophic Series is to treat historically the chief topics which have been discussed dialectically in the previous Numbers. The special doctrine to be thus illustrated is that of first principles. The discussion on this subject began with Locke's denial of Innate Ideas in the First Book of his Essay on Human Understanding, published in 1690, and has been continued ever since, particularly by such original writers as Hume, Kant, and Herbert Spencer. Our work would be incomplete without a historical and critical review of these leaders of thought. All of them have exposed prevailing errors, and all of them have caught glimpses of important truth; I have to add that all of them have promulgated serious error. Can we by any magnetic process draw out the pure metal and allow the dross to sink?

Our notices will be critical as well as historical. But in criticism there are always principles involved, and these ought always to be formally stated, that all may perceive the ground proceeded on, and be able to sit in judgment on the critic. This I propose to do in this Introductory Section.

Believing as I do in first truths, I am convinced that

there has been confusion in the account given of them, and consequent errors in the conclusions drawn. Much clearness may be imparted by attending to certain distinctions which I would thus illustrate. If we are considering the subject of gravitation, we may look first at it in its actual operations as seen by the senses, say, in a body falling to the ground; secondly, as a deep law in the very nature of bodies; and thirdly, the expression of that law by Newton. We may in like manner, in inquiring into a fundamental law of the human mind, regard first its actual operations falling under the eye of consciousness, say, when on noticing an effect we look for a cause; secondly, the law in the mind which is followed; and thirdly, the axiomatic form taken by that law, that everything which begins to be has a cause. The errors committed by the defenders of primary principles have almost all arisen from overlooking this threefold distinction. There is a fourth principle which needs to be brought into prominence in the present day, when it is so much overlooked, namely, that all intuitions look at things, and that this should be expressed in the form which the generalized law takes.

I. Our intuitions appear as PERCEPTIONS. We perceive self in a certain state. We perceive external objects as affecting us and resisting our energy. We perceive relations between things as that this quality implies a substance—say, this weight implies a heavy body; that this effect, say a house on fire, implies a cause; and that this thing A, being equal to B, which is equal to a third thing, C, is also equal to C. We have also moral perceptions, as that this deceitful act is wrong and deserves punishment. Under this aspect our primary truths are before the eye of consciousness. Locke is right, so far as these are concerned, in denying that they are innate; they

come forth only when the mind begins to act. Primitively they are all singular. There is a subsequent process involved in drawing the general law out of them.

II. Underneath these perceptions are REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES. These are not before the consciousness any more than the law of gravitation is before the senses. The bodily eye sees an apple fall to the ground, but does not see the law of universal gravitation which all the while is acting. Just as little does the internal eye see directly the fundamental laws of thought or belief. They are in the mind and deeply seated there, just as the power of gravitation is seated in matter. They constrain us to believe in our personal identity; that it is impossible for the boy to eat his apple and yet have his apple preserved to him; that every occurrence has a cause, and that hypocrisy is to be condemned. These principles may be said to be innate (and Locke is wrong when he denies this), for they are in the mind when it begins to act. They are in our very nature and constitution, and are often so appealed to by Bishop Butler and the Scottish School of Metaphysicians. On the supposition that there is a God who made us and gave us our endowments, they have the sanction of God and can plead his authority in behalf of their decisions. They are in our nature and founded on the Divine nature.

III. They may be generalized into PRIMITIVE LAWS OR AXIOMS. They are thus formed by a discursive process out of the primitive perceptions, just as the law of gravitation is formed by generalizing its individual operations. We perceive that we are the same person to-day that we were yesterday, and that we are the same to-day as we were a week ago, or a year ago, and thus reach the law, that we always carry with us an identity. We perceive that this effect has a cause, and that we would declare of

every other effect that it has a cause, and thus lay down the rule that every effect has a cause.

Our primitive perceptions are varied and are innumerable. We have such perceptions every hour, I might almost say every minute, of our waking existence. We seem continually to have a consciousness of self and of body as affecting self, say, of the ground we stand on, of the chair we sit on, of the air we breathe. But as to the great body of them we are not at the trouble to form them into general laws. As being generated by regulative principles without our noticing them, we act according to them without being at the trouble to form them into laws; indeed, we do not so construct them except for certain purposes, only, in fact, for scientific, but especially for metaphysical ends. While constantly employed, they are not usually before the mind as laws, any more than the law of gravity is before the mind when we drop a hot body from our hand expecting that it will fall.

It is in the formation of these laws that error may come in. There is no error in our primitive regulating principles; they have the sanction of our constitution and of God. There will be no error even in our primitive perceptions so far as they are primitive, and unless we mix up prejudices with them. But there may be mistakes in the generalized axioms that we construct. There are apt to be mistakes because of the complication of the phenomena of the mind, and because we mix up derivative truths and reasonings of our own with the primary truths. It is from this cause that there are so many disputes in metaphysics, and whenever there are disputes there must be error, at least on one of the sides, perhaps in both. We make hasty generalizations, and then claim for them the authority of reason and of God. People say in their haste that every thing has a cause, and are led to draw back

only when they discover that this would compel them to hold that God has a cause; when, discovering that they have committed a mistake, they put the maxim in a more correct form, that every thing which begins to be has a cause. It is only by a very careful observation, along with what Bacon calls "the necessary rejections and exclusions," that we are able from the singular and concrete operations to enunciate precisely the general law which is the expression of the regulative principle. But it is possible, by exceedingly careful inspection, to get the general from the singular, and to express it accurately, and when we do so we have a genuine metaphysical philosophy.

I believe that by far the greater part of the confusion and error on the subject of primary or fundamental truth arises from overlooking these distinctions. Those defending them make assertions, regarding them under one, which hold true of them only under another aspect. Those attacking them succeed in making a plausible statement only by exposing them under one of these sides. Descartes, in standing so resolutely by them, contemplates them mainly as faculties or powers lying deeply in the mind, in short, as regulative principles. "Lorsque je dis que quelque idée est née avec nous, ou qu'elle est naturellement empreinte en nos âmes, je n'entends pas qu'elle se présente toujours à notre pensée, car ainsi il n'y en aurait aucune; mais j'entends seulement que nous avons en nous-mêmes la faculté de la produire." (*Trois objec.*, Rep. Obj. 10.) Locke, in opposing them as ideas or perceptions in consciousness, succeeded in showing that these are not innate. Kant, in calling them *a priori* principles, views them as regulative principles in the mind. Those who oppose him show that the conscious perceptions are not *a priori* in the mind. In these historical papers I hope to show, as to the authors criticised, what were the aspects they looked

at, and what those overlooked. In this way I hope on the one hand, to introduce clearness into a subject which has become so confused, and on the other hand, to give such an account of the constituent principles of the mind, as to remove the prejudices which have been entertained against them, and recommend them to candid minds.

Under the First of these Aspects they have been called Primitive Perceptions, Intuitions, Instincts, and Cognitions.

Under the Second Aspect they have been described as "native laws," "fundamental laws of thought," "forms." Plato (Rep., vii., 51) called it *νοητὸς τόπος*. Aristotle (De Anim., iii., 4), adopts the view but modifies it, saying it is right, provided it be limited to the noetic power and the forms be represented as not in readiness for action, but in capacity, not *ἐντελεχεια*, but *δυνάμει*.

Under the Third Aspect they have been called *κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, πρῶται ἔννοιαι, πρῶτα νοήματα*, naturæ judicia, *à priori* notions, definitions, maxims, axioms.[1]

IV. Our intuitions or primitive perceptions LOOK AT THINGS. This is a point to be especially emphasized in the present day. It has been overlooked because of the almost universal prevalence of an erroneous metaphysical principle. It has been taken for granted commonly, without being positively asserted, that the mind can be cognizant, at least directly, only of itself. Locke, as we shall see, made it percipient only of its ideas, though he was apt to identify his ideas with things. Hume made all human knowledge consist of impressions and ideas without a mind to perceive or an object to be perceived. Kant, in answering Hume, started with assuming only presentations which he called phenomena, and labored from these to get real things, but without succeeding—as I believe

[1] See *Intuitions of the Mind*, P. I., b. ii., s. 2.

every one now acknowledges. The time has come for formally abandoning this philosophic heresy. We should assume that the mind knows things; not appearances, but things appearing. Appearances necessarily presuppose things appearing—even an image in a mirror implies a reflecting surface and rays reflected. In the very first exercise of our faculties we look at things: at the things perceived and the self perceiving them. It is a fact that we regard the colored surface before us, and the resisting energy in it, as realities. If we deny this we are virtually declaring that we cannot trust our cognitive powers, or rather that we have no cognitive powers, and we may give up, as Hume recommends, all philosophic inquiry and attend merely to our instinctive and acquired cravings, as we have no means of reaching positive truth.

It is a favorite mode of procedure in the present day to assume an hypothesis and then prove it to be true by showing that it accounts for every thing and puts it in the right place. The hypothesis that we know realities can stand this test; assume it, and we can go on consistently and find corroborations every hour, nay, every minute. But it is preposterous to make reality perceived a mere hypothesis; we know it quite as certainly as the hypothesis we put forward to explain it, or the supposed verifications. It is pleasant to have these, but they do not prove the known fact.

We are to assume that we know self and not self. Proceeding upon these we have other primitive perceptions. On comparing the present self with the past self at any given time, we know that we are the same. We know of this not-self that it exists independent of our cognition of it and exercises energy. As to many of our primitive perceptions, the object is not immediately before us. This is at once seen to be the case with the two perceptions last

named. Thus, when I perceive that I am the same person to-day that I was yesterday, the self of yesterday is not before the consciousness. But it being brought before us by the memory we contemplate it, and then pronounce the judgment, which proceeds on the remembered fact. When we discover an effect, a thing effected, we decide that it must have had a thing causing it. This is the case with all our primitive perceptions of relations: we perceive them as in the things related.

In our moral perceptions the objects are not before us in the same sense as the self and not self are. But these perceptions all refer to things contemplated. It is upon an act of cruelty, believed to be a fact, that we pronounce the judgment that it is bad. It is in regard to a deed of self-sacrifice and benevolence that we declare it to be good. The act may not be before our senses, it may be far distant, or it may be long past, or it may be in the future, but it is upon the act supposed to have happened or to be about to happen, that the judgment is formed.

It is because this is the nature of our primitive perceptions that the first test of them is self-evidence. Since the days of Leibnitz, and especially since the time of Kant, the first and essential criterion of primitive truth has been commonly regarded as necessity, a necessity in our nature which leads us to know or decide in a particular manner that a quality implies a substance, that charity is good. But the proper statement is, not that an object is real and a proposition true because we are obliged to believe it, but we are obliged to believe it because we perceive the thing existing and the quality as being in the thing. The true mental process is that we look at the thing and perceive the quality in the thing; and we appreciate the benevolent action as in its very nature good.

SECTION I.

A BRIEF SKETCH OF LOCKE'S LIFE.[1]

John Locke was born at Wrington, in the pleasant fields of Somersetshire, August 29, 1632. His father was a lawyer possessed of moderate landed property, and took part in the great parliamentary and non-conformist upheaval. He exacted great respect from his son when a child, but when he grew up allowed him greater familiarity, a practice which the philosopher recommends. He got a place on the foundation of the famous Westminster school, and was there trained in the ordinary classical studies of the period. In 1651 he entered Christ Church, Oxford (in the grounds of which they still show the mulberry-tree which he planted), and there he was a diligent student and devoted himself specially to the branches requiring thought. He was reared amid the din of civil war. At school he must have heard the echoes raised by the execution of Charles I., and in college he was in the heart of the Royalist and Puritan contests. Like Bacon, two ages earlier at Cambridge, he did not derive much satisfaction from the studies pursued at college, and longed for new topics and a fresher mode of investigation. He did not follow any profession but he was particularly addicted to the study of medicine, in which Sydenham, the eminent physician of his day, declares that he acquired great

[1] See The Life of John Locke, by Lord King, 2 vols.; The Life of John Locke, by H. R. Fox Bourne, 2 vols.; Locke, by Thomas Fowler—the last giving a good sketch of his Life, but a meagre account of his philosophy.

knowledge and skill. He gave himself by turns to politics and philosophy, living mainly in Oxford and pursuing independent studies there. In 1664, during the Dutch war, he accompanied the king's envoy to the Elector of Brandenburg, and has left a graphic picture of his journey. In 1666, being called in to give medical advice, he became acquainted with Lord Ashley, afterward Lord Shaftesbury, and from that time became the medical adviser, counsellor, and friend of that tortuous statesman. Henceforth his life is partly in Oxford and partly with Shaftesbury, who appointed him to various offices. Though very prudent he became an object of suspicion to the Royal party, and Sunderland, by the king's command, ordered his expulsion. He was not expelled but deprived of his studentship by the dean and chapter of the college. He retreated from this strife to Holland, where he read and wrote and had close intercourse with a number of eminent men who met in each other's houses for discussion; with Le Clerc, Guenilon, the physician, with Limborch, and with the Remonstrant or Armenian party, to whom he attached himself rather than to the Calvinists. The Revolution of 1688 enabled him to return with Queen Mary to his own country, bringing with him the work which he had been pondering for years, the *Essay on Human Understanding*. Now in the maturity of his powers his literary activity was very great. He carried on an extensive correspondence, afterward published, on philosophic subjects with his admirer, William Molyneux, of Dublin, who introduced his essay into Dublin University, where it held sway down to the second quarter of this century, when it gave way before Kant. He carried on a keen controversy with Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester, who objected to his negative account of substance as undermining the doctrine of the Trinity. He wrote three letters on *Toleration*, on

which his views, perhaps derived in part from John Owen, who was the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford when Locke was there, were very liberal for his day, though much behind those now entertained; he would give no toleration to atheists or papists. In a constitution which he drew out for North Carolina he allowed hereditary slavery to exist. He wrote valuable papers on *Currency* and *Coin*. In 1695 he published *Essay on the Reasonableness of Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures*. He wrote a *Commentary* consisting of paraphrases and notes on the Epistles to the *Galatians*, *Corinthians*, *Romans*, and *Ephesians*, together with *An Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul's Epistles by consulting St. Paul himself*. All these are written in a reverent spirit, such as he always cherished toward God and Scripture, but are decidedly rationalistic.

His health had never been good, and latterly became worse. From 1691 he resided with Sir Francis and Lady Masham, the latter a daughter of Ralph Cudworth, the erudite defender of the older philosophy which Locke was now undermining. On October 27, 1704, he told Lady Masham that he never expected to rise again from bed. He thanked God he had passed a happy life, but now that he found all was vanity, and exhorted her to consider this world as a preparation for a better state hereafter. Next day he heard Lady Masham read the Psalms, apparently with great attention, until perceiving his end to draw near he stopped her and expired a few minutes after, in his seventy-third year.

We see what were the circumstances in which he was brought up. He lived when the Commons were limiting the authority of the crown; when the Puritans were seeking to tear away every "rag of popery"; when the non-Conformists were rebelling against church authority, and the Armin-

ians were softening the asperities of Calvinism. When he began to think for himself the ancient logic was still holding its place in the universities and the philosophy was largely analytic and deductive and couched in scholastic phrases. But a spirit was abroad fitted to break all this up as the returning sun does the ice in spring. The stars in the sky that presided over his birth were Bacon, Descartes, Herbert of Cherbury, Hobbes, and Gassendi. All these had declared more or less distinctly against Aristotle, who had ruled for so many centuries, and were introducing new methods of inquiry. Already Harvey, Boyle, and Newton were successfully prosecuting the observational method, and showing how rich mines of wealth it had opened. He was acquainted with the writings of all these men; it is rather a curious circumstance that he seldom quotes them, but of all things he is resolute in preserving his independence and following a course of his own.

His characteristics among metaphysicians were his sagacity and independence, tempered with good sense. He was determined to look beyond appearances into the realities of things. Trained in an ancient university, but at a time when the old was passing away, educated for the bustling profession of medicine, mingling constantly with statesmen, with a social disposition and many attached friends, both in England and Holland, he had a large practical acquaintance with human nature and with mankind. He is bent above all things to have *determinate* (to use a phrase which he is anxious to introduce into philosophy) opinions of his own. It has to be added that having formed, by long observation and thought, a theory on a subject, he was apt to carry it too far and not notice the other truths by which it was limited. His was one of those greater minds which, unlike those which dwell only on differences, are disposed, as Bacon describes it, to fix

their attention exclusively on resemblances to the neglect of exceptions and so form hasty generalizations.

If you look at Locke's portrait you have a good idea of his character. What strikes one at first is the prominence of the bones; brow, nose, cheek, and chin are all marked and decided. Our attention is at once fixed on these, and we do not notice the flesh or softer parts. It is a type of his mind with a strong and bony intellect, but without the finer emotions being visible, though they certainly existed like waters down in the fountain. His expression indicates thought, observation, profound sense, modesty, firmness, decision, and great independence of character. From the very look of him you would see that he is a man who thinks and acts for himself, who sets a high aim before him, whose honesty cannot be tampered with, and who cannot be either drawn or driven from his purpose.

You notice perhaps some irritability, and he tells us he was somewhat hasty in temper, but you perceive that it has been subdued by a stern judgment. In his little work on *The Conduct of the Understanding* he lays down some admirable rules for the guidance of the intellectual powers, but would lay too severe a restraint upon the affections —which are to be cherished and not eradicated. He was possessed of deep and genuine feeling, but it would have improved his philosophy had he given it as prominent a place as he did to the understanding. By looking more carefully at man's emotional and moral nature he might have been led to see that there are ideas of beauty and moral good which cannot be had from the only two inlets into the mind allowed by him, sensation and reflection. He was ever a man of independent thought and was in general a sincere lover of truth, but he was a little too self-dependent: he speaks rather too often and too strongly of

his being actuated by a pure desire to discover truth. It might have been better perhaps, both for his philosophic and religious creed, if he had learned to distrust his judgment a little more, if he had realized that self-confidence is one of the sins to which humanity is liable, and allowed that the love of a favorite theory, such as that all our ideas come from sensation and reflection, may lead to the oversight of facts. Still, when we go along with him we feel that we are walking in a clear and bracing atmosphere with a man of high aim, of noble purpose, and vigorous step, and that to keep up with him is a healthy exercise fitted to invigorate the whole intellectual frame.

His style is described by Dugald Stewart. "It resembles that of a well-educated and well-informed man of the world rather than of a recluse student who had made an object of the art of composition. It everywhere abounds with colloquial expressions, which he had probably caught by the ear from those he had considered as models of good conversation, and hence, though it seems somewhat antiquated and not altogether suited to the dignity of the subject, it may be presumed to have contributed its share toward his great object of turning the thoughts of his contemporaries to logical and metaphysical inquiries" (*Dissertation*, Sec. I.). He can put wisdom in apt and apposite forms. "Good manners are the blossom of good sense, and it may be added of good feeling; for if the law of kindness be written on the heart it will lead to that disinterestedness in little as well as in great things, that desire to oblige and attention to the gratification of others which is the foundation of good manners." He has at times passages of literary beauty. "Thus the ideas as well as the children of our youth often die before us, and our minds represent to us those tombs which we are approaching, where, though the brass and the marble remain, yet the in-

scriptions are effaced by time and the imagery moulders away. The pictures drawn in our mind are laid in fading colors, and if not sometimes refreshed, vanish and disappear" (*Essay*, II., 19). He has a good deal of humor, the usual concomitant of good sense. On his way to Brandenburg, "I met lately accidentally a young sucking divine, who thought himself no small champion, who, as if he had been some knight-errant bound by oath to bid battle to all comers, first accosted me in courteous voice, but the customary salute being over I found myself assaulted most furiously, and heavy loads of arguments fell upon me. I, that expected no such thing, was fain to guard myself under the trusty broad shield of ignorance, and only now and then returned a blow by way of inquiry, and by this Parthian way of flying defended myself till passion and want of breath had made him weary, and so we came to an accommodation, though had he had lungs enough, and I no other use of my ears, the combat might have lasted as long as the wars of Troy." "One day when I rode out only to an airing I was had to a foddering of chopped hay or logic forsooth. Poor *materia prima* was canvassed cruelly, stripped of all the gay dress of her forms and shown naked to us, though I must confess I had not eyes enough to see her; however, the dispute was good sport and would have made a horse laugh, and truly I was like to have broke my bridle. The young monks (which one would not guess by their looks) are a subtle people, which dispute as eagerly for *materia prima* as if they were to make their dinner on it, and perhaps sometimes it is all their meal, for which others' charity is more to be blamed than their stomach. The professor of philosophy and moderator of the disputation was more acute at it than Father Hudibras; he was top full of distinctions, which he produced with so much gravity and applied with so good a grace, that ignorant I began to ad-

mire logic again, and could not have thought that 'simpliciter aut secundum quid materialiter et formaliter,' had been such gallant things which, with the sight of stroking his whiskers, the settling of his hood, and his stately walk made him seem to himself and me something more than Aristotle and Democritus. But he was so hotly charged by one of the seniors of the fraternity that I was afraid sometimes what it would produce, and feared there would be no other way to decide the controversy between them but by cuffs; but a subtle distinction divided the matter between them and so they parted good friends. The truth is hog-shearing is here much in its glory, and our disputing in Oxford comes as far short of it as the rhetoric of Carfax does that of Billingsgate." I have given these extracts from his journal at such length because they furnish a more vivid picture, than I myself could have drawn, of the new philosophy represented by Locke, in its confidence and pride taking a parting look at the old philosophy, represented by the scholastic discussions, passing away in the midst of weakness and ridicule.

SECTION II.

SKETCH OF LOCKE'S GENERAL THEORY.

His theory is a simple one, some think scarcely equal to the complexity of nature. In his Epistle to the Reader he explains the occasion on which the thoughts arose in his mind. "Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this essay, I should tell thee that five or six friends meeting at my chamber and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves very quickly at a stand by the difficulties that arose on every side. After we had a while puzzled ourselves without coming nearer a resolu-

tion of these doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature it was necessary to examine our own abilities and see what objects our understanding were or were not fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented, and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first inquiry."

His aim was to find what subjects the understanding was fitted to deal with, and for this purpose to discover how the mind gets its ideas and what is their nature. The work was written "by catches," and he acknowledges that intervals of "many long interruptions" caused "some repetitions."

His first position, to which he holds most determinedly, is that the mind has nothing innate. This he seeks to establish in Book I., arguing that man has no innate speculative principles, such as "that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time," that he has no innate practical or moral principles, and that the ideas supposed to be innate, such as that of God, are not so.

In Book II. he shows how we get our ideas. Locke is much addicted to speak of truths by means of images, and he supposes the mind to be, "as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas" (II. 1). He says that "external and internal sensation are the only passages that I can find of knowledge to the understanding. These alone, as far as I can discover, are the windows by which light is let into this dark room; for methinks the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut out from light, with only some little opening left to let in external visible resemblances or ideas of things without; would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there and be so orderly as to be found

upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man in reference to all objects of sight and the ideas of them" (II.).

These two inlets he called Sensation and Reflection, or external and internal sense. By these we get the materials of all our ideas. He defines idea as "the object of the understanding when it thinks," and means by it much the same as we would now describe as conscious states or operations of the mind.

Upon these ideas are faculties operating. These are:

I. Perception.	IV. Comparison.
II. Retention.	V. Composition.
III. Discernment.	VI. Abstraction.

Briefly, the faculties (1) perceive; (2) retain; (3) distinguish between one thing and another; (4) compare, that is, observe resemblances; (5) put objects in new shapes; (6) separate a part from the whole. He shows how, from these materials and by these faculties, we get all our ideas simple and complex of the primary and secondary qualities of matter, of space, power, substance, solidity, and infinity.

In Book III. he speaks of words in relation to ideas, and makes some very important remarks, and some very extravagant ones, as to the abuse of language. This subject does not come specially in our way. It is different with Book IV., where he speaks of knowledge, opinion, assent, and faith. Knowledge is represented as the perception of the agreement or repugnance of our ideas, not of things, but with one another; in some cases the agreement being seen intuitively or directly, and in others by a process in which there may be more or less certainty.

Locke's mind was filled with this theory, he kept it before him for twenty years, from 1670 to 1690, when he published it; but he did not state it in a *determinate* way (to use a phrase of his own), and did not notice other

truths which limited it. Catching the spirit of his times, he had an aversion to the scholastic nomenclature of the middle ages (he speaks with disdain of "their uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms"), which continued to be used in philosophy down to the beginning of the seventeenth century. In his style he adopted the language of those who were reckoned as the models of talking and writing in his day. As a consequence his phraseology is often conversational and loose. This helped to gain him a hearing in his own age, but has led to his being misunderstood in later times. There have been many controversies as to his precise doctrine on certain points, as for instance, what power he gives to reflection as one of the inlets of knowledge, and what is the relation between his two inlets of ideas on the one hand, and the faculties represented as working upon these ideas on the other. I believe that on some points he has been misrepresented; he has been spoken of as an idealist, a sensationalist, and a rationalist. It will be necessary to examine these charges. I suspect that the *Essay on Human Understanding*, which used to be so famous, is not much read in the present day. The views of it which are entertained by students generally are commonly taken from histories of philosophy and compends, in which Locke is put into an artificial class, in which the comprehensiveness of his philosophy and his specialties are overlooked. It is necessary in these circumstances to have his system reviewed anew. This will enable us to determine exactly what was his view of the understanding, when it will appear that in some points he has been misunderstood both by his admirers and his opponents; that he has retained a larger portion of primitive truth than some give him credit for; while he has not retained enough to furnish a deeply settled foundation for truth.

SECTION III.

MEANING OF IDEA AND REFLECTION.

He defines "idea" as "the object of the understanding when it thinks," and uses it to express "whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species." The schoolmen drew more or less clearly a distinction between these three phrases. By phantasm, a term derived from Aristotle, they designated the representation of a particular thing, say, of a lily. Notion was used only when some intellectual operation was employed in the formation of it, say, a general notion, or what is now designated concept. Species referred to visible appearance and to objects classified. Locke might have profitably looked to these distinctions; they would have saved him from much confusion; but he has an aversion to all scholastic distinctions. He seems to me to denote by it any of our conscious mental states, as we would now express it, all our sense perceptions, our recollections, our judgments, our moral approbations. As he employs it, the literal meaning of the word as an image always attaches to it, hence he has a difficulty in understanding what a general notion is; for when he regards it as an idea, he looks upon it not as a combination of things by points of resemblance, which it is, but as a figure or fancy which is inadequate to represent a class or concept.

It is evident that Locke views the mind as looking to ideas in all its exercises rather than to things. It will be necessary, as we proceed, to inquire how he gets from ideas to things. At this point Berkeley drove him to idealism,

maintaining that there is no proof of anything but the idea; and Hume to skepticism, arguing that there is no reality in the idea. But it is certain that Locke thought he could, from the ideas, get to things. He identifies the ideas with the things they represent, and regards the understanding in looking at ideas as looking at real things. He tells us expressly, indeed, that "the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them" (IV., 4). But there are passages in which he speaks of the understanding as looking at material things. "To discover the nature of our ideas the better and to discourse of them intelligently, it will be convenient to distinguish them as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds, and [what seems an extraordinary statement from him] as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us" (II., 8). But our present inquiry is about the meaning of the word. The subject of the relation of ideas to realities will require to be taken up in a later part of this paper.

But this may be the most suitable place for mentioning that I regard Locke as entirely successful in showing that the mind has not within it at its birth the ideas of which he speaks; that it has not images, phantasms, or abstract notions of any kind. In all this he has dissipated and scattered a whole cloud of errors which had for ages brooded over and darkened the whole subject of the origin and nature of ideas and knowledge.

There has also been a controversy about the use of the word reflection. The phrase was used by Gassendi, by whom it is supposed Locke was considerably influenced, to signify a faculty above sensation reviewing all the operations of the mind. Locke makes it, our observation "employed about the internal operations of our mind perceived and reflected on by ourselves" (II., 1). It denotes some-

thing more than we now express by the phrase self-consciousness, which signifies the knowledge of self in its present state. According to Locke it implies attention, which is an act of the will and is continuous. He says that the ideas of reflection "need attention." He denotes by it the act of the mind in voluntarily bending back and looking in upon its operations. When it was objected to Locke that he could not get our higher ideas, such as those of moral good, from his two inlets, it was answered by some, such as Leibnitz and Stewart, that he could get them from reflection. But this is entirely inconsistent with Locke's theory, which represents reflection as the eye looking in upon the operations of the mind, in which exercise it can see only what is in the mind, and therefore cannot see moral good unless it be already there; and this must be by some other power producing it.

SECTION IV.

OFFICES DISCHARGED BY THE FACULTIES.

What is the relation of the faculties to the two original inlets of knowledge? This is a subject on which Locke has not expressed himself very clearly. From his metaphorical expressions it looks as if ideas came into the mind from without. We can understand how this might be so far as sensible objects are concerned. When it is asked "how bodies produce ideas in us," it is answered, "that it is manifestly by *impulse*, the only way which we can conceive bodies operate in" (II., 8). But what does impulse mean when applied to an action on mind by matter? Then, it is not conceivable that our ideas by reflection, which are wholly within the mind, could have come from without.

He represents the ideas coming in by these inlets as *passive*, and such as the mind cannot get rid of. But it does not seem as if formed ideas come in after this manner, but merely the *materials* of ideas. Both the phrases *inlet* and *materials* are metaphorical and somewhat materialistic. It does not appear that the inlets furnish ideas till the faculties, till at least perception works upon them. "To ask at what time a man has first any ideas, is to ask when he begins to perceive; having ideas, and perception, being the same thing" (II., 9). "Simple ideas are suggested and furnished to the mind only by those two ways above mentioned, viz., sensation and reflection" (II., 2). And yet a little further on he says, "Perception is the first faculty of the mind employed about our ideas" (II., 9); as if we had first ideas and then perceive them. "Our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind which cease to be anything when there is no perception of them" (II., 10). He says, "Perception being the first step and degree toward knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it;" and again, "Perception is the first operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge into our minds" (II., 9). How are we to bring a consistent whole out of these various statements, giving its office to sensation and reflection on the one hand, and to perception on the other? Before we can answer the question we must notice that all the other faculties are employed about the ideas as well as perception. Thus he tells us that there is "no knowledge without discerning," that is, "distinguishing between the several ideas we have." In particular, he is obliged to give a large place to the faculties in discovering relations, such as those of identity, and of cause and effect.

Locke speaks everywhere of the ideas and knowledge which men may obtain "by the use and due application

of their natural faculties" (I., 3). He asserts that "men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have without the help of any innate impressions, and may arrive at certainty without any such original notions or principles" (I., 3). Here we may notice his opposition to everything inborn, but at the same time his distinct recognition of the important offices discharged by the faculties. It looks as if, while denying innate ideas, he made the faculties perform somewhat of the same offices as the *a priori* principles, or primary truths, are supposed to do by their advocates. Had Locke carefully and systematically unfolded all that is in the faculties, it might have been seen that there is not after all so great a difference between his views and those of the philosophers who oppose him, as is commonly imagined. But it would thereby appear only the more clearly that he was guilty of a great and inexcusable oversight in not telling us precisely how much the faculties can do. The following passage helps to let us see what his views were: "Had they examined the ways whereby men come to the knowledge of many universal truths, they would have found them to result in the minds of men from the being of things themselves, when duly considered, and that they were discovered by the application of those faculties that were fitted by nature to receive and judge of them when duly employed about them" (I., 4). Here we have two very important principles. One is that knowledge comes from the *consideration*—he should have said from the *perception*—of the being of things; a most important truth, which will require to be separately considered. The other is that men obtain them by "the application of their faculties."

He certainly ascribes to the faculties very important functions. He gives them the power of *suggesting*, a ca-

pacity which might open up wide fields. Existence is an idea suggested to the understanding by every object (II., 7). Among all the ideas we have, as there is none suggested, so there is none more simple than that of unity (II., 16).

He allots a very important place to intuition. "Our highest degree of knowledge is intuitive without reasoning." "For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we shall find that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves without the intervention of any others; and this, I think, may be called intuitive knowledge. For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye doth light, only by being directed toward it" (IV., 2). "Some of the ideas that are in the mind are so there, that they can be by themselves immediately compared one with another, and in these the mind is able to perceive that they agree or disagree as clearly as that it has them. Thus the mind perceives that the arch of a circle is less than the whole circle" (IV., 17). He tells us "we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence" (IV., 3). He goes so far as to declare, "It is on intuition that depends all the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge" (IV., 2).

Upon this intuitive knowledge demonstration proceeds, and in it "the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, but not immediately;" it is by intervening proofs in which each step has intuitive evidence. He maintains that of "real existence we have an intuitive knowledge of our own, demonstrative of God's, sensitive of some few other things. All this sounds very much like the doctrine of those who hold by *a priori* truth. I am pleased to find that he regards self-evidence—and not necessity, which Leibnitz and Kant do—as the test of intui-

tive truth. "Whether they come in view of the mind earlier or later, this is true of them, that they are all known by their native evidence, are wholly independent, receive no light, nor are capable of any proof one from another." But there is a fundamental error in his view of intuition. He cannot, in consistency with his general theory of the mind, looking only at ideas, make intuition look at things. All intuitions are judgments and involve a comparison of ideas. This error was seen at an early date (1697) by King, author of the *Origin of Evil*, and at a later day by Reid, who remarks: "I say a sensation exists, and I think I understand clearly what I mean. But you want to make the thing clearer, and for that end tell me that there is an agreement between the idea of that sensation and the idea of existence. To speak freely this conveys to me no light, but darkness." [1] The primary exercise of intuition seems to be an immediate perception of things without us and within us. It is only thus we can construct a philosophic realism such as Locke meant to hold.

He gives a high and deep place to reason. In replying to Stillingfleet he is able to say, "Reason, as standing for true and clear principles, and also as standing for true, and clear, and fair deductions from these principles, I have not wholly omitted, as is manifest from what I have said of self-evident propositions, intuitive knowledge, and demonstration." He might have stated more strongly that he often appeals to reason; and he was claimed by the Unitarians of last century as a rationalist both in philosophy and religion. From the passage last quoted we discover what he means by reason and what offices he allots it; it includes "true and clear principles," and also deductions from them. It is especially important to notice that it em-

[1] See *Intuitions of the Mind*, Part I., Book ii.

braces "self-evident propositions, intuitive knowledge and demonstration." What is this but "the reason in the first degree" of Reid, "the fundamental laws of belief" of Stewart, and the "pure reason" of Kant? Again we discover that Locke meant to stand up for the deep and radical principles which the Scottish and German schools have been defending and settling. But while he means to do this I am not sure that he has done it. For at what place in his system does reason come in? It is certainly not among the inlets of ideas and knowledge, and it does not appear in the list of the faculties working on the ideas. But he certainly brings it in, consistently or inconsistently, and I can only suppose that he makes it an exercise, probably a sort of combined exercise of the faculties. This only makes us regret the more that he has not unfolded more fully the powers embraced in these faculties as they look at things. Had he done so he might have found that these faculties and their properties are truly innate, though the ideas which they produce cannot be said to be so.

SECTION V.

HOW THE HIGHER IDEAS OF THE MIND ARE FORMED.

Having set aside all innate ideas in Book First of his Essay, Locke proceeds, in Book Second, to show how ideas are actually formed: this is from the two sources Sensation and Reflection, and by the Faculties working on the materials thus supplied. He shows this specially as to the ideas which are farthest removed from sense, and are supposed to be innate. It may serve a good purpose to look at the way in which he fashions some of the deepest and highest ideas which the mind of man can form. The

charge against him is that he cannot form them by the means he calls in.

Existence is "an idea suggested to the understanding by every object" (II., 7). The correct account is that we know objects as existing, and do not need a suggestion. *Unity* is also represented as a suggested idea, whereas it is involved in the perception of things which are known first as singular. *Our own existence* is known intuitively. This is all right, but surely this implies a knowledge not through ideas but directly. At this place we see clearly the unsatisfactory nature of the theory of knowledge only through ideas.

Body.—It is difficult to determine how Locke makes us reach the knowledge of body. He tells us expressly "'tis evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the idea it has of them" (IV., 3). But he has not succeeded in showing how from an idea supposed to be in the mind he can reach by any legitimate process an object external to the mind and extended. This, however, will require to be separately considered. He distinguishes primary and secondary qualities (II., 8). The Primary "are utterly inseparable from matter, in whatever state it be." How he knows that primary qualities are inseparable from matter he does not tell us. He says that "the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are *resemblances* of them," as if the idea of gold could be properly described as having a resemblance to gold. There is, certainly, some correspondence, though resemblance does not seem the exact word; but how can he know this when he does not perceive the bodies? "The ideas produced in us by the secondary qualities have no resemblance of them." I believe that there is a distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of bodies. But I am not sure that it has been accurately drawn by Locke. Primary qualities

resolved by Locke, very properly, into extension, solidity, and motion, are perceived at once, whereas secondary qualities, such as heat, are mere organic affections for which we argue a cause, and science finds it in molecular motion.

Space.—He is in the same difficulty here as in regard to body, of getting it from an idea in the mind which has no spatial properties. He very properly says that our idea of space is got from touch and sight; I believe he might have said that we get it from all the senses, as by all the senses we know our bodies as extended and resisting our energy.

Time.—It is evident that he cannot get this idea from sensation, so he gets it from reflection: by reflecting on the succession of our ideas. At this point the defect of his theory has been pointed out by Leibnitz and Cousin. Reflection can perceive only what is in the mind, and cannot perceive succession unless it be already there. Time is one of those ideas which come in always in the concrete with the exercise of the faculties; in memory we recall an event as having happened in the past.

Substance.—Evidently he is greatly troubled with this idea, and yet he has not the courage to avow it. Stillingfleet, a man of scholarship, though not of much philosophical ability, charges him with denying or at least overlooking this idea. Locke wrote a courteous and elaborate reply in which he shows a good deal of fencing, but no very decisive statement. He is indignant at his opponent for making him deny the existence of substance. He argues that it exists, but certainly not on grounds very consistent with his theory. He acknowledges that substance is unknown to us (II., 23); he evidently cannot get it either from sensation or reflection, but he asserts, "all sensible qualities carry with them a supposition of a substratum to exist in" (II., 23). "We cannot conceive how

sensible qualities should subsist alone, and therefore, we suppose them to exist in some common subject." Here he makes our conception a test of truth, and resorts to a supposition which he cannot justify on his theory. We know the substances mind and body as having being, independence of our observation of them, and as having potency.

Power.—His views on this subject, which has come into such prominence since the days of Hume, contain some important truths, but are very far from being adequate. Power being the source from which all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are when they exert this power are called causes (II., 21). I am glad to find him placing power in substance. His account should be quoted in full (II., 21): "The mind being every day informed by the senses of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without, and taking no notice how one comes to an end and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before; reflecting also on what passes within itself, and observing a constant change of its ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses, and sometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like changes will be made for the future in the same things by like agents and by the like ways; considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that change, and so comes by that idea we call power." He *concludes*, but from what premises he does not tell us, and from this theory he cannot find a premise which will guarantee such a wide conclusion. He simply tells us, "the mind must collect a power somewhere able to make that change, as well as a possibility of the thing itself to receive it." The word *must* makes the appeal to necessity which he cannot legitimately

employ. "Again, from the observation of the constant vicissitude of things we get our ideas of cause and effect" (II., 37), a theory which enables Hume to draw all his skeptical conclusions, that we have no idea of cause beyond that of observed antecedence, and no evidence that cause operates beyond our experience. I believe that he is right in drawing our idea of cause from both sensation and reflection, but "that the mind receives its idea of active power clearer from reflection on its own operations than it does from any external sensation." He has some very positive ideas as to the extent and limits of power which he cannot draw from his inlets and capacities. "It is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitable matter should produce a thinking, intelligible being, as that nothing should produce something."

This may all be good reasoning, but Locke has nothing on which to found it.

Infinity.—He denies that he has a positive idea of infinity (II., 17). Yet he stands up for its existence. "Man knows that nothing cannot produce a being, therefore there must be something eternal" (IV., 10). The conclusion is right, but he does not prove it. He assures us, on what evidence he does not say, "Wherever the mind places space itself by any thought, either amongst or remote from all bodies, it can in this uniform idea of space nowhere find any bounds, any end; and so must necessarily conclude, it by the very nature and idea of each part of it to be actually infinite" (II., 17). He has some fine glimpses of the truth which we will speak of when we come to consider the idea of God.

Moral Good.—At this point Locke's oversights were first seen in England, which has always been jealous of every thing seeming to bear against morality. These were pointed out by the third Lord Shaftesbury, the grandson

of his friend and patron. Certainly the philosopher's views on this subject are lamentably meagre. He does not get the idea of moral good from reflection; indeed he could not do so according to his theory, as reflection only sees what is already in the mind. He derives it openly and avowedly from sensation. "Things are good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain; that we call good which is apt to cause or increase pleasure" (II., 20). He makes good not to be a thing in itself, but merely a relation. "Moral good and evil is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law whereby good and evil is drawn on us from the lawgiver; which good and evil, pleasure and pain attending our observance or breach of the law by the decree of the lawgiver, is that we call reward and punishment" (II., 28). In this he makes morality depend on an arbitrary appointment on a law for which he can bring no defence, and a God whose ways he cannot justify. The moral evil is bad, not in itself, but because there is punishment attached. Whereas, the true statement is that punishment is attached to it because it is evil. Yet he thinks he is able by this unsatisfactory genesis to reach "a natural law," "discoverable by our natural faculties." He reaches the conclusion, "The idea of a Supreme Being infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea of ourselves as understanding rational beings, being such as are clear to us, would, I suppose, if only considered and pursued, afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action as might place morality among the sciences capable of demonstration; wherein I doubt not but from self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences as incontestable as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong might be made out to any one that will apply with the same indifferency and atten-

tion to the one as he does to the other of these sciences" (IV., 3). The language here employed leads me to consider—

The Idea of Necessity.—He is often appealing to a necessity. He speaks of certain and universal knowledge as having "necessary connection," "necessary coexistence," "necessary dependence" (IV., 3). We are able to see how he could reach demonstration, all the propositions in which are seen to be true intuitively; the question is, Could he do it consistently? "In some of our ideas there are certain relations, habitudes and connections, so visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any power whatsoever. And in these only we are capable of certain and universal knowledge. Thus the idea of a right-angled triangle necessarily carries within it an equality of its angles to two right angles" (IV. 3). He thinks he has like principles in ethics, and so thinks they are capable of demonstration. All this is apparently after the method of the rational school, and it is not easy to see how he could draw it from his experiential principles. Again we are led to regret that he has not determined for us what is in this reason, with its "certain relations, habitudes and connections." We have yet to consider as illustrating these points—

The Idea of God.—He tells us how we come by this idea: "I think it unavoidable for every considering, rational creature that will but examine his own or any other existence to have the notion of an eternal being who had no beginning" (II., 14). He refers his proof to the faculties. "We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God, though God has given us no innate ideas of himself, though he has stamped no original characters on our minds wherein we may read his being; yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed

with, he hath not left himself without a witness, since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him as long as we carry ourselves about us" (IV., 10). He thinks he can reach in this way: "The eternity of that infinite being which must necessarily have always existed" (II., 114). By a like exercise of the faculties he clothes the Divine Being with his other perfections.

What was needed in Locke's day, what is still needed, is an inductive exposition of all that is comprehended in these faculties, in the intuition and the reason to which Locke is so constantly employing. This was what was attempted by Reid and Kant; but the attempt has to be renewed to reduce the systems to a consistent whole and above all to make them thoroughly conform to the principles of the mind.

SECTION VI.

WAS LOCKE AN IDEALIST?

Certainly no one uses the word "idea" so frequently. I believe that Berkeley drove his theory logically to idealism, yet Locke was undoubtedly a determined realist, believing in the existence of a mind as well as of ideas, and of a body as well as a mind.

He defines idea, "Whatsoever is the object of the understanding when it thinks" (I., 1). It would have been more correct to say that idea is the state of the mind when it thinks of an object. His view is repeated in the fuller definition, "Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call an idea" (II., 8). This seems to me clearly to make the object of which a man thinks to be within the mind. The difficulty in which Locke, and all

metaphysicians who agree with him in making the mind percipient only of things within itself, here faces us: how from an idea in the mind can we get something out of the mind by any logical or legitimate process? Already idealism has got an entrance and great difficulty has been experienced in expelling it. It takes its full form and assumes its full significance in the definition of knowledge in Book Fourth, "Since the mind in all its thoughts and reasoning hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does and can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them" (IV., 1). So he goes on to define knowledge "to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists." The common definition of knowledge is the agreement of our ideas with things. But in Locke's account things are left out, and it is difficult to discover how he finds things, or at least things external to the mind. I see no way in which he can logically extricate himself from idealism, which believes only in what is in the mind.

But Locke's good sense made him a very decided realist, in spite of his theory. He has a way in which he reaches a reality out of the mind. "The power to produce any idea in our mind I call quality of the subject wherein that power is. Thus a snow-ball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the power to produce those ideas in us as they are in the snow-ball I call qualities;" and then he speaks of primary and secondary qualities (II., 8). But by what logical process can he reach those qualities in body, say of hot, cold, and round? Those qualities, say that of roundness, are not in the idea which is not round. An idea without roundness could never give a notion, much less a knowledge, of roundness; any argument to this effect would be a paralogism

and have more in the conclusion than in the premises. It is clear that Locke is left without any means of consistently reaching roundness, or any other external quality involving extension. The pronounced realist is thus driven by his theory into idealism.

But error, like vice, leads to evil consequences, which may in the end be made the means of correcting it. Logic is as inflexible a disciplinarian as morality. Berkeley, as we shall see, carried out Locke's theory as to ideas to its legitimate conclusion. If we have no direct perception or knowledge of external things, but only of ideas, it was argued, then we can have no proof of the existence of anything but these ideas; even if there be such gross corporeal things as atoms, molecules, and masses they could not possibly be known by us. There is no need of supposing, certainly not of believing, that there are any such gross bodies really existing; every end supposed to be produced by them may be accomplished by the ideas. There is left us a grand ideal world, created by God, and forever in the vision of God, who hath given us the power of contemplating it, and so operating upon it as to gather experience, and to act upon it.

This is a beautiful speculation, but it is not consistent with consciousness, which shows us as knowing external objects. As the theory violated our natural convictions, it was necessary that the avenger should come, and he appeared in the *Treatise of Human Nature*, by David Hume (1739). Proceeding on the principle of Locke, carried out by Berkeley, that we do not know things, he showed that we have only impressions, and ideas, the reproductions of them, the latter being fainter than the former.

It was at this point that the Scottish school, with Thomas Reid as the founder, and Dugald Stewart and William Hamilton as its most distinguished disciples, met

the skeptic. Reid tells us that he was carried along by the doctrine till he saw what consequences it produced in the philosophy of Hume, when he was led to draw back and review the whole ideal theory. Reid's own theory was hesitating and uncertain. He talked of sensation *suggesting* a perception, thereby cumbering his doctrine of immediate sense perception. Hamilton corrected this vacillating doctrine by making sense perception direct, but then he unfortunately made all our knowledge relative and not positive. The inquiry needs to be taken up at this point and prosecuted anew.

SECTION VII.

WAS LOCKE A SENSATIONALIST?

Locke's Essay was translated into French at the beginning of the eighteenth century, but was not much known till it (with Newton's *Principia*) was strongly recommended by Voltaire on returning from his visit to England. The French accepted only one half of the philosophy of the Englishman. The Abbé Condillac in his *Traité des Sensations* labored to reduce the original inlets of knowledge to one, and thus founded the sensational school which prevailed in France down to the end of last century, greatly to the debasement of mind and morality. Taking their views from French writers, rather than from Locke himself, the German metaphysicians from and after Leibnitz (who appreciated while he opposed Locke) down to within the last age spoke of Locke as a sensationalist, indeed as the representative sensationalist. But Locke calls in two fountains of knowledge. His language is express: "The other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas is *the perception of the operations of our own*

mind within, as it is employed about the ideas it has got, which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas which could not be had from the things without, and such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own mind, which we being conscious of and observing in ourselves do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas as we do from the bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has solely in himself, and though it be not sense as having to do with external objects, yet it is very like it and might be properly called internal sense. But as I call the other sensation, I call this reflection" (II., 1). Condillac argued that as reflection had no innate idea and could not create anything of itself, and as everything in the mind previous to the exercise of reflection was got by the external sense, so all we have after can only be sensations, it may be transformed—they called them *transformes sensations;* but Locke, whether logically or illogically, held that Reflection is a distinct inlet of ideas, higher than those of the bodily senses. The mind gets ideas from material things (how, he cannot very well show, as it does not perceive bodies directly); so it also gets a new kind of ideas from its own actings (this is more easily understood) as it observes them. "The mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations" (II., 1). Upon these, as we have seen (*supra*, Sec. IV.), he makes the Faculties to work, and thus gets, in a not very satisfactory manner (*supra*, Sec. V.), our higher ideas. Helvetius and the Encyclopedists multiplied *transformed sensations* till they got rid of God and Good; so Locke and his English followers fashioned what we may call *transformed reflections* till they got a sort of rationalistic theology and utilitarian morals which prevailed for several ages. It

thus appears that Locke was not a sensationalist, as he clearly and emphatically makes reflection a source of ideas, and is thus distinguished from Hobbes, from Condillac, the French Encylopedists and their whole school. British writers have always felt this.

SECTION VIII.

LOCKE WAS AN EXPERIENTIALIST.

While Locke was not a sensationalist, he was an experientialist—to adopt a phrase which has been conveniently coined since his day. It is his avowed doctrine, "Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience. In that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation, employed either about external, sensible objects, or the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understanding with all the materials of thinking" (II., 1). But the account is not free from ambiguity. Our observation brings us all our knowledge, but from two sources—sensation and reflection, and these are prior to observation. The manufacturer works all his own cloth, but he has to get wool to start with. Not only so, but he has to use machines to weave it. So it is with the understanding, according to Locke's own theory, when fully expanded. All is from observation, but it is the observation of something within and without, independent of our observation. Then it is by observing faculties, which have functions, and these are not the product of observation. Surely these might be called innate. So far

the maxim requires to be modified and explained. I believe this is what Leibnitz meant when, after allowing that there was nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses—always, in Locke's theory, including both the external and internal senses—he adds, *nisi intellectus ipse.*

There is an ambiguity, which has seldom or never been noticed, in the use of the term experience. Sometimes it means a mere individual experience, say the experience of anticipating a cause when we fall in with an effect. In this sense all intuitions, all *a priori* principles, fall within our conscious experience. These individual experiences, it is needless to show, do not constitute a science or a philosophy. But when from a number of individual experiences we rise to a general law, this is a different thing, and this is commonly called experience in speculative philosophy. Locke never seems to have inquired what observations were required to establish a general law. He does not appear to have ever discovered that experiences, however numerous, could not establish a universal law, which must hold good beyond our experience. This subject has had to be discussed since his day by the profound minds of Hume, Kant, and J. S. Mill, and needs still to be cleared up.

SECTION IX.

WAS LOCKE A RATIONALIST?

Locke's philosophy has certainly both a sense side and an intellectual side; both an experiential and a rational element. The former was observed and accepted in France in the last century, and was observed without being accepted in Germany. The latter was the more fondly con-

templated among English-speaking people, both in Great Britain and in the United States. In France his system was driven to sensationalism, and from the time of Kant almost to our day, he was called a sensationalist in Germany. But a very cursory reading of his works shows that Locke was utterly opposed to sensationalism, so far, at least, as it tended to sensualism. His English readers saw this all along.

In religion his spirit and tendency were rationalistic. In his Bible Commentaries, and in all his writings, he treats the Scriptures with profound reverence; but he is not partial to those doctrines which do not commend themselves to human reason. He recognizes the distinction drawn by Abelard and others between propositions contrary to reason and propositions above reason, and is willing to admit the latter when they clearly have the authority of God; but he is opposed to every kind of enthusiasm, extravagance, and mysticism. The Unitarians of last century, who denied the Deity of Christ and the Atonement were fond of claiming his name and quoting his authority In philosophic discussion he gives a deep place to intuition as the immediate perception of truth. He allots very important offices to the faculties. He is constantly appealing to reason, both as a discursive process, that is, reasoning and as "the principle of common reason" (I., 4), and he regards mathematics as demonstrative, and would make ethics the same. During the last age, while the German historians of philosophy were calling him an empiric and a sensationalist, there were British writers who were showing how high the view which he presented of the human understanding, and what great truths he defended, such as Henry Rogers, in his *Essays;* Professor Bowen, in his *Philosophic Discussions;* and Professor Webb, in his *Intellectualism of Locke.*

SECTION X.

THE RELATION OF LOCKE'S THEORY TO THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF FIRST TRUTHS.

In the opening of this paper I have called attention to three aspects of primitive or *a priori* principles. I mean to examine the chief modern philosophic systems in the light of these distinctions. It is evident that Locke did not observe the difference between the three aspects.

I. He regards innate ideas mainly as perceptions in consciousness. The original meaning of the word, that is, an image, likeness, or phantasm, always adheres to it in his apprehension. "Ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, which cease to be anything when there is no perception of them" (II., 10); "having ideas and perception being the same thing" (II., 1). Under this aspect he is right in declaring that they are not innate. They are not in the mind prior to birth or at birth. They rise up as the faculties are exercised. They constitute an individual experience. Not only so, but they cannot transcend the original inlets of knowledge—whatever these may be—certainly most of them may be traced to sensation and reflection as their fountains.

I think that Locke has been obliged to allow, that in the exercise of the faculties, ideas which I regard as new are generated. This being so, there may be perceptions, such as that of time and substance, not derivable directly from sensation and reflection. Now he is right in maintaining that none of these is innate. Herein his criticism is successful, and it has delivered philosophy from a whole host of imaginary entities in the shape of already formed ideas

ready to come forth, on occasions presenting themselves, as writing by invisible ink is when a chemical process is applied to it.

II. The great omission of Locke is in overlooking primitive principles under the second aspect as regulative principles. It was in this light that they were viewed by Aristotle when he called *νοῦς* the *τόπος εἰδῶν* not *εν ἐντελέχεια* but *εν δυνάμει*. This was the view taken by Descartes. "While I say that some idea is born with us, or that it is naturally imprinted on our souls, I do not understand that it presents itself always to our thought, for there is no thought it does so, but I understand that we have in ourselves the faculty to produce it. It was at this point that Locke was corrected by Leibnitz, when he added *nisi ipse intellectus;* maintaining that the intellect is innate though the actual ideas or perceptions are not, and that the innate principles" are in us before we perceive them (*Nouv.-Essais*, II., 1). Herein, too, Locke was improved by Kant, who places in the mind *a priori* principles, ready to be imposed on the objects of possible experience. Herein, too, Reid noticed the same truth, when he called in the principles of common sense, and Stewart, when he called them fundamental laws of belief. But whatever defects there may be in Locke's philosophy, he is ready to express the facts, whether they are reconcilable with his theory or not. His beliefs and his expressions are often sounder than his system. His honesty leads him to make statements which seem to be fatal to his favorite opinions. In answering Mr. Lowde, he says of supposed innate notions: "Before they are known there is nothing of them in the mind but a capacity to know them when the concurrence of those circumstances, which this ingenious author thinks necessary in order to the souls exerting them, brings them into our knowledge" (II., 28, *foot-note*).

III. We have seen that our intuitive perceptions may be generalized, when they become axioms or maxims. So far as they are not correctly drawn from the singular exercises they may be a source of error, widening like the darkness of an eclipse.. It has to be added that from their subtle character, and from their being mixed up with other and empirical operations of the mind, there is very apt to be inaccuracies in the expression of them, breeding the confusion and controversies which are so apt to appear in metaphysics. But so far as they are correctly generalized they are as certain as our primitive perceptions, which are founded on the regulative principles of the mind, which have the sanction of our constitution and the authority of the God who gave us our constitution. How does Locke's philosophy stand toward them?

First, he is altogether right in saying that under this aspect primary truths are not innate. Locke is again successful here, and in consequence has carried with him on the general question multitudes who do not see that this is not the whole question, who do not see that there may be in the mind innate faculties with their laws, while there are no innate general axioms. Locke's favorite example in his First Book of a supposed innate principle is that "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time." He shows successfully that children and savages, in whom we might expect it if it is native, have no such conscious principle, and that they would not understand it if presented to them. "Such kind of general propositions are seldom mentioned in the huts of Indians, much less are they found in the thoughts of children or any impressions of them on the minds of naturals" (II., 3).

Secondly, he sees that these general propositions are derived from particular instances. "It is certain that not all, but only sagacious heads light at first on these observa-

tions and reduce them into general propositions, not innate, but collected from a preceding acquaintance and reflection on particular instances" (I., 2).

Thirdly, he does not see what they are generalizations of. They are not generalizations of external facts, like those of natural history or astronomy. They are generalizations of our primitive perceptions which grow out of the innate and constituent principles of the mind. On noticing a thing at a certain place we decide that it cannot be that this thing has passed out of existence, and we perceive that we would so decide in every like case, and generalizing our judgments, we declare that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time. This is not like the ordinary laws of nature discovered by induction, say the law of gravitation, which may or may not hold true in all worlds, but is true universally, and seen to be so by a necessity of thought.

Locke is further right when he says that these maxims do not furnish evidence of the particular instance. "The consideration of these axioms can add nothing to the evidence or certainty of its knowledge" (IV., 7). The truth is the evidence to us of the general depends on the particular, and not the evidence of the particular upon the general. "If one of these have need to be confirmed to him by the other, the general has more need to be let into his mind by the particular than the particular by the general. For in particulars our knowledge begins and so spreads itself by degrees to generals" (IV., 7). When I see the stick A of the same length as the stick B, which is again of the same length as the stick C, I judge and decide at once that A is of the same length as C, without getting any assurance from the axiom, that "things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another."

He sees that the generalized maxims serve some good

purpose. "They are of use in the ordinary methods of teaching science as far as they are advanced." "They are of use in disputes for the silencing of obstinate wranglers and bringing those contests to some conclusion" (IV., 7). But why or how they should do so, unless they have authority? and whence their authority except from our nature and constitution, which are certainly innate? What is thus brought before us enables us to answer a plausible objection by Locke which has led some to discard innate principles. "Not only those few propositions which have had the credit of maxims are self-evident, but a great many, even almost an infinite number of other propositions are such," and he gives as examples that two and two are four, and that yellow is not blue. I am sure that the number of such propositions is almost infinite. They are pronounced upon our cognition of individual things. These propositions are all singular. But we are at the trouble to generalize only a few of them into maxims, such as the axioms of Euclid and of rational mechanics and generally metaphysical principles. Locke was tempted by his aversion to innate ideas of every kind to set too little value on these fundamental principles. Being put in the form of laws, which all science requires to be, they are the connecting links of many of the sciences, as for instance of the sciences of quantity, of energy, of logic—where we have the dictum of Aristotle, and of ethics, which assumes that wrong differs from right.

SECTION XI.

THE MIND LOOKS AT THINGS THROUGH IDEAS.

In this review I have sought so far as possible to enter into the very thoughts of the author, and this even when I do not agree with them. I have labored to look at things from his point of view before venturing to criticise him. In most of his tenets which have been controverted since his time I partly agree and partly disagree with him. As a truly honest inquirer he had commonly a large amount of truth in his doctrines; but I have been obliged to point out incorporated errors, commonly originating in his adherence to a favorite theory. Every one has noticed the apparent inconsistencies in his statements; I believe they arise from his discovering at times and acknowledging truths which cannot be reconciled with his general doctrine.

It is clear that he represents the mind as not directly perceiving things out of itself. "'Tis evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them" (IV., 4). His philosophy proceeds throughout on this principle. The object of the understanding when it thinks is an idea. The mind has intuitive knowledge, but it consists in the perception of the immediate agreement or disagreement of two ideas. Knowledge in general is the perception of the agreement or repugnance of ideas. Judging from these expressions it looks as if the mind, even in perceiving by reflection its own states, does so by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. I have difficulty in believing that he meant

this, but his language carries this with it. We see how necessary it is, if we would get at the exact truth, to abandon the whole ideal theory of Locke and to return to the natural theory that we at once perceive things.

It appears to me that Locke very much identified ideas and things. He is not very well able to say how from ideas in the mind we reach things without the mind. The truth is, the question of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of arguing from things internal to things external was not expressly started at that time. He seems, at times at least, to proceed on the principle of causation; we have an idea in the mind and see that there is no cause within the mind and we argue a cause without the mind. But this proceeds on the necessary law of cause and effect, which is not justified by his experiential theory. It is supposed that we argue from an idea to an external object believed to be extended. But there is no extension in the idea, and we cannot logically argue from an unextended effect to an extended object, for this would place in the conclusion an entirely new object not in the premise. He regards the primary ideas of bodies as *resemblances* of the ideas, but how can he know that they are so unless he has known both and compared them? Altogether it is clear to me that Locke left this whole subject of the relation of the objective external state to the subjective idea in an uncertain state. Since his day it has passed through the idealism of Berkeley and the skepticism of Hume; Reid and Hamilton have sought to bring it back to a natural realism, while Kant, and of a later date Spencer, have introduced each of them new and important elements. We still need to have the subject cleared up; and this I am convinced will be done sooner or later, though it will be a difficult work. A statement with a critical examination of the opinions of the great thinkers now

named, and a judicious criticism, may help to secure this end.

Meanwhile we have an important principle held by Locke, which has been overlooked by others, and which, as it appears to me, ought to be brought into prominence in the present state of the discussion. He has no very satisfactory way of reaching things, but when he reaches them he holds that our perceptions, our faculties generally, our intuitions, our reason, all look to things. Kant, in this respect, instead of advancing beyond Locke, has fallen behind him. The German philosopher did improve upon the English one when he showed that there were in the mind *a priori* principles anterior to experience. But then he made these, not perceptions of things, but forms imposed upon our perceptions of objects, adding to them and modifying them. In this respect he has been followed by Hamilton. It is time to repudiate this Kantian doctrine and return to the natural system which makes our primitive perceptions contemplate things. Locke meant to hold this system: "Had they examined the ways whereby men come to the knowledge of many universal truths they would have found them to result in the minds of men *from the being of things themselves* when duly considered" (I., 4).

SECTION XII.

GENERAL REVIEW OF LOCKE'S PHILOSOPHY.

I. We see what he denies: all innate ideas. Under this he asserts that there is nothing in the mind at its birth; it is a sheet of white paper. In attacking the views that were commonly entertained in his day he did philosophy much service. He was successful in showing that the

mind was not born with a set of ideas, in the sense of perceptions actually formed or ready to come forth on occasion. He was evidently right in holding that the mind has not an original repository of abstract and general notions, such as those of space, of time, of infinity, and moral good. He showed that all general notions and maxims were formed out of particular instances by the exercise of the faculties.

On the other hand he carried his negations too far. Even a sheet of paper, though it has no characters, has properties without which there could be no writing on it. So it is with the mind; it has certain powers which are native, which, indeed, might be called innate. These powers have rules and limits; they can do certain work; in short, they are laws or principles. A *tabula rasa*, or blank paper, is not the fittest emblem of them. Leibnitz has a better. It is not, he says, merely like bare marble; it is like marble with veins in it, fitting it to become a statue, say of Hercules. It has "inclinations, dispositions, habitudes, and natural virtualities" (*Nouv.-Ess.*, Pref.). Locke, as we have seen, is obliged constantly to appeal to judgments which the mind pronounces at once, and which are necessary. These show that there are innate regulating principles in the mind, supporting and guaranteeing great truths.

II. Locke has two grand inlets of knowledge—sensation and reflection. But he has also faculties operating upon these, such as perception, discernment, comparison, composition, abstraction. These actually form our ideas. Locke has not been able to state very clearly the relation between these inlets and the faculties. What, for instance, is the difference between sensation as an inlet, and perception as directed to the ideas supposed to be introduced by sensation? Do they not, in fact, perform the same func-

tion, namely, give us a knowledge of bodily objects? It has been shown above that the faculties in their exercise give us new ideas, such as those of time and moral good, which cannot be had from either sensation or reflection, or from the two combined. It is clear that in a correct philosophy the inlets and the faculties should not be separated—they should be combined; and the faculties should be so unfolded and determined as to settle for us—what Locke was so anxious to do—the boundaries of our intellectual vision, and let every man "know the length of his tether."

III. No man has seen more clearly than Locke that our primitive perceptions are all individual. We perceive of these two straight lines that they cannot enclose a space; that the shortest distance between these two points is a straight line. Locke also sees that our general maxims are formed out of these particular instances, but he does not see precisely how this is done. In fact it is accomplished by the generalization of the singular exercises. We perceive of these two straight lines that they cannot enclose a space, and we discover that we would say the same of every other two lines, and so reach the general truth. Locke acknowledges that these generalized maxims serve some useful purposes, particularly in settling forever some disputed points. But he does not see how they accomplish such ends. It is because, when properly generalized, they are the expression of the constitutional principles of the mind, looking at things, and pronouncing a judgment as to what is involved in things.

IV. Locke had great difficulty in reaching realities. The mind perceived, and retained, and compared only ideas, and he had no legitimate way of arguing from these ideas in the mind any external things. His theory seemed to imply that the mind itself was only perceived by ideas

coming in by reflection. But Locke was in fact a determined realist, believing in both mind and body, and that he knew things. Thus he made all our primitive perceptions, all our intuitions, our knowledge, and our common reason to look at things and all judgments to be pronounced about things.

NOTICE OF BERKELEY.

GEORGE BERKELEY was born March 12, 1685, in the vale of the Nore, near Thomastown, in County Kilkenny, in the south of Ireland. In 1700 he entered Trinity College, Dublin, where his favorite studies were mathematics and metaphysics. He began while there *A Commonplace Book*, in which we see as in a glass the rise and development of the new views which rose up in his mind. He became tutor in the family of Dr. William Molyneux, a great admirer of Locke, and was introduced to the *Essay on Human Understanding*, which had become famous. The other philosophical writers studied by him seem to have been Descartes, Hobbes, Malebranche, and he must have known the works of Peter Brown, Provost of Trinity College, and of King, Archbishop of Dublin. In 1709 he published his *Essay toward a new Theory of Vision*, in which he showed that the eye is not immediately percipient of distance. He afterward lived for some time in England, where he became acquainted with such men as Samuel Clarke, Addison, Steele, Swift, and Arbuthnot, and took a tour on the continent of Europe. He returned to Ireland in 1721, and became Dean of Derry in 1724. He was now seized with an impulse to set up a university in Bermuda to Christianize the Indians, and

persuaded the government to favor his scheme and a number of influential people to subscribe funds. In prosecution of this scheme he sailed for America, and landed at Newport, in Rhode Island, in 1729. He lived for some years in a house in the neighborhood still standing, and was a favorite with those who came in contact with him; but not being able to carry out his Bermuda purpose he returned to his own country and was made Bishop of Cloyne. At this period of his life he strongly recommended the virtues of tar-water, which he mixes up with his philosophic theories. In his declining life he retired to Oxford and became enamored with the Platonic philosophy, toward which he had always been tending, even when he was under the influence of Locke. He died in 1753.

It is not very difficult to estimate the intellectual calibre and the character of Berkeley. From an early date he was addicted to dreamy reflection. "I was distrustful at eight years old, and consequently by nature disposed for these new doctrines." In gazing so intently into the spiritual world the material covering was lost sight of. He was possessed of great acuteness and ingenuity, but was not distinguished for good sense or shrewdness. The fact is, Berkeley was a visionary in everything. His Bermuda project and his belief in tar-water were not wilder than his philosophy. It is amusing meanwhile to observe how he claimed to be so practical. He convinced British statesmen of great shrewdness, by an array of calculations, that the best way of converting the Indians and of Christianizing the continent of America was by a college instituted at Bermuda. By an undiscerning agglomeration of facts he convinced numbers in his own day, and he has had believers in Ireland almost to our day, that tar-water could cure all manner of diseases. In like way he persuaded himself that his philosophy is the expression of

vulgar belief and the perfection of common-sense. He professes "to be eternally banishing metaphysics and recalling men to common-sense," "to remove the mist and veil of words," and to be "more for reality than other philosophers."

His style is acknowledged, on all hands, to be graceful and attractive. He avoids, as Locke does, all scholastic and technical phrases. As Locke affected the style of the conversation which he had heard among the upper classes, so Berkeley adopted the style of the literature of his day, that is, of the wits of Queen Anne. This mode of composition has its disadvantages. If it has the ease of conversation and literature, it has also the looseness. Berkeley confesses that he is by no means very precise in his use of language: "Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some latitude; this is what cannot be helped. It is the fault of language that you cannot always apprehend the clear and determinate meaning of my words." His editor complains of "the chronic tendency to misconceive" Berkeley's philosophy. His admirers are ever telling us that he has been misunderstood, and in particular that his opponents of the Scottish school, such as Baxter, Reid, Beattie, and Stewart, do not apprehend his meaning. His opponents are apt to feel, if not to say, that his speculations are so undefined that any one may form the shape that suits him out of the cloud. Those attacking him suppose that he denies the existence of matter; those defending him maintain that he holds resolutely by the existence of matter. But surely there is some defect in a philosophic writer who has so expounded his doctrine that it is forever misunderstood by able and candid minds. With all these imperfections we feel that some of his works, such, for instance, as *Three Dialogues between Phylas and Philonous*, are the finest philosophic dialogues in the

English tongue, and are worthy of being placed alongside those of Plato.[1]

I am now to examine the chief points in his philosophy, so far as they relate to Locke, who preceded him, and to Hume, who professed to carry out his principles.

Theory of Vision.—Berkeley is best known in connection with this theory, which he expounded in his *Essay toward a New Theory of Vision* (1709) and defended in his *Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained* (1733), and, indeed, in most of his works. Professor Fraser is of the opinion that in respect of his theory he has not so much originality as is commonly attributed to him. "He takes the invisibility of distance in the line of sight for granted as a common scientific truth of the time." It is well known that there were notices by Descartes of the way by which the eye perceives distances, and Malebranche specifies some of the signs by which distance is estimated. William Molyneux, in a treatise on optics, published in 1690, declared that distance of itself is not to be perceived, for "'tis a line or a length presented to the eye with its end toward us, which must therefore be only a point and that is invisible" (I., 17); and then he shows that distance is chiefly perceived by means of interjacent objects, by the estimate we make of the comparative magnitude of bodies or their faint colors: this for objects considerably remote; as to nigh objects their distance is perceived by the turn of the eyes or the angle of the optic axis. Locke, in the fourth edition of his Essay, mentions a problem put to him by Molyneux, whether, if a cube and a sphere were placed before a blind man who was made to see, he would be able

[1] The standard edition of Berkeley's works is *The Works of George Berkeley, D.D.*, 4 vols., by Professor Alexander Campbell Fraser. See, by the same author, *Selections from Berkeley* and *Berkeley*, in the "Philosophic Classics."

to tell which is the globe and which the cube, to which both Molyneux and Locke answered "not." These statements by well-known philosophers were known to all interested in such studies before Berkeley's work appeared. But the *New Theory of Vision* treated of the subject specially and in a more elaborate way, and has commonly got the credit, not certainly of originating the doctrine, but of establishing it. Professor Fraser has shown that Berkeley all along meant his views as to vision to establish a far more important principle, that by all the senses we perceive only signs of mental realities, a doctrine cherished by him from an early date, but kept in the background in his early work.

Idea.—Berkeley takes the word not in the sense of Plato or the schoolmen, but in that of Descartes and Locke, specially the latter. The literal meaning always stuck to it in Locke's apprehension, and breeds inextricable confusion. He habitually regards the object of the mind when it thinks as an idea in the sense of image. He supposes there is such an image when we use the senses, even such senses as smelling and hearing, and he seeks for such an image when we think of space, time, and eternity. He sees the difficulty in the mind forming an idea—in this sense—of the product of abstraction and generalization. He acknowledges that it doth "require some pains and skill to form this general idea of a triangle," "for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenum, but all and none of these at once. In effect it is somewhat imperfect that cannot exist; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together." Upon this Berkeley remarks: "After reiterated efforts and pangs of thought to apprehend the general idea of a triangle, I have found it altogether incomprehensible" (I., 146). "The idea of a man

that I frame to myself, must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, or a straight, or a crooked, a tall or a low, or a middle-sized man" (I., 142). Here, as in so many other cases, he has sharpness enough to detect the errors of the prevailing philosophy, but not clearness or comprehension enough to set it right. He would use the word as Locke had done: "I take the word idea for any of the immediate objects of sense or understanding" (I., 55). But then this object is an image: "By idea I mean any sensible or imaginable thing" (IV., 457). "Properly speaking it is the picture of the imagination's making. This is the likeness of and referred to the real idea or (if you will) thing" (445). He rejects, as I believe he ought, abstract ideas in the sense of Locke, that is, in the sense of images of qualities; and he claims it as his merit that he gets rid in this way of those grand abstractions, such as matter and substance, existence and extension, space and time, to which philosophers have given an independent being, and set up as rivals to Deity. But while he has exposed the errors of Locke, he has not established the positive truth. It turned out that David Hume, taking advantage of his doctrine, undermined, by a like process, the separate existence of personal identity and power, of mind and morality.

Abstract and General Ideas.—His defective views on this subject perplexes his whole philosophy. He takes credit for removing abstractions out of speculation that we may contemplate realities. And it is quite true that we cannot form an abstract idea in the sense of likeness or phantasm. We cannot form in the mind an image of whiteness as we do of a lily, of redness as we do of a rose, of humanity as we do of man. We have to bring in here the distinction known to Aristotle, between *phantasm* (image) and *noema* (notion). An abstract is not a *phan-*

tasm, an exercise of the mere reproductive, recalling or imaging power of the mind; but a *notion*, the product of the elaborative or discursive—of the comparative powers, in fact—specially of the power which perceives the relation of part and whole, of an attribute to that concrete object of which it is an attribute. Having seen a lily I can ever afterward image the lily—this is the phantasm of Aristotle. But I can exercise another mental operation regarding it, and the product is the noema of Aristotle: I can consider its whiteness and not its shape or size, and when I do so I have an abstract notion about which I can pronounce judgments and reason. On rare occasions Berkeley had a glimpse of what is involved in abstraction, as in his *Principles of Human Knowledge:* "And here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular without attending to the particular qualities of the angles or relations of the sides. So far he may abstract; but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract general inconsistent idea [in the sense of image] of a triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter so far forth as man, so far forth as animal, without framing the forementioned abstract idea [image], either of man or animal; inasmuch as all that is perceived is not considered" (I., 148). He says that "there is a great difference between considering length without breadth, and having an idea or of imagining length without breadth." Speaking of the qualities abstracted he acknowledges that "it is not difficult to form general propositions and reasonings about these qualities without mentioning any other" (I., 284). Had he taken as much pains in unfolding what is contained in "considering" a figure as triangular, and Peter as man, without considering other qualities and what is involved in "forming general propositions and reasonings about qualities." as he has taken to expel abstract

ideas in the sense of phantasms, he would have saved his own philosophy, and philosophy generally from his day to this, from an immense conglomeration of confusion.

Much the same may be said of the General Idea, which Locke confounded with the Abstract Idea, under the phrase abstract general idea. These two evidently differ. An abstract notion is the notion of an attribute, a general notion is a notion of objects possessing a common attribute, or common attributes. We cannot form, in the sense of likeness, a general idea. An image, as Berkeley saw, must always be singular, whereas a general notion, the notion of a class, must embrace an indefinite number of individuals, all that possess the quality or qualities which bring the objects into a class. There can be no phantasm formed of the individuals in the class, which are innumerable, nor of the attributes, which are abstracts. At times he had a glimpse of what is implied in a general idea, but he does not pursue it, and he speedily loses sight of it. "Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea, which considered in itself is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort" (I., 145). But what constitutes the *sort* and the same *sort?* Had he proceeded to answer this question he might have found the exact truth. A sort is composed of things assorted, and assorted because possessing a quality or qualities in common, and must embrace all the objects possessing the quality or qualities. In looking at the things thus assorted, we see that the affirmations we make apply to all and each of the objects of the class, so that when a geometrician draws a black line of an inch in length, "this, which is in itself a particular line, is nevertheless, in regard to its signification, general, since, as it is there used, it represents all particu-

lar lines whatsoever, so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, in other words, of a line in general" (*ib.*). This is the general idea I stand up for, and I hold that it, and the abstract idea as above described, may be made the object of the understanding when it thinks, and that we can pronounce judgments upon it, and reason about it. This is, in fact, what we do in mathematics and in all the sciences.

While he set himself in an indiscriminating manner against abstract general ideas, Berkeley was not, as he has been commonly represented, a nominalist. His aim was to carry us away both from abstracts and names to individual things. According to him "ideas become general by a particular idea standing for all the ideas of the sort," and so, "certainly it is not impossible but a man may arrive at the knowledge of all real truth as well without as with signs, had he a memory and imagination more strong and capacious," and therefore "reasoning and science doth not altogether depend on word or names" (IV., 467).

Existence.—In every intelligent exercise we know ourselves as existing in a particular state, say thinking or willing. Our knowledge of ourselves and the particular state, say thinking, are mixed up, but we can so separate them as to consider ourselves as existing. This does not show that our existence depends on our perception. We perceive ourselves to exist because we already exist. So far as external objects are concerned, we perceive them by the eye as extended and colored, but we can, if we choose, consider them as existing apart from the color, apart even from our perception of them. Of course our perception is implied in our perceiving them; but this does not prove that our perception is necessary to their existence. In fact we perceive them because they exist. Unwilling to admit abstractions of any kind, Berkeley argued that the objects

could not exist apart from the perception; hence his maxim, *esse est percipi.* I admit that a thing perceived must exist; but this does not imply, according to the rules of logic, the converse proposition, that a thing in order to exist must be perceived. I allow *percipi est esse*, but not *esse est percipi.* There were rocks deposited in our earth before there was a man to perceive them. We may believe that at this moment there are flowers in forests which have never been trod by human foot. The external thing, be it matter or be it idea, must exist in order to my perceiving it—it is *esse* before it is *percipi.*

But then he explains that he does not mean that in order to the existence of a thing it must be perceived by the individual, it may be perceived by other finite beings, it must be perceived by God. But this admission implies that in order to its existence it is not necessary that we should perceive it; in other words, the thing may exist independent of our perception of it. "I will grant you that extension, color, etc., may be said to be without the mind in a double respect; that is, independent of our will and distinct from the mind" (IV., 667). And if it exist independent of our perception it may exist independent of the perception of other created beings. There is nothing, then, in the nature of our perception, considered in itself, implying that the existence of the object implies perception. Berkeley speaks as if the existence of a thing independent of mind is meaningless and contradictory; is repugnant, as he expresses it. But surely I can conceive of a thing as existing out of and independent of the mind perceiving it, and if there be evidence I can believe it to exist. True, if I believe it to exist on reasonable ground, I must have perceived it myself, or have the testimony of some one who has perceived it. But then I can conceive it to exist whether I have perceived it or no; whether, in-

deed, I believe in its existence or no. In all this there is nothing self-repugnant. "But, then, to a Christian, it cannot surely be shocking to say that the real tree existing without his mind is truly known and comprehended by (that it exists in) the infinite mind of God" (I., 330). That everything is known to God and comprehended by his infinite mind will be admitted by all Christians, by all who believe in an omnicient God. But, then, this does not follow from the nature of perception, but from our belief derived otherwise of the guardian care of God, a belief most readily obtained when we acknowledge the reality of external objects. Observe how dextrously he slides from one meaning of comprehension, from the meaning "embraced in the understanding," to "exist in," which is an entirely different thing. I comprehend the deed of a son murdering his father, but this does not make the deed exist in me. Not only so, but I hold it to be in every way most reverent, not to speak of that deed of murder as existing in the mind of the good God. Berkeley often writes as if it were not possible for God to make a thing, having an existence out of himself, with any power in itself. This, surely, is a limitation of the divine power by no means very reverential. Believing the plunging of the knife into the bosom of the murdered man to exist out of me, I believe it to be most becoming to represent it as also existing out of God.

He is greatly alarmed for the consequences which might follow, provided it is admitted that there can be existence independent of perception. "Opinion that existence was distinct from perception of horrible consequence. It is the foundation of Hobbes' doctrine" (IV., 459). But fact and truth never lead to evil consequences, which errors, even well-meant errors, commonly do. The good bishop never dreamed that his favorite principle would furnish a

starting-point to Hume. I have noticed passages in Berkeley which look as if they might have suggested the basis of Hume's skeptical theory. Hume opens his *Treatise of Human Nature:* "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I call *impressions* and *ideas*. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence we may name *impressions;* and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and convictions as they make their first appearance in the soul. By *ideas*, I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning." Might not the whole doctrine, and the language employed, and the distinction drawn, have risen up in his shrewd, unsatisfied mind as he read at the close of a long discussion in the *Principles:* "What do we perceive besides our ideas and sensations?" (I., 157). He specifies the very distinction between the two, the one more lively, the other more faint. "The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of imagination" (170). "The ideas imprinted in the senses by the author of nature are called real things, and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant are more commonly termed ideas" (172). Hume thus got his very phraseology, *impressions* (from *imprinted*) and *ideas*, and the distinction between the two, as lying in the difference of force or strength, liveliness or distinctness. Hume accepted the bishop's doctrine and drove it logically to a conclusion which did not admit of an argument for the existence of a God to uphold these impressions or sensations and ideas.

Matter.—The whole philosophy of Locke proceeds on the supposition that we perceive only ideas. His theory

of knowledge is a movement in a circle. An idea is the object we perceive; the object we perceive is an idea. This idea was regarded by him as an image of an object out of the mind which it resembles and represents. But it was perceived at an early date that he had and could have no proof of this, indeed no proof of the existence of matter. Man can take no immediate cognizance of matter; and logic will not allow us from a mere idea in the mind to argue the existence of something beyond the mind. This was the condition of speculative philosophy in Great Britain when Berkeley thought out his ingenious theory. He saw it to be very unsatisfactory, if the mind can perceive nothing but the idea, to argue that there must be a material object of which it is a copy. So he boldly declared we are not required to believe in anything but the idea. All that we perceive is the idea. We have no proof of the existence of anything else. If there be anything else it must be unknown. Every purpose that could be served by this supposed external thing may be accomplished by the idea. "If, therefore, it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so must be a very precarious opinion, since it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are utterly useless and serve no manner of purpose. In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and, if it were not, we might have the very same reason to think that there were that we have now" (I., 165). Berkeley thus started what Hamilton would call a presentation theory of sense-perception; that is, that the mind looked directly on the object, the object with him, however, being the idea with nothing beyond. Reid followed: discovering that Locke could never reach the existence of matter by a process of reasoning, he insisted that the existence of matter

was suggested by instinct, intuition, or common-sense, there being first a sensation, this instinctively raising a perception of an external thing. Hamilton took a bolder and a more direct course than Reid: discarding, as Reid had done, the idea of Locke and of Berkeley; and discarding, too, the *suggestion* of Reid, he asserted that we look directly on matter, are immediately conscious of matter. Hamilton, like Berkeley, is a presentationist; but Berkeley says that the object before the mind is an idea, whereas Hamilton says it is a material object possessing extension.

At this point it is of all things the most important to determine in what sense Berkeley admits, and in what sense he denies, the existence of matter. He is ever asserting, and asserting in strong language, that he believes in the existence of bodies. Yet he speaks constantly of his aim being to expel matter from the universe: "Were it necessary to add any further proof against the existence of matter" (I., 16 and *passim*). But he is a firm upholder of the existence, not of abstract matter, but of individual bodies: "I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we do deny is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance." In the interests of religion he is tremulously afraid of allowing the existence of matter as a substance. "Matter once allowed, I defy any man to prove that God is not matter" (IV., 442); as if matter did not, like mind, supply evidence of the existence of its maker and disposer. He is for expelling the substance, matter, to which some were attributing an existence independent of God; but infidels in our day are quite ready to make a like use of matter con-

sidered as a mere phenomenon: they argue that it does not need a God to support it. He is right, so I think, in maintaining that in regard to body we should not be required to believe in more than we can perceive by the senses, more than we see, and feel, and taste, and smell, and hear. But then we perceive by the senses much more than he is disposed to allow. He means by idea "any sensible or imaginable thing." An idea must be in the mind, so he argues that the whole, perception and thing perceived, must be in the mind. "The tree or house, therefore, which you think of is conceived by you." "What is conceived is surely in the mind" (I., 291, 292). "Nothing properly but persons, *i.e.*, conscious things, do exist. All other things are not so much existences, as manners of the existence of persons;" on which Professor Fraser asks, "Is an extended thing a mode in which a person exists?" (IV., 469). He showed in his *New Theory of Vision* that color is in the mind, and then, in his *Principles* and later works, that extension, as an idea, must also be in the mind. Professor Fraser thus expounds him, I believe fairly: "When we do our utmost by imagination to conceive bodies existing externally or absolutely, we are, in the very act of doing so, making them ideas, not of sense indeed, but of imagination. The supposition itself of their individual existence, makes them ideas, inasmuch as it makes them imaginary objects, dependent on an imagining mind" (I., 123). Still he stands up for the reality of body: "The table I write on I say exists, that I see and feel it, and if it were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby, that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit does actually perceive it" (I., 157). This is the very theory which, passing through Hume and James Mill, has been elaborated by John Stuart Mill into the doctrine of matter

being the "possibility of sensations." Every man of ordinary sense on first hearing this doctrine will be inclined to say, there must surely be some mistake, some confusion here, and this whether he is able to point it out or not. The misconceptions, I believe, are to be rectified by an inductive inquiry into what the senses really reveal. Looking simply to the testimony of our senses they make known something out of us and independent of us. In particular we know body as extended, we see it as extended in two dimensions, we feel it as with three dimensions. No doubt there is perception in all this, but perception is not extended in any sense, in one, two, or three dimensions. We perceive it as something different from our perception, and we perceive it as having something not in our perception, we perceive it, in short, as extended. This is an intuition carrying within itself its own evidence. As being self-evident it can stand the test of contradiction: we cannot believe the opposite; we cannot be made to believe that the table before me has not length and breadth. It is also catholic or universal, as being in all men. Just as by the internal sense we know mind, so by the external senses we know matter. The evidence for the existence of the one is much the same as the evidence for the existence of the other. We cannot allow the one to set aside the other. We must accept both, and I defy any one to show that there is any repugnancy between them.

Extension perceived by Sight and Touch.—He puzzles himself and puzzles his editor greatly by his favorite maxim, that we do not see the same extension by the eye and by the touch. "The objects of sight and touch are two distinct things" (I., 56). Professor Fraser seems to go further, "colored extension is antithetical to felt extension." The perplexity arises from not observing precisely what we do perceive by means of these two senses. By

the eye we do not perceive abstract extension, but an extended thing. It is the same with touch, we do not perceive mere extension, we perceive an extended thing. By a subsequent act of comparison, we may discover the two, the extended table seen and touched, to be the same thing. Surely there is no antithesis here, any more than there is between seeing first one side of a building, and then another side, between seeing the one side of a shield red, and the other black. By each of the senses we get a certain amount of information, which we combine in the one thing, which we discover to have extension, discovered both by the eye and by touch. Certainly the knowledge given by the touch in our ordinary apprehension of sensible objects mingles with that given by the eye, and indeed with that given by all the senses, and we superadd to all these the inferences which we have drawn. To intuitive perception by the eye a mountain is but a colored surface with a definite outline; but we combine in it all that we have known about mountains by touch and a gathered experience, that green is grass, that other green is a tree, that brown is a scar, and that sharp outline a precipice. There is no contradiction in all this.

Substance.—It is not to be wondered at that Berkeley should have been dissatisfied with Locke's doctrine on this subject. Locke denies very strongly and emphatically that he sets aside substance, and he is very angry at his opponent, Stillingfleet, when he says that he does so. He believes in substance; but then it can be made known neither by sensation nor reflection, and so it comes in very awkwardly in a system which acknowledges no other inlets of knowledge than these two. It is the unknown substratum or support of what is known. Berkeley did great service to philosophy by removing these crutches supposed to help, but really hindering, our conviction as to the

reality of things. "Say you there might be a thinking substance—something unknown which perceives and supports and ties together the ideas. Say, make it appear that there is need of it, and you shall have it for me; I care not to take away anything I can see the least reason to think should exist" (IV., 443). I have always regretted that Reid and the Scottish school, in discarding the "idea" of Locke as coming between the thing perceived and perception, did not also abandon the "substance" of Locke as being equally useless and cumbersome. Berkeley seems to me to be farther and pre-eminently right when he maintains, in regard to matter, that we are to believe only in what is made known by the senses. "That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this there is no damage to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The atheist, indeed, will want the color of an empty name to support his impiety; and the philosophers may possibly find that they have lost a great handle for trifling and disputation" (I., 173). I am glad to find him saying farther, as if he had a reference to a mode of speaking in our day: "The philosophers talk much of a distinction betwixt absolute and relative things, considered in their own nature, and the same things considered with respect to us. I know not what they mean by 'things considered in themselves.' This is nonsense, jargon." I have, however, endeavored to show that Berkeley did not discover all that is involved in perception by the senses.

But is Matter a Substance? The answer to this question must depend on the definition which we give of substance. There is a sense, and this I believe the proper

sense, in which both mind and matter are substances. It can be shown of both that they exist. It can be shown, secondly, of both, of matter as well as mind, that they are not created by our perceiving them. We perceive matter because it already exists. It exists whether we perceive it or no. It does not cease to exist because we have ceased to look at it. In this sense it has an independence, not, it may be, of God, but an independence of the percipient mind, of our perception of it. I am prepared to maintain that matter, like mind, has power of some kind. I do not assert that it has power independent of God—this is a question which carries us into a much higher region than our primitive perceptions. What I affirm is, that it has potency, influence of some kind. Now combine these three things: being, independence of our perceptions, and potency, and we have the true idea of substance. Thus understood, substance has no need of a substratum or support. Under God, who may himself be understood as a substance, it is its own support; and any other support would be a weakness. Everything possessing these three things may be regarded as a substance. Mind is a substance, for it has being, independence, and power. But matter is also a substance for the very same reasons.

Power.—His views on this subject are vague and unsatisfactory. He seems to regard all power as in God. He leaves no power whatever in body. "Matter neither acts, nor perceives, nor is it perceived." The first question here is: Is it true? Can we prove it? I believe we know things in this world, we know ourselves as having power, and bodies as having power upon each other. I believe them to have such power in our primitive cognition of them. Experience confirms this. According to Berkeley there is no relationship between material things, except

that of coexistence and succession: one thing is a mere sign of another, and an arbitrary sign. These ideas which constitute all we perceive, can have no influence on each other. Now it seems to me that we are led to believe that they do act on each other. It can be shown that in all bodily actions there are two or more agents. A hammer strikes a stone and breaks it: the cause consists of the hammer and stone each in a certain state; the effect consists of the same hammer and stone in another state, the hammer having lost the momentum which it had when it came in contact with the stone, and the stone being broken. It seems plain to me that the cause here is not a mere arbitrary sign of the effect; the effect is the result of powers or properties of the agent. A second question may arise: What is the religious bearing of such a doctrine? According to it God "useth no tool or instrument at all" (I., 312); there are no second causes in nature, but only natural signs. There is "no sharing betwixt God and nature or second causes in my doctrine." Is there not a risk that this very pious doctrine land us in the very impious conclusion, that if all action is of God, sinful action must also be of him? If we have no knowledge of power in nature or in created mind, have we any proof of the existence of power in God? The doctrine was eagerly seized by Hume, who showed that according to it the mind could form no idea of power beyond a custom of expecting that things which have been unvariably together in our experience will continue to be together. Left without the idea of power in the cognition of ourselves or earthly objects, we have really no ground except this same custom, carried illegitimately beyond our experience, (which can give us no knowledge of world-making) for arguing the existence of God from his works in nature.

Signs.—The great truth which Berkeley helped to

establish, that distance can be known by the eye only by means of signs supplied by touch, opened new views, which he carried out further than he was logically entitled. From the beginning he meant to use the theory of vision, to establish his favorite principle that we do not perceive extended things out of the perceiving mind: we perceive merely the signs of things. What the eye discerns is merely the sign of something else discovered by touch. "We see distances as we see shame or anger in the looks of a friend" (I., 63). In his later works he carries out the same principle to touch, and shows that it makes known simply heaven-appointed and heaven-organized symbols of reality beyond. But this view involves a mistake in starting, and a want of logic in the process. It is not correct to say that the eye does not immediately discover extended body; it looks directly on an extended colored surface. The eye may need the aid of the muscular sense to reveal space in three dimensions, but it at once perceives space in two dimensions; and we are thus put in a position to understand the farther information conveyed by touch. Our secondary knowledge implies primary knowledge, and the elements of the secondary knowledge must be found in the primary. If there be the idea of extension in the derived knowledge, there must have been the idea of extension in the original knowledge. The looks of a man reveal shame and anger, because we already know these by self-consciousness. Signs cannot reveal to us anything not otherwise known in its materials. We certainly have the idea of an extended thing, and this could never be made known to us by a sign which was not itself extended. Signs are merely the antecedents or concomitants of things which we are enabled to conceive because we know them otherwise. Little did Berkeley see in arguing that we only see signs of things, that he was pre-

paring the way for the avenging skeptic, who allows the existence of the signs, but argues with David Hume and Herbert Spencer that the things signified are unknown and unknowable.

Lofty minds are apt to be particularly fascinated with the doctrine that nature is a system of universal symbolism. I believe as firmly as Berkeley ever did, that it is so; I believe with him that "the methods of nature are the language of its author" (I., 211). But I do so because the signs are real things, signs of other things. If the glass is visionary the things seen through it will be apt to be regarded as also visionary. As he advanced in life and enjoyed leisure in the bishopric of Cloyne, he eagerly turned to the study of Plato and the Neo-Platonists, and embodied the results in his *Siris, a Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Inquiries concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water.*

Mind.—Our author is very valiant in making inroads into the territories of his enemies; but meanwhile he leaves his own domain defenceless. "There is not any other substance than spirit, or that which perceives." But it is very difficult to tell us what he makes of spirit. Professor Fraser acknowledges, "Berkeley has no clear teaching about finite minds—*egos* as distinguished from the *Ego*" (IV., 638). Berkeley tells us, "the very existence of ideas constitutes the soul." "Consult, ransack the understanding; what find you there besides several perceptions or thoughts? Mind is a congeries of perceptions. Take away perceptions and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind" (IV., 438). Every one acquainted with the history of philosophy will perceive that this, the doctrine with which the young Berkeley started, is the very doctrine which Hume reaches: "Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks, and

we know this too. In sleep and trances the mind exists not, there is no time, no succession of ideas" (IV., 444). No wonder the editor says, "As to personal identity he is obscure." I would rather say, he is clearly wrong. He tells us again and again that mind or spirit is "not knowable, not being an idea" (IV., 462); a doctrine far lower than that of Locke, who maintains that we have an idea of mind by means of Reflection. "I have no idea of a volition or act of the mind; neither has any other intelligence, for that were a contradiction" (IV., 446). He seeks to save himself from palpably absurd consequences by drawing, in the second edition of his *Principles of Human Knowledge*, the distinction between Idea and Notion (taking the phrase, I believe, from Bishop Browne): "It must be admitted, at the same time, that we have some notion of soul or spirit, and the operations of the mind, such as willing, loving, hating, inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words" (I., 170). But he never accurately defined what he meant by Notion; and his whole philosophy is left, in consequence, in an unsatisfactory condition.

In digging away the ground on which error has rested, I do not believe that Berkeley has left to himself a foundation on which to build a solid philosophy. "I approve," he says, "of this axiom of the schoolmen, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.* I wish they had stuck to it. It had never taught them the doctrine of abstract ideas" (IV., 457). His editor is evidently staggered with "this remarkable statement," and does not know very well what to make of it. His doctrine on this subject is a great deal lower than that of Locke, who made reflection as well as sensation an inlet of ideas, such as those of time, and power, and spirit, by which he so far counteracted the sensational tendency of his philosophy.

Berkeley is often appealing to intuition and reason in upholding his own favorite maxims, such as that there cannot be matter without mind, but has left no explanation of the nature and laws of these ultimate principles, or defence of their legitimacy. His negative appeal is to some "repugnancy," he does not tell us to what. These defects in the foundation are not to be repaired by abutments in the superstructure. There is a like defect in his ethical principles. "Sensual pleasure is the *summum bonum*. This is the great principle of morality. This once rightly understood, all the doctrines, even the severest of the gospels, may clearly be demonstrated. Sensual pleasure *quâ* pleasure, is good and desirable by a wise man. But if it be contemptible 'tis not *quâ* pleasure but *quâ* pain or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater pleasure" (IV., 457). This is a vastly more degraded view than that taken by Shaftesbury, of whom he speaks so disparagingly. We see how much need there was in that age of a Butler to give a deeper foundation to morality than Locke or Berkeley had done. There is greater need of a Butler than of a Berkeley in our time.

His view of space and time is thus rendered by his editor: "Finite Space is, with him, experience in unresisted organic movement which is capable of being symbolized in the visual consciousness of coexisting colors. Finite Time is the apprehension of changes in our ideas, length of time being measured by the number of changes. Infinite Space and Infinite Time, because inapprehensible by intelligence, are dismissed from philosophy as terms void of meaning, or which involve contradictions" (I., 117). If our natural judgments were not meant to deceive us there must be vastly more than this in Time, Space, and Infinity, say, the Infinity of God.

There is a very general impression that the philosophy of Berkeley is favorable to religion. That he meant it to be so is certain; that many have felt it to be so should not be denied. Taken apart from his speculations about tar-water and the non-existence of matter, the general influence of his writings is inspiring and ennobling, carrying us above the damp earth into the empyrean, where we breathe a pure and delicious atmosphere. His *Minute Philosopher* is distinguished by great acuteness, a lofty tone, and an alluring charm of manner and of style. The speakers appointed to oppose religion do not argue so searchingly as the objecting interlocutors do in Plato's dialogues; but they bring forward the current objections of the age, and the answer to them is complete. But our present inquiry is, What is the tendency of his system? And, whatever may be the immediate impression produced by it, the influence of a philosophy is determined by its logical consequences, which will come to be wrought out by some one. Hume declares that most of Berkeley's writings "form the best lessons of skepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers—Bayle not excepted," and he gives the reason, "they admit of no answer and produce no conviction." Hume certainly labored with all his might (and he was a mighty man) to make Berkeley teach lessons of skepticism. If bodies have an existence merely as perceived, people will argue that it may be the same with spirits; and Berkeley virtually allows the consequence. If matter has no substantial existence, why may it not be the same with mind? And, if so, what remains but Hume's sensations and ideas? Berkeley imagined he was getting new and special proof of the Divine existence by his doctrine of signs; but Hume came after him and showed that the

signs suggested things beyond them merely by the association of ideas; merely by a phenomenon of sight suggesting a phenomenon of touch; in fact merely by the two having been together. In particular, he showed that two sensations, with an interval between, gendered the illusive feeling of the continued existence of the sentient agent.

II

AGNOSTICISM OF HUME AND HUXLEY, WITH A NOTICE OF THE SCOTTISH SCHOOL AND NOTES ON J. S. MILL

PART FIRST.

DAVID HUME.

SECTION I.

A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF HUME'S LIFE.

In the winter of the year 1723 there entered the University of Edinburgh a boy under twelve years of age (he was born April 26, 1711), who in his future life was to undermine all previous modern speculative thinking, and constrain philosophy to begin to build anew. This was David Hume, son of Joseph Hume or Home, advocate, but who passed his life as a country gentleman at Ninewells, near the borders of England. Entering college when he should have been at school, he was introduced, after getting an imperfect acquaintance with Latin and Greek, in the classes of logic, pneumatics, and moral philosophy, to subjects fitted only for men of matured powers and enlarged knowledge. I suspect there was no ruling mind among his teachers to sway him, and he was left to follow the bent of his own original and searching intellect.

We have two accounts of Hume's life, the one an autobiography, *My Own Life*, the other by Mr. Hill Burton, who had access to the papers collected by Baron Hume and deposited with the Royal Society of Edinburgh.[1]

[1] In this paper I have made use of the larger article on Hume in my *Scottish Philosophy, Biographical, Expository, and Critical.*

"I was seized very early," he says in *My Own Life*, "with a passion for literature which has been the ruling passion of my life, and a great source of my enjoyments." In writing to a friend, July 4, 1727, he mentions having by him written papers which he will not make known till he has polished them, and these evidently contain the germs of a system of mental philosophy. He had to pass through a singular experience, which he details in a letter written, though probably never sent, to a physician, supposed by Mr. Burton to be Dr. Cheyne, author of the *Philosophical Principles of Natural Religion*, and a work on "Nervous Diseases." He begins with stating that he had always a strong inclination to books and letters, and that after fifteen years he had been left to his own choice in reading. "I found it to incline almost equally to books of reasoning and philosophy, and to poetry and the polite authors. Every one who is acquainted either with the philosophers or critics knows that there is nothing yet established in either of these sciences, and that they contain little more than endless disputes on the most fundamental articles. Upon examination of these I found a certain boldness of temper growing in me which was not inclined to submit to any authority on these subjects, but led me to seek out some new medium by which truth might be established. After much study and reflection on this, at last, when I was about eighteen years of age, there seemed to be opened up to me a new scene of thought which transported me beyond measure, and made me, with an ardour natural to young men, throw up every other pleasure or business to apply entirely to it. The law, which was the business I designed to follow, appeared nauseous to me, and I could think of no other way of pushing my fortune in the world but that of scholar and philosopher. I was infinitely happy in this course of life for some months, till at last, about the be-

ginning of September, 1729, all my ardour seemed in a moment to be extinguished, and I could no longer raise my mind to that pitch which formerly gave me such excessive pleasure. I felt no uneasiness or want of spirits when I laid aside my book; and, therefore, never imagined there was any bodily distemper in the case, but that my coldness proceeded from a laziness of temper which must be overcome by redoubling my application. In this condition I remained for nine months, very uneasy to myself, but without growing any worse—which was a miracle. There was another particular which contributed more than anything to waste my spirits and bring on me this distemper, which was, that having read many books of morality, such as Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch, and being smit with their beautiful representations of virtue and philosophy, I undertook the improvement of my temper and will, along with my reason and understanding. I was continually fortifying myself with reflections against death and poverty, and shame and pain, and all the other calamities of life. These no doubt are exceeding useful when joined with an active life, because the occasion being presented along with the reflection, works it into the soul and makes it take a deep impression; but in solitude they serve to little other purpose than to waste the spirits, the force of the mind meeting with no resistance, but wasting itself in the air like our arm when it misses the aim. This, however, I did not learn but by experience, and till I had already ruined my health, though I was not sensible of it." He then describes the symptoms, scurvy spots breaking out on his fingers the first winter, then a wateryness in the mouth. Next year, about May, 1731, there grew upon him a ravenous appetite and a palpitation of heart. In six weeks, from "being tall, lean, and rawboned, he became on a sudden the most sturdy, robust, healthful-like fellow

you have seen, with a ruddy complexion and a cheerful countenance." He goes on to say that, "having now time and leisure to cool my inflamed imagination, I began to consider seriously how I should proceed with my philosophical studies. I found that the moral philosophy transmitted to us by antiquity labored under the same inconvenience that has been found in their natural philosophy, of being entirely hypothetical and depending more upon invention than experience; every one consulted his fancy in erecting schemes of virtue and happiness, without regarding human nature, upon which every moral conclusion must depend. This, therefore, I resolved to make my principal study, and the source from which I would derive every truth in criticism as well as morality." He tells how he had read most of the celebrated books in Latin, French, and English; how, "within these three years I find I have scribbled many a quire of paper in which there is nothing contained but my own inventions;" how he "had collected the rude materials for many volumes;" but, he adds, "I had no hopes of delivering my opinions with such elegance and neatness as to draw to me the attention of the world, and I would rather live and die in obscurity than produce them maimed and imperfect." "It is a weakness rather than lowness of spirits which troubles me," and he traces an analogy between what he had passed through and recorded religious experiences. "I have noticed in the writings of the French mystics, and in those of our fanatics here, that when they give a history of the situation of their souls they mention a coldness and desertion of the spirit which frequently returns." But, "however this may be, I have not come out of the cloud so well as they commonly tell us they have done, or rather began to despair of ever recovering. To keep myself from being melancholy on so dismal a prospect, my only security was

in peevish reflections on the vanity of the world and of all human glory; which, however just sentiments they may be esteemed, I have found can never be sincere, except in those who are possessed of them. Being sensible that all my philosophy would never make me contented in my present situation, I began to rouse up myself." He found these two things very bad for this distemper, study and idleness, and so he wishes to betake himself to active life. His choice was confined to two kinds of life, that of a travelling governor and that of a merchant. The first not being fit for him, he says he is now on his way to Bristol, to engage in business till he is able to "leave this distemper behind me." He says that "all the physicians I have consulted, though very able, could never enter into my distemper," and so he now applies to this eminent doctor.

We can understand the circumstances in which the youth was educated and on which his philosophy was formed. He had been carefully brought up, we are not told in what form of religion, by his mother, who described him as "a fine good-natured crater, but uncommon wake-minded," probably because he had not the energy of the young lawyers and gentry of the period. He lived in a region where the religious life was not so deep as in the covenanting country in the southwest of Scotland, and where indifferentism, called *moderatism*, was exercising a deadening influence. Deism had been started in the previous century in England by Herbert of Cherbury, and was defended in the early part of the eighteenth century by Blount, by Toland, by Middleton, by Tindal, by Whiston, and Collins. It had reached Scotland in 1732, when David Dudgeon, a farmer in Hume's district, published a deistical work called the *Moral World*. Hume must have known the controversies thus excited. Meanwhile he had become enamoured of the philosophy of the

Latins, as Cicero and Seneca; and was familiar with the views of Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley, the names that stood highest in his day.

His friends had destined him for the law, but not liking it he thought of business. He says: "In 1734 I went to Bristol with some recommendations to eminent merchants, but in a few months found that scene totally unsuitable to me. I went over to France with a view of prosecuting my studies in a country retreat, and I there laid that plan of life which I have steadily and successfully pursued."

We can easily picture the youth of twenty-three as he set out for France. By nature he is one of a class of persons to be found in all countries, but quite as frequently in Scotland as anywhere else, who are endowed with a powerful intellect conjoined with a heavy animal temperament; and who, with no high aspirations, ideal, ethereal, or spiritual, have a tendency to look with suspicion on all kinds of enthusiasm and high-flown zeal. With an understanding keen and searching he could not be contented with the appearances of things, and was ever bent on penetrating beneath the surface; and his native shrewdness, his hereditary predilections, and the reaction against the heats of the previous century, all combined to lead him to question common impressions and popular opinions. He saw the difficulties which beset philosophical and theological investigations, and was unable to deliver himself from them, being without the high sentiments which might have lifted him above the low philosophy of his own day in England and France, and the sophistries suggested by a restless intellect. He knew only the ancient Stoic philosophy in the pages of Roman authors and the modern philosophy of Locke, as modified by such men as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and driven to its logical consequences

by Berkeley; he had tried the one in his practical conduct and the other by his sifting intellect, and having found both wanting he is prepared to abandon himself to skepticism, which is the miserable desert resorted to by those who despair of truth. Meanwhile his great intellectual powers find employment in constructing theories of the mind in which he himself perhaps had no great faith, but which seemed the logical conclusion of the acknowledged philosophical principles of his time, and quite as plausible as any that had been devised by others and brought such fame to their authors.

With these predilections France was the country which had the most attractions to him, but was at the same time the most unfortunate country he could have gone to; and the middle of the eighteenth century the most unfortunate period for visiting it. In philosophy the age had outgrown Descartes and Malebranche, Arnauld and Pascal, and the grave and earnest thinkers of the previous century, and was embracing the most superficial parts of Locke's philosophy, which had been introduced by Voltaire to the knowledge of Frenchmen, who turned it to a wretched sensationalism. In religion he saw around him, among the great mass of the people, a very corrupted and degenerate form of Christianity; while among the educated classes infidelity was privately cherished and was ready to burst out. Voltaire had issued his first attack on Christianity in his "Epître à Uranie," published in 1728, and carried English Deism into France. The fire spread with a rapidity which showed that there were materials ready to catch it and propagate it. Sixty years later, one so fond of order and peace would have been scared by the effects produced by skepticism, so powerful in overthrowing old abuses, and so weak in constructing anything new or better; but at this time infidelity was full of hope and

promising an era of liberty and peace. The very section of the Catholic Church which retained the highest faith, and the purest morality had unfortunately been involved in a transaction which favored the skeptical tendency among shrewd minds. Only a few years before, the people believed that the sick were healed and the blind made to see at the tomb of a famous Jansenist, the Abbé Paris; and the noise made by the occurrences and the discussions created by them had not passed away when Hume arrived in Paris, and the youth pondered the event to bring it out years after in his *Essay on Miracles.* While he lived at La Flèche a Jesuit plied him with some "nonsensical miracle" performed lately in their convent; and then and there occurred to him the famous argument which he afterward published against miracles. "As my head was full of the topics of the *Treatise on Human Nature* which I was at that time composing, the argument immediately occurred to me and I thought it very much gravelled my companion; but at last he observed to me that it was impossible for that argument to have any validity, because it operated equally against the gospel as the Catholic miracles: which observation I thought fit to admit as a sufficient answer."

After living a short time in Paris he retired to Rheims, and afterwards went to La Flèche, where he passed two of the three years he spent in France. We know nothing of his employments these years, except that he devoted himself most earnestly to the composition of his *Treatise on Human Nature.* In 1737 he brought it over with him to London, where he published the two first books the end of the following year.

This Treatise is by far the most important of all his philosophical works. If we except certain speculations in history and political economy, it contains nearly all his

favorite ideas. He devoted to it all the resources of his mighty intellect. He had read extensively, pondered deeply, and taken immense pains in polishing his style. He could scarcely indeed be called a learned man in the technical sense of the term, but he was well informed. We could have wished that he had possessed wider sympathies with earnest seekers after truth in all ages, but this was not in the nature of the man. His knowledge of Greek was very imperfect at this time (he afterward renewed his acquaintance with that language); what he knew of Greek philosophy was chiefly through Cicero (his very pictures of the Stoics and Epicureans are Roman rather than Grecian), and he never entered into the spirit of such deep and earnest thinkers as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle—he tells us somewhere that the fame of Aristotle is utterly decayed. In respect even of modern writers, he never comprehended the profundity of such men as Cudworth and Descartes in the previous century; and he had no appreciation of the speculations of Clarke and Leibnitz, who lived in the age immediately preceding his own. He belongs to the cold, elegant, doubting, and secular eighteenth century, and setting little value on antiquity, he builds for the present and the future on the philosophy of his own time.

As to style, which he greatly cultivated, the models which he set before him were the Roman prose writers, the French authors of his own day, and the Englishmen who were introducing the French clearness and point, such as Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke and Pope. He says "the first polite prose we have was writ by Swift." Though he took great pains he never altogether succeeded in weeding out his Scotticisms, nor in acquiring a genuine English idiom; but his style is always clear, manly and elegant, and worthy of his weighty thoughts. When he broke down his

elaborate Treatise into smaller ones, he endeavored to catch the ease and freedom of the lighter French literature, but neither the subject of which he treats, nor the ideas of the author admit of such treatment, and though the Essays are more ornate and have more attempts at smartness and repartee, the student will ever betake himself to the Treatise as containing the only systematic and by far the most satisfactory statement of his views.

Having published his work he retired to Ninewells to wait the result. "Never was literary attempt more unfortunate than my *Treatise on Human Nature.* It fell dead-born from the press without reaching such a distinction as even to create a murmur among the zealots." He evidently felt disappointed. "I am out of humor with myself." But he was conscious of intellectual power, he had laid his plan for life, and he indomitably persevered in his literary career. Next year he printed at Edinburgh the third volume of his Treatise with no better success. He now began to break down his great work into smaller essays. In 1741 he printed the first, and in 1742 the second, of his *Essays Moral and Political.* The work was favorably received and he was encouraged. In 1748 he cast the first part of his Treatise into a new and more improved form in the *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding,* which created no interest; but he persevered with his Essays, and in 1752 he published the second part, being his *Political Discourses.* This work was immediately received with acclamation, and being translated into French it procured him a high reputation and, in fact, raised those investigations which issued in making political economy a science in the *Wealth of Nations.*

Having set the youth and matured man with his opinions before my readers, it is not necessary to detail his remaining history. He spent most of his time in

Edinburgh, where he became the centre of a literary circle and encouraged literary men. He held for several years the office of Librarian of the Advocates' Library, and having there a valuable collection of books he began to execute his long-cherished plan of writing a History of England. He lived on friendly terms with the leaders of the church of Scotland, and encouraged them in their efforts to allay the religious fervor which had been so strong in the previous ages. On two occasions he sought to be appointed Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, but even his literary friends were doubtful as to the character of the morality to be taught to young men by one who had no religious convictions. Good-natured, sociable, and declining controversy with those who opposed him, he suffered few annoyances because of his scepticism; certainly none that deserves the name of persecution. Believing that speculative truth in philosophy or in religion was impossible, he was yet unwilling to be called an atheist, or even a deist, and professed to be seeking after light, which he never got.

In 1763 he received from the Earl of Hertford an invitation to attend him on his embassy to Paris. His visit to the capital of France on this occasion deserves a special notice as characteristic of the times. Dukes, mareschals, foreign ambassadors vied with each other in honoring him. The famous men whose persons and conversations he liked best were D'Alembert, Marmontel, Diderot, Duclos, Helvetius, and old President Henault; and he writes to Dr. Blair and bids him tell Dr. Robertson that there was not a single deist among them, meaning that there was none but went farther. But he was the special favorite of the ladies—and we know what was their character—who at that time ruled the fashion in Paris. The Coun-

tess de Boufflers addressed him, declaring the "admiration which your sublime work (*The History of England*) has awakened in me." "I know no terms capable of expressing what I felt in reading the work. I was moved, transported, and the emotion which it caused me is in some measure painful by its continuance. It elevates the soul, it fills the heart with sentiments of humanity and benevolence; it enlightens the intellect by showing that true happiness is closely connected with virtue, and discovers by the same light what is the end, the sole end, of every reasonable being." "In truth, I believed I had before my eyes the work of some celestial being, free from the passions of humanity, who, for the benefit of the human race has deigned to write the events of these latter times!!" The philosopher is evidently gratified. "What new wonder is this which your letter presents to me? I not only find a lady, who, in the bloom of beauty and height of reputation, can withdraw herself from the pleasures of a gay court, and find leisure to cultivate the sciences, but deigns to support a correspondence with a man of letters, in a remote country, and to reward his labors by a suffrage the most agreeable of all others to a man who has any spark of generous sentiment or taste for true glory." This lady, it is proper to say, in plain terms, was the wife of the Comte de Boufflers, still alive, but the mistress of the Prince of Conti, who superintended for the king that mean diplomatic correspondence which he carried on unknown to his ministers. Hume might also be seen attending the evening salons of Madame Geoffrin, who had been the daughter of a valet de chambre, and was now the centre of a circle of artists and men of letters. He also waited on the entertainments of the famous Mademoiselle de l'Espinasse, who, originally an illegitimate child, had raised herself by being, first, the

humble companion, and then the rival of Madame du Deffand, and was well known to have been the mistress of a number of successive or contemporaneous lovers. There must have been something in the philosophy of Hume which recommended him to so many ladies of this description. We believe they were glad to find so eminent a philosopher, with a system which did not seem to bear hard upon them. The courtiers told him that Madame de Pompadour "was never heard to say so much of any man." He says of himself: "I eat nothing but ambrosia, drink nothing but nectar, breathe nothing but incense, and tread on nothing but flowers. Every man I meet, and still more, every lady, would think they were wanting in the most indispensable duty if they did not make a long and elaborate harangue in my praise."

But what, it may be asked, did he think of the state of society in which he had to mingle? It is evident that he was horrified at times with the proclaimed atheism of men and women. But what did he think of the morality of the circles in which he moved, more especially of the loose relationship of the marriage tie? Did this utilitarian theory of morals, of which he surely knew the bearing and tendency, allow of such a state of things? It is certain that Hume uttered no protest at the time, and he has left behind no condemnation of the morality of France, while he was fond of making sly and contemptuous allusions to the manifestations of religious zeal in his own country. The tone of morality in France could never have been amended by him, nor, we venture to say, by any utilitarian.

In his will he gave orders for the publication of his *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, a work written long before, and undermining all natural religion, to which his literary friends in Scotland still clung. He died August 26, 1776.

SECTION II.

IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS.

Everybody knows that Hume was a sceptic. It is not so generally known that he has developed a full system of the human mind in his *Treatise of Human Nature.* His scepticism is unfolded in the form of a psychology. He claims to proceed, in the manner of his time, by observation. I am to proceed in the same way in opposing him. This is not the plan followed by the recent critics of Hume, on whose objections to his scepticism I set no value whatever, as they proceed on Kant's critical method. While Kant has established certain important truths he has not shown wisdom—such is my opinion—in his manner of meeting Hume. He has not opposed the sceptic at his entrance; he has allowed the Trojan horse to come in, and has thus introduced a foe which he has not been able to expel, and opened the way for a more widespread and devouring infidelity than Hume's direct attacks ever did. I am to follow Hume's method; but in doing so I discover by observation truths prior to, and above observation, which not only he, but his immediate philosophic predecessors, Locke and Berkeley, did not notice.

Locke had said, "Since the mind in all its thoughts and reasoning hath no other object but its own ideas, which it alone does and can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them" (Essay, B. iv., 1). Berkeley had put the question (Berkeley's Works, by Fraser, vol. i., 157), "what do we perceive besides our ideas and sensations." He fixes on a distinction between these two, the one being more strong and lively, and the other

faint. "The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of imagination" (p. 170). "The ideas imprinted in the senses by the author of nature are called real things, and those excited in the imagination, being less regular, vivid, and constant, are commonly termed ideas" (172). At this point Hume started, using the very phrases of Berkeley, *impressions* (from *imprinted*) and ideas. He thus opens his *Treatise:* "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I call impressions and ideas. The difference betwixt them consists in the degree of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence we may name *impressions*, and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight or touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion."

Hume is to be met at this gate, by which he would enter. Kant, we may show in a future paper, betrayed the cause of genuine philosophy by granting what the sceptic demanded. We are not to be satisfied with the account which Hume gives, because it proceeds on what Locke and Berkeley and the prevalent philosophy of the day admitted. His appeal is to observation, and by it he is to be tried. Falling in with the theories of his time, he has given a wrong account, our observation being witness, of our perceptions. The sceptical conclusions which he has drawn should make us review the philosophy of his predecessors. We are not to follow him simply because he follows those who have gone before; we are to inquire by

the internal sense what our perceptions are. We never, in fact, have a mere impression or a mere idea, we have a thing impressed, and in our sense impression there is a thing impressing; and we have self receiving the impression and entertaining the idea. He has given a totally perverted view of our perceptions. In the perceptions of the mind there are things perceived. We have as good evidence, in fact the same evidence, a self-evidence, of the thing perceived as of the perception; in fact, the perception is of a thing, of self or body as perceived. We thus stop the sceptic at the entrance. We have thus realities, we have things as the basis, and upon this can rear a solid, and not an ideal philosophy.

It will not do to place under the same head and call by the one name two such things as the affections of the senses on the one hand, and the mental emotions of hope, fear, joy, and sorrow on the other. Nor can we allow him to describe all our sense-perceptions by the vague name of *impressions*. What is meant by impression, a term employed by Locke and Berkeley, and now adopted by Hume? If the word has any proper meaning, it must signify that there is something impressing—without which there would be no impression—and also, something impressed. If Hume admits all this to be in the impression, we ask him to go on with us to inquire what is in the thing impressed, and in the thing that impresses, and we are at once in the region of existences, internal and external. "I never," he says, "catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception." His very language contradicts itself. He talks of catching *himself*, what is this *self* that he catches? But he may say it is only a perception. We reply that there is more; we never observe a perception alone. We always observe self as perceiving. It is true that I never can catch myself at any

time without a perception; but it is quite as certain, and we have the same evidence for it, that we never observe a perception except when we observe self-perceiving. Let us unfold what is in this self, and we shall find that it no way resembles an impression like that left by a seal upon wax.[1] In regard to certain of our perceptions, those through the senses, we observe not only the self-perceiving, but an object perceived.

SECTION III.

MEMORY.

He now explains the way in which *ideas* appear. By memory the impressions come forth in their original order and position as ideas. This is a defective account of memory, consciousness being the witness. In memory we have not only a reproduction of a sensation, or it may be a mental affection—we recognize it as *having been before us in time past.* Of all this we have as clear evidence as we have of the presence of the idea.[2] In imagination the

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[1] As my object in this paper is not only to oppose Hume, but all who adopt his principles, I mean to attach a few notes to show how my criticisms apply to Mr. J. S. Mill, the ablest of the school. My quotations will be from his *Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy.* At this place I remark that as Mr. Mill derives all our ideas and convictions from sensations, he is to be met by showing that we never have a sensation without knowing *self* as sentient.

[2] At this point Mr. Mill has been driven into difficulties by Dr. Ward, and he avows it in a foot-note, page 174: "Our belief in the veracity of Memory is evidently ultimate; no reason can be given for it which does not presuppose the belief and assume it to be well grounded." The full facts of the Recognitive Power of Memory are not embraced in this brief enunciation; but there is much stated and more implied; he should have inquired how much is involved, and he would have seen

ideas are more strong and lively, and are transposed and changed. This, he says, is effected by an associating quality, and he here develops his account of the laws of association which has been so commended. But the truth is, his views on this subject, so far from being an advance on those of Hutcheson, are rather a retrogression; they are certainly far behind those of his contemporary, Turnbull. He seems to confine the operation of association to the exercise of imagination; he does not see that our very memories are regulated by the same principle; nay, he allows that the imagination can join two ideas without it. The associating qualities are said by him to be three in number—resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause or effect. "I do not find," he says, "that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate all the principles of association." But the classification propounded by him bears so close a resemblance to that of Aristotle that we must believe that the one given by the Stagyrite had, in the course of his reading, fallen under his notice, though he had forgotten the circumstance. The difference between the two lies in Hume giving us cause and effect, instead of contrast, as proposed by the Greek philosopher. It has often been remarked that Hume's arrangement is redundant, inasmuch as cause and effect, according to him, are nothing but contiguity in time and place.

He now shows how our complex ideas are formed. Following Locke, he represents these as consisting of substances, modes, and relations. He dismisses substance very summarily. He proceeds on the view of substance given by Locke, one of the most defective and unsatis-

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that there is truth admitted fatal to his system. He should also have shown on what ground he proclaims this belief to be "evidently ultimate," and then we might have shown that, on the same ground, that is, self-evidence, we are entitled to call in other ultimate beliefs.

factory parts of his philosophy. Locke stood up for some unknown thing called substance behind the qualities. Berkeley had shown that there is no evidence of the existence of such a substratum. Hume assumes that we have no idea of external substance different from the qualities, and he proceeds to show that we have no notion of the substance mind distinct from particular perceptions. "I believe none will assert that substance is either a color, or a sound, or a taste. The idea of substance must, therefore, be derived from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions, none of which can possibly represent a substance." A substance is thus nothing else than a collection of particular qualities united by the imagination. He thus suits the idea to his preconceived theory, instead of looking at the peculiar idea and suiting his theory to the facts. Now I give up the idea of an unknown substratum behind the qualities. I stand up only for what we know. In consciousness we know self, and in sense-perception we know the external object as *existing things exercising qualities.* In this is involved what we reckon the true idea of substance. We can as little know the qualities apart from an object exercising them, as we can an object apart from qualities. We know both in one concrete act, and we have the same evidence of the one as the other.

When he comes to Modes he examines them by the doctrine of abstract or general ideas propounded by Berkeley, which he characterizes "as one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters." According to this very defective theory (as it appears to us), all abstract or general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term. Like Locke, Hume confounds abstract and general

ideas, which should be carefully distinguished, the former meaning the notion of the part of an object as a part, more particularly an attribute; the other, the notion of objects possessing common attributes, the notion being such that it embraces all the objects possessing the common attributes. Abstraction and generalization are most important intellectual operations, the one bringing specially to view what is involved in the concrete knowledge (not impression) of the individual, and the other exhibiting the qualities in respect of which objects agree. Without such elaborative processes we should never know all that is involved in our original perceptions by sense and consciousness. Nor is it to be forgotten that when the concrete is a real object, the abstract is a real quality existing in the object, and that where the singulars are real the universal is also real, that is, a class, all the objects in which possess common qualities. Here again we find Hume overlooking one of the most essential of our mental attributes, and thus degrading human intelligence. In relation to the particular end for which he introduces his doctrine, we hold that substance and mode are known in one concrete act, and that we can separate them by abstraction for more particular consideration; the one being quite as real an existence as the other, and both having their reality in the singular object known by sense and consciousness.

SECTION IV.

SPACE AND TIME.

He goes on to a very subtle discussion as to our ideas of space and time. He says that "it is from the disposition of visible and tangible objects we receive the idea of

space, and from the succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea of time." The statement requires to be amended. It is not from the disposition of separate objects we have the idea of space, but in the very perception of material objects we know them as extended, that is, occupying space; and in the very remembrance of events we have time in the concrete, that is, events happening in time past. He is, therefore, wrong in the sceptical conclusion which he draws, that the ideas of space and time are no distinct ideas, for they are ideas formed by a high intellectual process from things immediately known. Taking a defective view of the nature and function of abstraction, he denies that we can form any idea of a vacuum or extension without matter. He maintains that the idea we form of any finite quality is not infinitely divisible. The dispute, he says, should not be about the nature of mathematical points, but about our ideas of them; and that in the division of our ideas we come to a minimum, to an indivisible idea. This whole controversy seems to me to arrive from a misapprehension. Our *idea* of space, it is evident, is neither divisible nor indivisible, and as to space, it is not divisible either finitely or infinitely, for while we can divide matter, that is, have a space between, we cannot separate any portion of space from all other space: space is and must be continuous. He is evidently jealous of the alleged certainty of mathematics, which seemed to be opposed to his universal scepticism. His aim is to raise up doubts and difficulties, some of which we may not be able to resolve, while yet we have a body of clearly perceived and certain truth. He maintains that the objects of geometry are mere ideas in the mind. We admit that surfaces, lines, points, have no independent existence, but they have all an existence in solid bodies. We are capable of perceiving the relations

between them, and can thus construct a science of mathematics in which truth is seen intuitively in considering the objects. By an excess of ingenuities and subtleties he would drive us to the conclusion that space and time are mere ideas for which we need not seek a corresponding reality, a conclusion unfortunately accepted by Kant, who thus opened the way to the empty idealism which so long reigned in the German philosophy.[1]

The result reached is summed up in the statement, "As long as we confine our speculations to the *appearances* of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never be embarrassed by any question." But, "if we carry our inquiry beyond the appearances of objects to the senses, I am afraid that most of our conclusions will be full of scepticism and uncertainty." The intelligent reader will here perceive the source whence Kant derived his doctrine, that the senses give us not things but *phenomena*, that is, appearances, and that we are involved in contradiction when we suppose that they furnish more. However great the logical

[1] Mr. Mill's treatment of Space and Time is superficial. He brings in Time quietly, without noticing it, or giving any account of it. He does not see that the idea of it is involved in the concrete in memory; we remember the event as happening *in time past*. He derives our idea of Space from that of the time occupied by our muscular sensations. "When we say that there is a space between A and B, we mean that some amount of these muscular sensations must intervene." Resisting points "are said to be at different distances from one another, because the series of intervening muscular sensations is longer in some cases than in others" (pages 228–229). He thus avowedly makes (page 227,) an "identification" of length in time and length in space "as one," whereas our consciousness declares them to be as different as it is possible for ideas to be. Besides, the hypothesis on which he and Professor Bain build their whole theory of the origin of our idea of extension, viz., the sensations of our muscles, is disproven by physiology.

power of the German metaphysician, it is clear that he did not possess the shrewdness of the common-sense philosopher of Scotland when he adopted the conclusion of the sceptic as his starting-point.

SECTION V.

RELATIONS AND BELIEF.

He has now to face the important subjects of Existence and Knowledge. Proceeding on his assumption that nothing is present to the mind but perceptions, he argues, we think, logically (if the premises be allowed) that we can never advance a step beyond ourselves, and that it is "impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas or impressions." As knowledge had been represented by Locke as consisting in comparison (we reckon this a false and dangerous doctrine), Hume has to consider the relations which the mind of man can discover.

These he represents as being seven, those of Resemblance, Identity, Space and Time, Quantity, Degree, Contrariety, Cause and Effect. This is a very good enumeration of the relations perceivable by man; it is certainly very much superior to that of many later metaphysicians, British and Continental. But he proceeds to show how little is involved in the relations discovered. "These relations may be divided into two classes, into such as depend entirely on the ideas which we compare together, and such as may be changed without any change in the ideas." In CLASS FIRST he places Resemblance, Contrariety, Degree, Proportion. These depend solely on our ideas. These only can be the objects of knowledge and certainty, but they can never go beyond our ideas which can never

go beyond our impressions. But in fact the discovery of resemblances and differences, of degree and proportion, largely widens our knowledge. In CLASS SECOND the other three, Identity, Space and Time, Cause and Effect, do not depend on our ideas, and might seem to carry us beyond them, but this he shows is an illusion. In identity and time and space we can never "go beyond what is immediately present to the senses," and so can never discover the real existence or the relations of objects. But by the powers which discover relations we can go beyond what is present to the senses, and go on from the present to distant objects and the remotest time past and future. The relations perceived are not in our ideas, but in the things perceived within and without us. And so he goes on to say, "'tis only causation which produces such a connection as to give us assurance, from the existence or action of one object, that 'twas followed or preceded by any other existence or action." He devotes the whole energy of his intellect to the task of showing that we know nothing of the nature of the relation between cause and effect; that we know their conjunction within our experience, but not their connection.

In discussing this question and kindred ones he finds it necessary to explain the nature of Belief. "The belief of the existence of an object joins no new ideas to those which compose the idea of the object." What then is the difference between belief and incredulity? It consists solely in the liveliness of the former. "We must not be contented with saying that the vividness of the idea produces the belief. We must maintain that they are individually the same." "The belief or assent which always attends the memory and senses is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they represent, and this alone distinguishes them from imagination." The theory is surely

palpably false here, for our imaginations, in which there is no faith, are often livelier than our memories, in which there is belief. But by this theory he would account for all our beliefs. He would establish it as a general maxim in the science of human nature, that when any impression became present to us it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity. "A present impression being vivid conveys its vividness to all the ideas which are associated with it by such general laws as those of resemblance, contiguity, and causation. A person that has lost a leg or an arm by amputation endeavors for a long time afterward to serve himself with them. After the death of any one 'tis a common remark of the whole family, but especially the servants, that they can scarce believe him to be dead, but still imagine him to be in his chamber, or in any other place where they were accustomed to find him." The explanation may seem a very ingenious, but it is a very feeble one. We may believe that we saw a particular person yesterday, though we have no lively impression or idea regarding him; and we do not believe in the existence of Achilles, though the reading of Homer has given us a vivid conception of him.[1]

[1] Mr. Mill has made a most unwarrantable application of the laws of association in accounting for the formation of our higher ideas. He labors to derive all our ideas from sensation through association. But sensations, say of sounds, smells, colors, and forms, or of pleasure and pain, can never be anything else than sensations, that is, sounds, smells, colors, forms, pleasures, or pains, and never can of themselves yield such ideas as those of space and time, cause and effect, moral good and moral obligation. But then he gives to association a sort of chemical power, by it changes a series of successive or contemporaneous ideas into something different from any of the ideas, just as oxygen and hydrogen by their union form a third substance, water. He is to be met

But this theory is employed to give an explanation of our belief in the relation of cause and effect. The one having always been with the other in our experience, we

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here by showing that the laws of the association are merely the laws of the succession of our ideas, and they do not generate a new idea. Repeated association may quicken the flow of our ideas, and make several as it were coalesce into one, or it may weaken some and intensify others, but it cannot yield a new element. Even on the supposition that there is (which there is not) a chemical power in association to transmute one thing into another, this would be a new and different capacity, not in the sensations and associations, but superinduced upon them. Mr. Mill's professed evolution of our higher ideas out of sensation by association is a mere jugglery in which he changes the elements without perceiving it, and overlooks the peculiarities of the composites he would explain.

He has been guilty of an equal error in very much overlooking the relations which the mind of man discover; and so far as he does notice them, in giving a very inadequate account of them. In this respect he is far behind Hume, who we have seen gives a very comprehensive summary of them. So far as Mr. Mill treats of them he (followed by Professor Bain) seems to give the mind no other power of comparison than that of observing resemblances and differences. Nor is this his worst error. He confounds the judgments of the mind with associations, and thus endeavors in a plausible but superficial way to account for that conviction of necessity which is appealed to as a test of fundamental truth. "If we find it," he says, "impossible by any trial to separate two ideas, we have all the feeling of necessity the mind is capable of" (p. 264). Now there is here the confounding of two things that are very different, the association of two ideas, so that the one always calls up the other, with the judgment which declares that two things are necessarily related. The letter A suggests the letter B—this is one mental phenomenon; we decide that two plus two make four and that it cannot be otherwise—this is an entirely different phenomenon. Now it is this necessity of judgment, and not the invariable association that is the test of first truths. When we thus show that association cannot produce a new idea, and that judgment, especially necessary judgments, are something different from associations, we deprive Mr. Mill's theory of the plausibility which has deceived the London critics bred at the English universities—where, I may take the liberty of saying, they would be very much the better for instruction in a sound and sober philosophy.

are led by habit and proceeding on the principle of association, when we find the one to look for the other; and thus too the effect being present, that is an impression, gives its vividness to the cause as an associating idea. "The idea of cause and effect is derived from experience, which presenting us with certain objects constantly conjoined with each other, produces such a habit of surveying them in that relation that we cannot, without a sensible violence, survey them in any other." This is his explanation of what is implied in efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, connection, productive quality. The essence of necessity is "the propensity which custom produces to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant." "When any object is presented to it, it immediately conveys to the mind a lively idea of that object which is usually found to attend it, and this determination forms the necessary connection of these objects." His definition of cause is "an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other."

Hume's doctrine is founded on his favorite principle, "that all our ideas are copied from our impressions." But the necessary connection of cause and effect cannot be in the impression, for "when I cast my eye on the known qualities of objects, I immediately discover that the relation of cause and effect depends not the least on them." Not being in the impression, it cannot be found in the idea. Now it is here, we apprehend, that Hume is to be met. We have disputed his theory that the mind begins with mere impressions: it commences with the perception or knowledge of objects within itself and without itself. Now in its primitive perception of objects it knows them as having power; it knows self as a power and it knows

the not-self as a power—as a power in resisting and impressing the self. Here is the *impression*, if any one will call it so (we call it knowledge), that gives use to the idea, which may be separated in thought by abstraction and put in the form of a maxim by generalization.

Unfortunately, as I think, the opponents of Hume have not always met him at the proper point. They have allowed to him that we have no original knowledge of power in the objects, and having given this entrance to the sceptic, they find great difficulty in resisting his further ravages. Sometimes they have endeavored to discover a *nexus* of some kind *between* the cause and its effect, but have always failed to tell what the bond is. Causation is not to be regarded as a *connection between* cause and effect, but a power in the object, that is, substance (or objects and substances), acting as the cause to produce the effect. Kant labored to oppose the scepticism of the Scotchman by supposing that the mind by its own forms bound together events in its contemplation of them. But when he allowed that the power was not in the objects, he introduced a more subtle and perilous skepticism than that which he sought to overthrow. We avoid this subjective idealism by insisting that it is on the bare contemplation of a thing becoming, and not by the mere association of ideas and custom (which may aid), that we declare that it must have had a cause.

SECTION VI.

PERSONALITY AND IDENTITY.

He is now prepared to discuss two questions, "Why we attribute a continued existence to objects even when they are not present to the senses, and why we suppose them to have an existence distinct from the mind and perception." He shows, as to the first, the senses give us nothing but a present perception, and as to the second, that our perceptions being of ourselves can never give us the least intimation of anything beyond. He dwells in the usual manner on the acknowledged unreality of what have been called the secondary qualities of matter, and as we naturally look upon the primary qualities, such as motion and solidity, and the secondary qualities, such as colors, sounds, heat, and cold, as alike real, so we must philosophically consider them as alike unreal. After the manner of the times he rejects the notion that we can immediately perceive our bodily frame and not mere impressions, and that we can know both the "objects and ourselves." But whence, it is asked, the coherence and constancy of certain impressions? He accounts for it on the principle that the thought, according to the laws of association, slides from one impression to others with which it has been joined and reckons them the same, and mistakes the succession of images for an identity of objects. The result reached by him is: "All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences," and "the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences." "What we call mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different impressions united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity."

He gives the same account of what we call matter. He shows that having nothing but impressions we can never, on the mere ground of a conjunction which we have never witnessed, argue from our perceptions to the existence of external continued objects; and he proves (very conclusively, we think, on his assumption) that we could never have any reason to infer that the supposed objects resemble our sensations.[1] He now draws his sceptical conclusion: "There is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses, or more properly speaking betwixt those conclusions which we form from cause and effect and those that persuade us of the continued and independent existence of body. When we reason from cause and effect we conclude that neither color, sound, taste, nor smell has a continued and independent existence. When we exclude these sensible qualities there remains nothing in the universe which has such an existence."

[1] Here again, from like premises, Mr. Mill has arrived at much the same conclusions. Mind, according to him, is "a series of feelings" with "a belief of the permanent possibility of the feelings." He is to be met by showing that in every conscious act we know self as existing; that when we remember, we remember self as in some state; and that on comparing the former self with the present we declare them to be the same. This implies more than a mere series of feelings or a belief (he does not well know what to make of this belief) in possibilities—it implies a self existing and feeling now and in time past. Again, "Matter may be defined the permanent possibility of sensation." He is to be met here by showing that we apprehend matter as an existence external and extended, and that we cannot get this idea of extension from mere sensations which are not extended (see *supra*, foot-note, p. 22). As to the contradiction between the senses and the reason which Hume allows, Mr. Mill makes the reason and senses say the same thing, that we can know nothing whatever of matter except as the "possibility of sensation," and that it "may be but a mode in which the mind represents to itself the possibile modifications of the ego" (p. 189), which ego is but a series of feelings. This conclusion is quite as blank as that reached by Hume.

SECTION VII.

HIS RELIGIOUS SCEPTICISM.

The question is, How is such a scepticism to be met? Reid opposed it by showing that the sensation led us intuitively to believe in the existence of the external thing, and that the states of self, known by consciousness, implied a thinking substance. The more correct statement seems to me to be that we know at once the external objects, that intuitively we know our own frame and objects affecting it, that we are conscious not of states arguing a self but of self in a certain state, and that on comparing a former self recalled by memory and a present self known by consciousness, we declare them to be the same. Kant certainly did not meet the scepticism of Hume in a wise or in an effective manner when he supposed that the unity was given to the scattered phenomena by forms in the mind.

It is clear that all the usual psychological arguments for the immateriality and immortality of the soul are cut up and destroyed by this theory. We cannot speak of the soul as either material or spiritual, for we know nothing either of matter or spirit except as momentary impressions. "The identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one." Identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, but is merely a quality which we attribute to them because of the union of their ideas in the imagination when we reflect upon them.

His theory of causation undermines the argument for the Divine existence. He carefully abstains from dwell-

ing on this in his great philosophic work, but he expounds it at length and with all his intellectual power in his *Dialogues on Natural Religion.* We know nothing of cause except that it has been observed to be the antecedent of its effect; when we have noticed an occurrence usually preceded by another occurrence we may, on discovering the one, look for the other. But when we have never seen the events together, we have really nothing to guide us in arguing from the one to the other. We can argue that a watch implies a watchmaker, for we have observed them together, but never having had any experience of the making of a world, we cannot argue that the existence of a world implies the existence of a world-maker. There is no effective way of answering this objection but by maintaining that an effect necessarily implies a cause. It was on this ground that he was met by Reid, who argues that traces of design in God's works argue an intelligent cause. Kant deprived himself of the right to argue in this way by making the mind itself impose the relation of causation on events, so that we cannot argue that there is a corresponding law in the things themselves. Hume urges with great force and ingenuity, as Kant did after him, that if we are compelled to seek for a cause of every object we must also seek for a cause of the Divine Being. This is to be met by showing that our intuitive conviction simply requires us to seek for a cause of a new occurrence. He argues, as Kant also did after him, that the existence of order in the universe could at best prove merely a finite, and not an infinite cause. The reply is that we must seek for the evidence of the infinity of God in the peculiar conviction of the mind in regard to the infinite and the perfect.[1]

[1] Mr. Mill has adopted Hume's doctrine of causation with a few modifications. The question is, Has he left to himself or to his followers an

This may be the most expedient place for stating and examining his famous argument against miracles, as advanced in his essay on the subject. It is clear that he could not argue, as some have done, that a miracle is an impossibility, or that it is contrary to the nature of things. He assails not the possibility of the occurrence of a miraculous event but the proof of it. Experience being with him the only criterion of truth, it is to experience he appeals. He maintains that there has been an invariable experience in favor of the uniformity of nature, and that a miracle being a violation of a law of nature can never be established by as strong proof as what can be urged against it. He then exerts his ingenuity in disparaging the evidence usually urged in behalf of miraculous occurrences by showing how apt mankind are to be swayed on such subjects by such principles as fear, wonder, and fancy. We are not sure whether Hume has always been opposed in a wise or judicious manner by his opponents on this subject. It is of little use showing that there is some sort of original instinct leading us to believe in

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argument for the Divine existence? He advises the defenders of theism to stick by the argument from design, but does not say that it has convinced himself. The advice is a sound one; we should not give up the argument from design because of the objections of Kant, which derive their force from the errors of his philosophy. Mr. Mill says that we can "find no difficulty in conceiving that in some one of the many firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides the universe events may succeed one another at random, without any fixed law" (*Logic*, B. iii., C. 21). We should like to see an attempt made to construct an argument for the Divine existence by those who accept this view. Mr. Mill shows that our belief in the uniformity of nature is the result of experience. But the uniformity of nature is one thing and causation is a different thing. He should be met by showing that we have a necessary conviction, that every thing that begins to be has a cause, and that he has utterly failed in deriving this conviction from sensations and associations.

testimony, for this instinct, if it exists, often leads us astray, and we must still go to experience to indicate what we are to trust in, and what we are to discard. But the opponents of Hume were perfectly right when they showed that in maintaining that nature always acted according to certain mundane laws they were assuming the point in dispute. Let us admit that the whole question is to be decided by experiential evidence. Let us concede that in the present advanced state of science there is ample evidence that there is a uniformity in nature; but then let us place alongside of this a counterpart fact that there is a sufficient body of evidence in favor of there being a supernatural system. For this purpose let the cumulative proofs in behalf of Christianity, external and internal, be adduced: those derived from testimony and from prophecy, and those drawn from the unity of design in the revelation of doctrine and morality, and from the character of Jesus, and we shall find that in their consistency and congruity they are not unlike those which can be advanced in behalf of the existence of a natural system.

SECTION VIII.

MORALS.

In Book Second he treats of the Passions, on which he seems to me to throw no light, and therefore I pass it over.

In Book Third he treats of Morals, and starts his utilitarian theory, which, however, he develops more fully, and in a livelier, more pointed, and ornate manner in his essay—"An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals." He says of this work, that it "is of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best."

In respect to practical influence it has certainly been the most important. By his speculative doubts in regard to the operations of the understanding he has furnished a gymnastic to metaphysicians ever since his time, but by his theory of virtue he has swayed belief and practice.

He shows that we cannot distinguish between good and evil by reason alone, defining reason as the discovery of truth or falsehood, and truth and falsehood as consisting in the agreement or disagreement, either to the real relation of ideas or to real evidence and matter of fact. Taking reason in this sense it certainly cannot be said to discern the morally good; but then it may be maintained that the mind has a power of discerning moral good and evil analogous to the reason which distinguishes truth and falsehood, and all that he could urge in opposition would be, that such a view is inconsistent with his theory of impressions and ideas. It is by no means clear what is the faculty or feeling to which he allots the function of perceiving and approving the morally good. Sometimes he seems to make man a selfish being, swayed only by motives of pleasure or pain, and in this view, virtue is to be regarded as good because associated directly or indirectly with the pleasure it could bring to ourselves. But in other places he calls in a "benevolent sentiment leading us to approve what is useful." Hume's general theory might certainly seem opposed to every thing *innate*, and yet in criticising Locke he is obliged to say, "I should desire to know what can be meant by asserting that self-love or resentment of injuries or passion between the sexes is not innate." We have already quoted passages in which he appeals to instincts. He says elsewhere, "The mind by an *original* instinct tends to unite itself with the good and avoid the evil." At times he seems to adhere to the theory of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson as to the existence

of a moral sense. "The mind of man is so formed by nature, that upon the appearance of certain characters, dispositions, and actions, it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame." He tells us expressly that he is inclined to think it probable that the final sentence in regard to moral excellence "depends on some internal sense or feeling which nature has made universal in the whole species." We believe that we cannot account for the ideas in the mind except by calling in such a faculty or feeling; and it was his business, as an experimental inquirer, to ascertain all that is in this power, and to determine its mode of operation and its laws. But such an investigation would have overthrown his whole theory, metaphysical as well as ethical.

According to Hume, virtue consists in the agreeable and useful. "Vice and virtue may be compared to sounds, colors, heat, and cold, which according to modern philosophy are not qualities in objects but perceptions in the mind." "Virtue is distinguished by the pleasure and vice by the pain, that any active sentiment a character gives us by his mere view and contemplation." This theory goes a step farther than that of Hutcheson in the same direction. Hutcheson placed virtue in benevolence, thereby making the intention of the agent necessary to virtue, whereas Hume does not regard it as necessary that it should be voluntary and requires us to look merely to the act and its tendency. His definition might lead one to think that an easy road or a pleasant carriage should be regarded as virtuous. But he will not admit that because an inanimate object may be useful as well as a man that therefore it ought also to merit the appellation of virtuous, for he says: "The sentiments excited by utility are in the two cases very different, and the one is mixed with affection, esteem, approbation, and not the other." This lan-

guage, more particularly the phrases "esteem" and "approbation," might have led him to discover that there is a peculiar judgment or sentiment attached to virtuous action not produced by mere utility.

He easily satisfies himself that he can show that benevolence is a virtue because it is so agreeable and useful. But he never faces the real difficulty, which is to account for the sense of obligation which we feel and the obligation actually lying upon us to do good to others.[1] He strives to show that justice is commended by us because of its beneficial tendency. Justice can have a meaning, he maintains, only in regard to society and arrangements made with others. True, the giving to every one his due implies beings to whom the due is owing, but the due arises from the relation in which we stand to these beings. Thus the first man or woman having children had duties to discharge toward them as soon as they were born, and independent of any promise. He labors to prove that our obligation to keep a promise arises from utility. "Fidelity is no natural virtue and promises have no force antecedent to human conventions." True, a promise implies a person to whom it is made, but once made the obligation is complete.

This leads us at once to the fundamental objections which may be taken to the utilitarian theory. Whence the obligation lying on us to promote the happiness of others? to give others their due? to keep our promises? From their utility, it is answered. But why are we bound to attend to what is useful? is the question that immediately occurs. Why the reproach that follows and which justi-

[1] In his *Utilitarianism* Mr. Mill has endeavored to defend the theory from the objections commonly taken to it. But he has utterly failed in his attempt to derive our idea and conviction of moral good from mere sensations and associations of sensation.

fies itself when we have failed to keep our word? These questionings bring us to a justice which guards conventions, to a law which enjoins love.

The practical morality sanctioned by the system and actually recommended by Hume excludes all the higher virtues and loftier graces. The adoration of a Supreme Being and love to him are represented as superstition. He has no God to sanction the moral law, and no judgment-day at which men have to give in an account. Repentance has and can have no place in a system which has no fixed law and no conscience. Humility, of which he treats at great length, is disparaged. The stern virtues of justice, of self-sacrifice, of zeal in a good cause, of faithfulness in denouncing evil, and of courage in stemming the tide of error and corruption, these are often so immediately disagreeable that their ultimate utility will never be perceived except by those who are swayed by a higher principle. It is certain that they were not valued by Hume, who speaks of them as superstition and bigotry and characterizes those who practise them as zealots and fanatics. His view of the marriage relation was of a loose and flexible character and did not profess to discountenance the evil practices of his time. "A man in conjoining himself to a woman is bound to her according to the terms of his engagement: in begetting children he is bound by all the ties of nature and humanity to provide for them sustenance and education. When he has performed these two parts of duty, no one can reproach him with injustice or injury." Not acknowledging a God bestowing the gift of life and requiring us to give an account of the use we make of it, and setting no value on courage in difficulties, he argues that a man may take away his life when it is no longer useful.

The state of society which he aimed at producing is thus described: "But what philosophical truths can be

more advantageous to society than those here delivered, which represent virtue in all her genuine and most engaging charms, and make us approach her with ease, familiarity, and affection? The dismal dress falls off with which many divines and some philosophers have covered her, and nothing appears but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability; nay, even at proper intervals play, frolic, and gayety. She talks not of useless austerities and rigors, suffering and self-denial." People have often speculated as to what Hume would have taught had he been elected Professor of Moral Philosophy in Edinburgh. I believe he would have expounded a utilitarian theory ending in the recommendation of the pleasant social virtues, speaking always respectfully of the Divine Being but leaving his existence an unsettled question.

And what, it may be asked, is the conclusion to which he wishes to bring us by his whole philosophy? We are not sure that he has confessed this to himself. Sometimes it looks as if his sublime aim was to expose the unsatisfactory condition of philosophy, in order to impel thinkers to conduct their researches in a new and more satisfactory manner. "If, in order to answer the doubts started, new principles of philosophy must be laid, are not these doubts themselves very useful? Are they not preferable to blind and ignorant assent? I hope I can answer my own doubts, but if I could not is it to be wondered at?" We verily believe that this was one of the alternatives he loved to place before him to justify his scepticism. "I am apt," he says in writing to Hutcheson, "to suspect in general that most of my reasonings will be more useful in furnishing hints and exciting people's curiosity than as containing any principles that will augment the stock of knowledge that must pass to future ages." But I suspect that the settled conviction reached by him was that no certainty

could be attained in speculative philosophy; he was sure that it had not been attained in time past. The tone of the Introduction to his great work is: "There is nothing which is not the subject of debate and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions." "If truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, 'tis certain it must be very deep and abstruse, and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain and presumptuous." Its being thus deep, he feels as if the great body of mankind need not trouble themselves much about it. He seems at times complacently to contemplate this as the issue to which he would drive mankind; for he sees at once that if men become convinced that they cannot reach certainty in such speculations, they will give up inquiry. "For nothing is more certain than that despair has almost the same effect upon us as enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire than the desire itself vanishes," and he thinks it a satisfactory condition of things when men discover the impossibility of making any farther progress," and "make a free confession of their ignorance." Considered in this light, Hume's philosophy, in its results, may be considered as an anticipation of the Positive School of M. Comte, which in the British section of it approaches much nearer the position of Hume than most people are aware of.

He allows that man should, as indeed he must, follow his natural impulses and the lessons of experience, as far as this world is concerned. But he will grant nothing more. He thus closes his inquiry into the understanding: "When we trace up the human understanding to its first principles we find it to lead us into such sentiments as seem to turn into ridicule all our past pains and industry,

and to discourage us from future inquiries." "The understanding, when it acts alone and according to its general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of confidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life." In common life this scepticism meets with insuperable barriers which we should not try to overcome. But it is different with philosophical, and we may add theological truths, which are supported solely by speculative considerations. In these departments we may discuss and doubt as we please without doing any injury. "What injury can ever come from ingenious reasoning and inquiry? The worst speculative sceptic I ever knew was a much better man than the best superstitious devotee." Those who think they can reach truth in these matters are at liberty to cherish their conviction, provided always that they do not thereby disturb their neighbors. But the time is coming, and already wise men see it is coming, when mankind will not concern themselves with such speculative questions, or will engage in them only as a gymnastic to the intellect, or as a means of showing that ultimate truth is unattainable by man.

PART SECOND.

HUXLEY.

SECTION IX.

HUXLEY'S HUME.

PROFESSOR HUXLEY is a man of strong intellectual tastes and tendencies. He is evidently an enthusiast in his biological studies. It is not so generally known that he is also a metaphysician. This he has shown in his published address on Descartes and in other papers. He has now come forward to defend the study. (See *Popular Science Monthly*, May, 1879.) Kant has made the remark that we cannot do without a metaphysics, and others have noticed that those who affect to discard them will commonly be found proceeding, without their being aware of it, upon a very wretched metaphysics. The Professor now tells us: "In truth, the attempt to nourish the human intellect upon a diet which contains no metaphysics is about as hopeful as that of certain Eastern sages to nourish their bodies without destroying life." He adds, "By way of escape from the metaphysical will-o'-the-wisps generated in the marshes of literature and theology, the serious student is sometimes bidden to betake himself to the solid ground of physical science. But the fish of immortal memory

who threw himself out of the frying-pan into the fire was not more ill-advised than the man who seeks sanctuary from philosophical persecution within the walls of the observatory or of the laboratory." He shows that such conceptions as "atoms," and "forces," and as "energy," "vacuum," and "plenum," all carry us, whether we will or no, beyond a physical to a metaphysical sphere.

I rather think that the Professor's metaphysics were derived primarily from David Hartley, but especially James Mill, reckoned an age or two ago in England the chief philosophical authorities by those not trained at the two English universities. Hartley connected metaphysics with physiology, and James Mill, after abandoning the trade of preacher, adopted the fundamental principles of David Hume and transmitted them to his son John Stuart Mill, who modified and improved them by independent thought and a larger acquaintance with other systems. Professor Huxley has now in this work on Hume given his own philosophy, which is substantially that of Hume and James Mill, with some not very valuable suggestions from Bain, and a criticism now and then derived from Descartes and Kant, of whose profounder principles he has, in the meanwhile, no appreciation. It is expounded in the form of an epitome of the system of the Scottish sceptic, with constantly interspersed criticisms of his own. His style is not that usually supposed to be philosophic: it is not calm, or serene, or dignified; but it clearly expresses his meaning and it is graphic, living, and leaping. He shows everywhere great acuteness, and the shrewdness of one who is not to be taken in by show and pretension or awed by authority. No man is quicker in starting an objection, which, however, may be of a surface character and not penetrating into the heart of the subject. I cannot discover in his speculations the calmness of one who is waiting for light,

or the comprehension of one who goes round the object examined and views it on all sides.

Mr. Darwin has elected and proclaimed Professor Huxley as the philosopher of his school, and this when many would place Herbert Spencer above him. I treat and criticise him as such. Most of the members of the school are not professed metaphysicians; but like the man in the French play who spoke prose all his life without knowing it, there is a metaphysics underlying their reasonings, and this metaphysics, without their being aware, is very much that of Mr. Huxley. I venture not to urge objections to his biology, of which he is a master and to be reviewed only by a master in his department. But he is not so formidable as a metaphysician, and one with but a sling and stone may cast him down and scatter the philosophy of his admiring host, by a few facts as clearly revealed to our inner consciousness as the facts of physiology are to the external senses.

We have seen that Hume makes the mind percipient only of Impressions and Ideas. Huxley adopts this defective view. He amends it by simply classifying the Impressions into *A*, Sensations; *B*, Pleasure and Pain; and *C*, Relations. Let us confine our attention for the present to the first two, to Impressions *A*, of Sensation, and *B*, of Pleasure and Pain. Let us notice what we have got as he describes it: "When a red light flashes across the field of vision there arises in the mind an impression of sensation which we call red. It appears to me that this sensation red is something which may exist, altogether independently of any other impression or idea, as an individual existence." "The whole content of consciousness might be that impression." These Impressions with the Pleasure and Pain are represented by him as knowledge; this without a thing knowing or a thing known. It is such knowl-

edge with which man starts, such knowledge as man can attain, and the foundation of all other knowledge.

He has already laid the foundation of Agnostics. He has started with an assumed principle from which only nescience can follow. These Impressions can never by logic or any legitimate process give us the knowledge of things. The addition or multiplication of 0 can give us only 0; so the additions or multiplications of Impressions, of Sensations, of Pleasures and Pains, can give us only Impressions in Sensations and in Pleasures and Pains.

Now all this is to be met by showing that the mind begins in sense-perception with the knowledge of things. It knows this stone as an existing and resisting object. It knows self as perceiving this object. "The whole content of consciousness" never is a mere impression, say a sensation of red. It is of a thing impressed. If I am asked for my proof, I answer that all this is contained in my very consciousness. I have in fact the same evidence of this as I have of the existence of the impression "red." I am conscious of self perceiving a red object. Indeed, any impression I may have is an abstraction taken from the self impressed.

II. Omitting for the present the Impressions of Relation, we now view the only other content which he gives the mind, IDEAS, which he defines "copies or reproductions in memory of the foregoing." We are here at the point at which Mr. J. S. Mill was so perplexed. He saw, and acknowledged in his candor, that in memory there is more than a mere copy or a reproduction. There is *the belief that the event remembered has been before us in time past.* We thus get the idea of time always in the concrete, that is an event in time, and by abstraction we can separate the time from the events in time. We have got more. We intuitively believe that we are the same persons at the

present time as we were when, days or years ago, we witnessed the event. We cannot be made to believe otherwise. In this process we are adding knowledge to knowledge, and this a knowledge of ourselves and of other things. These are all revealed to and attested by consciousness, the organ of things internal. The person who would overlook such important facts as these in the animal structure would be terribly lacerated by our acute zoölogists.

III. The next step in the progress of the mind is the discovery of Relations. Hume's account of the relations which the mind can discover is taken from Locke, and improved, and is very large and comprehensive. He makes them to be seven in number: Resemblance, Identity, Space and Time, Quantity, Quality, Contrariety, Cause and Effect. He exerts all his ingenuity, I believe fruitlessly, to show that these cannot extend our knowledge beyond impressions, and ideas, which are mere reproductions of impressions. They are relations of impressions and ideas, and not of things. We meet this scepticism on the part of Hume, and agnosticism on the part of Huxley, by maintaining that what we perceive originally are things, and what we perceive by the faculty that discovers relations are relations of things. When we classify plants by their resemblances, we classify the plants and not impressions. When we decide that a thing which begins to be must have a cause, we have a reality, first in the thing that begins to be, which implies, secondly, a reality in the cause which we regard as producing it. It is thus that we argue that the present configuration of the earth, being an objective reality, is the result of agencies which acted thousands or millions of years ago. It is thus that we argue that the adaptation we see in the eye must have had a cause in an adapting, that is, a designing power.

Professor Huxley's account of the Relations which the

mind can discover, is much more meagre than that of Hume. Apparently following Professor Bain, he makes them consist in coexistence, succession, and similarity. He thus gets rid dexterously of the Relations of Quantity, on which mathematics, with all their certainty, so obnoxious to the sceptic, depend; and of Identity, which certifies to the soul's continued and permanent existence; and of Causation, which leads us from harmonies and adaptations, from order and design in nature, to rise to a producing power in a designing mind. The three which he acknowledges—Similarity, Coexistence, and Succession—are all regarded as relations among Impressions and Ideas, and tell us nothing as to realities.

This is the intellectual furniture of the mind, according to Huxley. Observe what it is: Impressions, Ideas and Relations among these. He calls these the "Contents of the Mind." It is the most miserably defective account of the mental powers I have met with anywhere, more so than that given even by Condillac and the sensational school of France, who gave to the mind a power of transforming its sensations into a considerable number and variety of elevated ideas.

IV. Having thus allotted to the mind so small a content, he finds it the more easy to refer the whole to cerebral and nervous action. "The upshot of all this is, that the collection of perceptions which constitutes the mind is really a system of effects, the causes of which are to be sought in antecedent changes of the matter of the brain, just as 'the collection of motions' which we call flying is a system of effects, the causes of which are to be sought in the modes of motion of the muscles of the wings. . . . What we call the operations of the mind are functions of the brain, and the materials of consciousness are products of cerebral activity."

The Professor here defends a doctrine from which I rather think Hume would have turned away. With all his scepticism Hume was fond of dwelling on mental rather than on material operations. Such sentences show that Huxley may be properly called a materialist. He denies, indeed, that he is a materialist. The fact is, that he is an agnostic, believing in neither mind nor matter as substances. But then he makes all agency material. "The roots of psychology lie in the physiology of the nervous system." He gives a physical basis to all mental action—inconsistently, I think, for I cannot find that on his principles he is entitled to seek for any basis. Neither reason nor experience sanctions the doctrine that matter can produce mind; that molecules or masses of matter can think, or feel, or discover the distinction between good and evil. At this point Huxley seems to separate from such men as Tyndall and Du Bois Reymond, who tell us that to bridge the wide gulf that divides mind from matter is altogether beyond human capacity or conception.

V. At this point it will be necessary to refer—I can do so only briefly—to the question so important in philosophy, as to whether the mind discovers some objects and truths at once, and without a process, that is, by intuition. Hamilton, in his famous Note A, appended to his edition of Reid's *Collected Works*, has shown that all thinkers, including even sceptics, have been obliged to assume something without proof, and to justify themselves in doing so. In my *Examination of Mr. J. S. Mills' Philosophy*, I have shown that, in his *Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy* he has assumed between twenty and thirty such principles. With Locke, I hold that the primary mark of these intuitions is self-evidence. We perceive things and truths by simply looking at them. Intuitions are not high *à priori* truths independent of

things, but they are involved in the very nature of things, and we perceive this as we look at them. Thus we know, by simply looking at them, that things exist; that if two straight lines placed alongside proceed an inch without coming nearer each other, they will not approach nearer, though prolonged through all space; that two things plus two things make four. Truths thus self-evident to our minds become necessary; we cannot be made to judge or decide that they are not true. Necessity is commonly put forward by metaphysicians such as Leibnitz and Kant as the test of these truths. I regard it as the secondary, the primary being self-evidence.

Hume and Huxley have discussed the question of Necessity, especially as applied to Causation. Hume accounts for it by custom and association of ideas; we are accustomed to see cause and effect together, and when we see the one we are constrained, whether we will or not, to think of and expect the other. But this is not the kind of necessity which metaphysicians appeal to. Necessity as a test of truth is a necessity of cognition, belief, or judgment, arising from our viewing the nature of the object, as, for example, when on contemplating two straight lines, we perceive, without any mediate proof, that they cannot inclose a space. Our commentator on Hume has equally misunderstood the nature of this necessity. He speaks of three kinds of necessity. The first is one merely requiring the consistent use of language: "The necessary truth A=A means that the perception which is called A shall always be called A." This throws no light on our convictions. The second, "The necessary truth that 'two straight lines cannot inclose a space,' means that we have no memory, and can form no expectation of their so doing." The instance he gives is a good example of an intuitive truth seen at once, and necessarily believed; but

it surely implies vastly more than merely that we have no memory, and can form no expectation of the straight lines inclosing a space; it means that we perceive that, from the very nature of things, two such lines cannot inclose a space. He has a third case of necessity, "The denial of the necessary truth that the thought now in my mind exists, involves the denial of consciousness." This is also an example of a self-evident, necessary truth, but it is so because we have an immediate knowledge of ourselves as existing.

VI. Hume's doctrine of causation takes a double form; the one objective, the other subjective. These two are intimately connected, and yet they should be carefully separated. Hume held that objective causation is only invariable antecedence and consequence. This is a doctrine contradicted both by metaphysical and physical science. It seems very clear to me that our intuitions, looking on objects, declare that they have power. This is implied in the axiom that we know objects as having properties; and what are properties but powers? Then modern science has established the doctrine of the conservation of energy, namely, that the sum of energy, actual and potential, in the world is always one and the same. Causes are not causes simply because they are antecedents; they are antecedents of the effects because they have power to produce them.

It would be preposterous, in so short a paper as this, to dive into all the subtilities of the subjective question, as to whether our belief in causation is intuitive, or is derived from a gathered experience. The settlement of this question will depend on the way we settle the one started under the last head, as to whether there are not truths which shine in their own light. If there be such truths, then causation is undoubtedly one of them. When we

see a thing produced, a new thing, or a change in an old thing, we look for a producing cause having power in its very nature, and ready to produce the same effect in the same circumstances.

VII. By his doctrine, defective as I reckon it, Hume undermined the argument for the Divine Existence. There is evidence in his life, in his correspondence, and in his philosophic writings, that, like John Stuart Mill, in a later age, he looked with a feeling of favor upon the seeming evidence for the existence of a designing mind in the universe. But neither of these men could find a conclusive argument. Huxley follows them here. The three are to be met in the same way. The philosophy of all of them is erroneous. Man has the capacity to discover that, by the very nature of things, everything that begins to be must have a cause. If a world begins to be, if there be a fitting of things to one another in the world, then there must be an adequate cause in a power and purpose on the part of an intelligent Being. Our agnostics can answer this only by making man incapable of knowing anything of the nature of things.

VIII. According to the philosophy of Hume, there is and can be no evidence of the immortality of the soul. If the mind be the product of matter, specially of the collection of nerves, then, on the dissolution of the body generally, and especially of the brain, there is no proof that the soul survives; indeed there remain no means, in fact, no possibility of its action. The moral argument so powerfully urged by Kant in favor of a judgment-day and a life to come to satisfy the full demand of the law, is entirely undermined in a philosophy which does not admit of an authoritative and imperative morality, and does not call in a God to make the moral law work out its effects. This scepticism is to be met by showing that mind and matter

are made known to us by different organs: the one by the self-consciousness, and the other by the senses; and that they are known as possessing essentially different properties, the one as thinking and feeling, and the other as extended and resisting our energy. That the body dies is no proof that the soul must also die. If these truths be established it is seen that the usual arguments for another life retain their force. Believing in God and in his law, we are convinced that He will call all men to judgment.

IX. But it may be urged that though the philosophic or scientific arguments on behalf of religion fail us, we may resort to revelation. But both Hume and Huxley deprive us of this refuge. Hume does not, like certain bewildered German speculators, deny the possibility of a miracle. His position is, that there is no evidence to support any given miracle. He defines miracles as a violation of the laws of nature, and labors to show that the testimony on behalf of a miracle is more likely to be false than that the order of nature should be violated. Huxley objects to his definition of a miracle, as many had done before. But he urges the same objection in a somewhat different form. "The more a statement of fact conflicts with previous experiences, the more complete must be the evidence to justify us in believing it" (p. 133). He decides that there is no such evidence as is fitted to sustain an occurrence so contrary to our experience as a miracle. Huxley advances nothing new on this subject, and the defenders of Christianity maintain that they can meet the objections he adopts. They show first, that they can produce testimony in favor of certain miracles, such as the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, more full and explicit than can be advanced in behalf of the assassination of Julius Cæsar or the best authenticated occurrences in ancient times. They show, secondly, that there is an accu-

mulation and a combination of evidence in favor of the life and mission of Jesus Christ: in the prophecies uttered ages before; in the results that followed the propagation of the Gospel; and above all in the fitness of Christ's work to remedy the acknowledged evils in the world, and in its adaptation to the felt wants, moral and spiritual, of man. It might be shown that the cumulated evidence in behalf of the Christain revelation is not unlike that brought to prove the uniformity of nature.

X. Professor Huxley has nothing original to advance on the subject of Moral Good. Neither Hume nor Huxley holds the selfish theory of morals. Both hold that man has a native instinct which leads him to sympathize with his neighbor and to be pleased at seeing him happy. So far both are right; but on the very same ground on which it is shown that there is a disposition in our nature to promote the pleasure of others, it can be shown that there is a principle in our nature which leads us to approve of what is good and condemn what is evil.

We are now in a position to discover and comprehend what Agnosticism is as expounded by its eminent living philosopher. Notwithstanding the meaning of the term, it is claimed by the whole school that there is knowledge gradually accumulating. According to our Professor, there are sensations, there are pleasures and pains, and among these are relations of coexistence, of succession and similarity. By observing these we may form science, which is systematized knowledge. He who is master of the sciences is a learned man and may be very proud or vain of his acquirements. Professor Huxley, as being acquainted with a number of the sciences, is undoubtedly possessed of much knowledge.

What then, it may be asked, is defective or faultworthy in the philosophy of Agnostics? Its error lies in its avowed

fundamental principle that we know only impressions, or as Kant expresses it, appearances, and do not things either mental or material. All that we know are impressions, impressions recalled and impressions correlated. The correlations constitute the various sciences.

There are *savans* who have a large acquaintance with these impressions and their correlations. But all the while they know nothing and never can know, or come nearer knowing the things thus appearing and thus correlated as appearances—if indeed there are any things. It is not positively asserted that there are things, but it is certain according to Kant, followed by Spencer, that they are unknown and unknowable by man with his present faculties. It is curious to find the metaphysical Hume and the physical Huxley at one on this point.

In one sense Huxley is entitled to deny that he is a materialist. He believes as little in the existence of matter as he does of mind. But he does claim that the impressions which we call mental are produced by those we call material, namely, cerebral action. So far he is a materialist, and the undoubted tendency of his philosophy is materialistic—he makes matter the basis even of mental action. He is not, like Hume, a sceptic, for he does not affirm that there are no things; all that he says is that if they exist we cannot know them, or rather that things known to us are merely impressions in the shape of sensations—of sensations remembered and correlated. He is not an atheist, not he; he only says that we have no proof of the existence of God. He is simply an honest Agnostic, not believing in mind or in matter or in God. What is the tendency of such a system?

It makes us feel that we are in a world of illusions. I say illusions and not deceptions; for as nature does not profess or promise anything it cannot be charged with in-

tentional deception. But then we may be deceiving ourselves or deceiving others; and Agnostics show that we are doing so. I maintain that it strips us of many of our natural beliefs—beliefs which men have entertained in all ages and countries. The great body of mankind believe that they themselves, and the objects that they have to deal with, are more than impressions, and that they are realities in a real world; that there is matter that is solid, that there is mind that thinks and feels, that we all possess a soul, and that our neighbors also have souls. I am prepared to show that these convictions are valid; that we have the same evidence of a self thinking and of body resisting our activity as we have of the existence of impressions. But suppose these convictions removed, and how do we feel, and what have we left us?

Will we be apt to set a higher value on life when we know it to be a mere bundle of impressions with unsubstantial ideas growing out of them? Will we take a deeper interest in our neighbors when we have come to believe (theoretically, for to believe this practically is impossible) that they too are a mere congeries of appearances? Will we be disposed to do more for the world when we regard it as a set and series of phantasmagoria bound by rigid uniformities of likeness, coexistence, and succession? Will we be more likely to feel that life is worth living for, and that it is our duty to work for its good, when we contemplate it as in fact a mere succession of images which do not reflect any reality? Will not one hindrance to self-indulgence be removed when we are made to acknowledge that sensations and pleasures are realities, and that there are no others? Will not one restraint on self-murder, which we may be tempted to commit when in trouble, be removed when we are sure that we are merely stopping a flow of sensations? Will the regret of the learned mur-

derer be deepened when he is told that he has merely laid an arrest on a few pulsations? Will the seducer be more likely to be kept from gratifying his lust when the highest philosophy teaches him that the soul of his victim is a mere collection of nerves? Is the youth who has run in debt less likely to rob his master when he is assured that both he and his master are mere throbs in the vibrations which constitute life? Agnosticism never can become the creed of the great body of any people; but should it be taught by the science and philosophy of the day, I fear its influence on the youths who might be led, not to amuse themselves with it, but by faith to receive it, would be that they would find some of the hindrances to vice removed, and perhaps some of the incentives to evil encouraged.

PART THIRD.

A NOTICE OF THE SCOTTISH SCHOOL.

SECTION X.

THOMAS REID.[1]

He was born April 26, 1710, at Strachan, in the heart of the Grampians, in Aberdeenshire. He was descended from a succession of Presbyterian ministers, and his mother was Margaret Gregory, who connected him with the illustrious family of that name, who did so much for the literature and science of Scotland. He was for a time at the parish school of Kincardine, where his teacher foretold "that he would turn out to be a man of good and well-wearing parts." He entered Marischal College, Aberdeen, when only twelve years of age, and was taught philosophy by George Turnbull, one of the founders of the Scottish School. He graduated at the age of sixteen, but being appointed librarian to the university he continued his college life till 1736. In 1737 he was ordained minister of New Machar, where he met at first with some opposition from the people, who were attached to the Evangelical party in the church; but he gradually overcame this by the propriety of his conduct, his conscientiousness,

[1] I may refer to the fuller account of Reid and the other Scottish metaphysicians in my *Scottish Philosophy*.

and his kindness. While minister there he was a hard student, and engaged, as his follower and biographer, Dugald Stewart, tells us, in "a careful examination of the laws of external perception, and of the other principles which form the groundwork of human knowledge," his chief relaxations being gardening and botany. At the mature age of thirty-eight he published, in the *Transactions of the Royal Society of London*, an *Essay on Quantity*, opposing the application of geometry to moral subjects. In 1752 he was elected professor in King's College, Aberdeen, where he was surrounded with an able body of colleagues in the two universities, and by thoughtful ministers and professional men beyond the colleges. He was the main instrument of forming the famous "Aberdeen Philosophical Society," where valuable papers were read, and which called forth what may be called the Aberdeen branch of the Scottish School of Philosophy.

It was the publication of Hume's treatise on Human Nature in 1739, that first directed him specially to philosophic research. In the end of 1763 he published his most original work, *An Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense.* About the same time he was appointed Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, and was there a most successful and acceptable professor, giving valuable instruction to all his pupils, and giving an intellectual stimulus to many men, such as Dugald Stewart, who rose to eminence. In 1785 he published *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, and in 1788 the *Essays on the Active Powers*, his two most elaborate works. He died October 7, 1796.

If he is not the founder (this honor belongs to Francis Hutcheson) he is the fit representative of the Scottish Philosophy. He is in every respect a Scotchman; shrewd, cautious, outwardly calm, and yet with a deep feeling

within (he often shed tears when he spoke of the love of Christ at a communion-table,) and capable of enthusiasm; not witty, but with a quiet vein of humor. He has the truly philosophic spirit; seeking truth humbly, modestly, diligently, piercing beneath the surface to gaze on the true nature of things, and not to be caught by sophistry or misled by plausible misrepresentations. He has not the mathematical consecutiveness of Descartes, the speculative genius of Leibnitz, the sagacity of Locke, the spirituelle of Berkeley, or the detective skill of Hume; but he has a quality quite as valuable as any of these, even in philosophy; he has in perfection that common sense which he so commends, and thus saves himself from the extreme positions into which these great men have been tempted by their soaring genius or inexorable logic. "It is," says he, "genius, and not the want of it, that adulterates philosophy." He inquires carefully into the subjects he is studying; and if he does not comprehend them thoroughly he acknowledges it, and what he does see, he sees clearly and describes honestly. "The labyrinth may be too intricate, and the thread too fine to be traced through all its windings, but if we stop when we can trace it no farther, and secure the ground we have gained, there is no harm done, and a quicker eye may at times trace it farther." Speculative youth are apt to feel that, because he is so sober and makes so little pretension, he cannot possibly be far-seeing or profound; but this is at the time of life when they have risen above taking a mother's advice, and become wiser than their father; and after following other and more showy lights for a time, they may be obliged at last to acknowledge that they have here the light of the sun, which is better than that of the flashing meteor.

He claims credit on two points: one in examining and undermining the ideal theory of sense-perception; the

other in establishing against Hume the principle of common sense.

I. His *Inquiry* is occupied almost exclusively with the senses. It is one of the excellences of his philosophy, as compared with most of those that have gone before, that (with Aristotle) he so carefully inquired into these original inlets of knowledge. He shows that he was acquainted with all that had been done in physiology down to his time, and that he had been in the way of making original observations. He goes over the senses one by one, beginning with the simpler—smell and taste—and going on to the more complex—hearing, touch, and sight. Under smell he announces a number of general principles applicable to all the senses, as in regard to sensation considered absolutely, and the nature of judgment and belief. Under hearing he speaks of natural language; and under touch of natural signs and primary qualities. He dwells at greatest length on sight; discussing such topics as color, visible figure, extension, the parallel motion of the eyes, squinting, and Berkeley's theory of vision.

He denies, first, that we perceive by means of ideas in the mind, or out of it, coming between the mind and the natural object perceived; secondly, that we reach a knowledge of the external object by means of reasoning; and thirdly, that in order to the conception of anything it is necessary to have some impression or idea in our mind which resembles it, particularly setting himself against the doctrine of Locke, that our ideas of the primary qualities are resemblances of them. What he advances on these points seems to me clear and satisfactory. He has done special service to philosophy by removing those confusing intermediaries which were called ideas. It may be that the great body of philosophers had not drawn out for their own use such a doctrine of ideas as Reid ex

poses; it may be, that some of them, if the question had been put to them, would have denied that they held any such doctrine; it may be, as Hamilton has tried to show, that some few held a doctrine of perception without ideas; but I believe Reid was right in holding that mental philosophers did bring in an idea between the mind perceiving and the external object; that some created an image in the mind or in the brain; that some objectified the internal thought, and confounded it with the object perceived; and that the greater number had not clearly settled what they meant by the term they employed. The service which Reid has done to philosophy by banishing the intermediaries between sense-perception, and its external object, say the body, cannot be overestimated. It brings nearer to the true doctrine which is, that we immediately perceive matter and thus begin with a reality in the self and not self. He has not been so successful in establishing a doctrine of his own as in opposing the errors of others. He maintains that there is first a sensation in the mind, and that this sensation suggests a perception. The word suggestion, to denote the rise of a thought in the mind, was adopted by Reid from Berkeley, who again took it from Locke. He holds that "there are natural suggestions, particularly that sensation suggests the notion of past existence, and the belief that what we remember did exist in time past; and that our sensations and thoughts do also suggest the notion of a mind and the belief of its existence and of its relation to our thoughts. By a like natural principle it is that a beginning of existence or any change in nature suggests to us the notion of a cause, and compels our belief in its existence. . . . And, in like manner, certain sensations of touch, by the constitution of our nature, suggest to us extension and solidity" (*Collected Works* by Hamilton, p. 111). He adopts from Berkeley a doctrine of natural

language and signs. There are natural signs "which, though we never had any notion or conception of the thing signified: to suggest it, or conjure it up as it were by a natural kind of magic and at once give us a conception and create a belief in it." He calls "our sensations signs of external objects." What Reid represents as two acts, the one going before the other, constitute one concrete act, and can be separated only by a process of abstraction. There is not first a sensation of a colored surface and then a perception of it; but we have the two at once. This does away with the necessity of signs and suggestions which might be quite as troublesome as ideas. There are both sensation and perception, but the two constitute one concrete act, and they can be separated only by a process of abstraction. The correct statement is, not that the sensations "suggest to us extension, solidity, and motion," but we perceive at one and the same time objects at once as extended, solid, and in motion.

Hamilton has gone beyond Reid and laid down the doctrine of immediate perception. When he began to edit Reid's *Collected Works* he thought that Reid's doctrine was the same as his own. But as he advances he sees it is not so, and he comes to doubt whether Reid did not himself retain some portions of the intermediate theory. While Hamilton has defended the true doctrine, he has not carried it out consistently. He makes our knowledge of things relative to the mind, and supposes, with Kant, that the mind adds subjective elements to the primitive cognitions, and thus makes it impossible to distinguish between what is real and what is not so in our perceptions. He claims that "venturing a step beyond Reid no less than Kant" (*Reid's Coll. Works*, p. 126), he brings on our perception of space both an *à priori* conception with Kant, and an *à priori* perception with Reid.

The true account is that our cognition of extension is one intuitive perception.

II. I do not think it necessary to state and examine Reid's classification of the faculties, which is of no great value. I have stated and examined his view of Perception. It remains only to look at his view of Judgment: "We ascribe to reason two offices and two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident, the second to draw conclusions which are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province, and the sole province, of common sense; and therefore it coincides with reason in its whole extent, and is only another name for one branch or degree of reason" (p. 425). He divides the principles of common sense into two classes; as they are contingent, or as they are necessary and immutable, whose contrary is impossible.

I doubt whether the distinction he draws between contingent and necessary truths is so profound as he would represent it. The test of the latter is that their contrary is impossible. But is not this true of all the principles of common sense? Some of the principles enumerated under the head of contingent truths have no claim to be regarded as original laws of reason, such as the signification of the sound of the voice, and the gestures of the body, the belief in human testimony and the uniformity of nature. They seem rather to be the result of a gathered experience to which we may be impelled by natural inclination. If these laws are principles of reason there could be no exceptions; but every one knows that the sound of the voice and the expression of the countenance and human testimony may deceive, and it is conceivable that the present order of things may be changed. It is necessary to have a more searching exposition of primary principles than Reid has furnished.

Reid evidently took the phrase "common sense" from Shaftesbury's *Characteristics*. The phrase was used by Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson, who all brought in an internal as well as a bodily sense, the two latter calling in a moral sense and a sense of beauty, and employing the phrase to intimate that there are other sources of ideas besides sensation, or sensation and reflection. The fundamental objection to the term is that it is ambiguous. Aristotle denoted by *κοινὴ αἴσθησις* the knowledge imparted by the senses in common. This long continued to be one of the meanings of the phrase, but by Reid's time this use had ceased in the English tongue. In the use which he makes of it there is an unfair ambiguity. It denotes the combination of qualities which constitutes *good sense*, being, according to an old saying, the most uncommon of all the senses. This valuable property is not possessed by all men, and is the result of a number of gifts and attainments, such as an originally sound judgment and a careful observation of the ways of mankind. In this sense common sense is not entitled to be appealed to as the arbiter in philosophy, though it may keep us from much error. But the phrase has another and a different signification in philosophical works, including Reid's. It denotes the aggregate of original principles planted in the minds of all. It is only in this latter senes that it can be legitimately employed in overthrowing scepticism or for any philosophic purpose. Reid rather dexterously takes advantage of both these meanings. He would show that the views he opposes, though supported by men of high intellectual powers, have the good sense of mankind against them.

Hamilton has succeeded, in his famous Note A, appended to his edition of Reid, in showing that the argument as employed by Reid is valid in itself and legitimately used

against scepticism. The appeal is to principles in our constitution which all are obliged to admit and act upon. But the account after all is partial. It brings before us the mark of universal consent, but does not bring into prominence the self-evidence and necessity—it shows some of the radicles but overlooks the main, the tap-root. It needs to be made more comprehensive.

But meanwhile let us observe to what point in the onward progress the Scottish school has brought us.

SECTION XI.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCOTTISH SCHOOL.

I. *It proceeds throughout by observation.* It has all along professed a profound reverence for Bacon, and in its earliest works it attempted to do for metaphysics what Newton had done for physics. It begins with facts and ends with facts. Between, it has analyses, generalizations, and reasonings; but all upon the actual operations of the mind. Its laws are suggested by facts and are verified by facts. It sets out, as Bacon recommends, with the necessary "rejections and exclusions," with what Whewell calls the "decomposition of facts," but all to get at the exact facts it means to examine. Its generalizations are formed by observing the points in which the operations of the mind agree, and it proceeds gradually,—*gradatim*, as Bacon expresses it,—rising from particulars to generals, and from lower to higher laws. It is afraid of rapid and high speculation, lest it carry us like a balloon, not into the heavens, but a cloud, where it will explode sooner or later. It is suspicious of long and complicated ratiocinations like those of Spinoza and Hegel, for it is sure—such is human fallibility—that there will lurk in them some error or defect.

in the premise, or some oversight or weak link in the process, weakening the whole chain. Thomas Reid was not sure whether Samuel Clarke's demonstration of the existence of God was more distinguished for ingenuity than sublimity.

II. *It observes the operations of the mind by the inner sense—that is, consciousness.* In this philosophy consciousness, the perception of self in its various states, comes into greater prominence than it had ever done before. Bacon did not appreciate its importance; he recommended in the study of the human mind the gathering of instances, to be arranged in tables, of memory, judgment, and the like. Descartes appealed to consciousness, but only to get a principle such as *cogito*, to be used in deduction, *ergo sum;* in which *sum* there is an idea of an infinite, a perfect. Locke was ever appealing to internal observation, but it was to support a preconceived theory that all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection. Turnbull and Hutcheson and Reid were the first to avow and declare that the laws of the human mind were to be discovered only by internal observation, and that mental philosophy consisted solely in the construction of these. They held that consciousness, the internal sense, was as much to be trusted as the external senses; and that as we can form a natural philosophy out of the facts furnished by the one, we can construct a mental philosophy by the facts furnished by the other. They held resolutely that the eye cannot see our thoughts and feelings even when aided by the microscope or telescope. They were sure that no man ever grasped an idea by his muscular power, tasted the beauty of a rose or lily, smelt an emotion, or heard the writhings of the conviction of conscience. But they thought that the mind could observe the world within by consciousness more directly and quite as accurately as it could observe the world without

by sight, touch, and the other senses, and could in the one case as in the other make a scientific arrangement of its observations and construct a science.

III. *By observation principles are discovered which are above observation, universal and eternal.* All the genuine masters and followers proceed on this principle, and apply it more or less successfully. I am not sure that they have expressly avowed it and explicitly stated it. I am responsible for the form which is given it at the head of this paragraph. No man can understand or appreciate or do justice to the philosophy of Scotland who does not notice it as running through and through their whole investigations and conclusions. It was in this way that Reid opposed Hume. It was in this way that Dugald Stewart, and indeed the whole school, sought to lay a foundation on which all truth might be built. They were fond of representing the principles as fundamental, and they guarded against all erroneous, against all extravagant and defective statements and applications of them, by insisting that they be shown to be in the constitution of the mind, and that their nature be ascertained before they are employed in speculation of any kind. By insisting on this restriction, their mode of procedure has been described as timid, and their results as mean and poor, by those speculators who assume a principle without a previous induction, and mount up with it, wishing to reach the sky, but stayed in the clouds. By thus holding that there are truths above and prior to our observation of them, they claim and have a place in the brotherhood of our higher philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle in ancient times, Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant in modern times.

They present these principles in the mind under various aspects and in different names. Reid called them principles of common sense in the mind itself, and common to all

men. Hamilton defended the use of the phrase common sense. I am not sure it is the best one, as it includes two meanings: one, good sense, of mighty use in the practical affairs of life; and the other, first principles in the minds of all men, in which latter sense alone it can be legitimately employed in philosophy. He also calls them, happily, reason in the first degree, which discerns truth at once, as distinguished from reason in the second degree, which discovers truth by arguing. Stewart represented them as "fundamental laws of human thought and belief," and is commended for this by Sir James Mackintosh, who is so far a member of the school. Thomas Brown represented them as intuitions, a phrase I am fond of, as it presents the mind as looking into the nature of things. Perhaps the phrase "intuitive reason," used by Milton when he talks of "reason intuitive and discursive," might be as good a phrase as any by which to designate these primary principles. Hamilton, who sought to add the philosophy of Kant to that of Reid, often without his being able to make them cohere, sometimes uses the Scotch phrases, and at other times the favorite Kantian designation, *à priori*. I remember how Dr. Chalmers, who was truly of the Scottish school, was delighted in his advanced years, on becoming acquainted with the German philosophy through Morell's *History of Philosophy*, to find that there was a wonderful correspondence between the *à priori* principles of Kant and the fundamental laws of Stewart.

I may be allowed to add, that having before me the views and the nomenclature of all who hold by these primary principles, I have ventured to specify their characteristics, and this in the proper order:

First, they look at things external and internal. They are not forms or laws in the mind apart from things.

They are intuitions of things. Under this view they are SELF-EVIDENT, which is their first mark. The truth is perceived at once by looking at things. I perceive self within and body without by barely looking at them. I discover that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, that benevolence is good, that cruelty is evil, by simply contemplating the things. *Secondly*, they are NECESSARY. This I hold with Aristotle, Leibnitz, Kant, and most profound thinkers. Being self-evident, we must hold them, and cannot be made to think or believe otherwise. *Thirdly*, they are UNIVERSAL, being entertained by all men.

But it is asked, How do you reconcile your one element with the other—your observation with your truth anterior to observation? I do hold with the whole genuine Scottish school, that there are principles in the mind called common sense, primary reason, intuition, prior to and independent of our observation of them. But I also hold, and this in perfect consistency, that it is by observation we discover them, that they exist, and what they are. I have found it difficult to make some people understand and fall in with this distinction. Historians and critics of philosophy are apt to divide all philosophies into two grand schools, the *à priori* and *à posteriori*, or in other words, the rational and the experiential. They are utterly averse to call in a third school, which would disturb all their classifications, and thus trouble them, and require the authors among them, especially the followers of Kant or Cousin, to rewrite all they have written. They do not know very well what to make of the Scottish school, and I may add of the great body of American thinkers, who will not just fall into either one or other of their grand trunk-divisions. In particular, when they condescend to notice the author of this paper they feel as if

they do not know what to make of him. "Are you," they ask, "of the *à posteriori* or empirical school? You seem as if you are so, you are so constantly appealing to facts and experience. If so, you have no right to appeal to or call in *à priori* principles, which can never be established by a limited observation. But you are inconsistently ever bringing in necessary and universal principles, such as those of cause and effect, and moral good." Or they attack me at the other horn of the dilemma. "You hold rather by *à priori* principles; you are ever falling back on principles, self-evident, necessary, and universal, on personality, on identity, on substance and quality, causation, on the good and the infinite." I have sometimes felt as if I were placed between two contending armies, exposed to the fire of both. Yet I believe I am able to keep and defend my position. Now I direct a shot at the one side, say at John S. Mill, and at other times a shot at the other side, say at Kant—not venturing to attack Hegel, who is in a region which my weapons can never reach. They pay little attention to me, being so engrossed with fighting each other. But I do cherish the hope that when each of the sides finds it impossible to extinguish the other they may become weary of the fight, look for the *juste milieu*, and turn a favorable look toward the independent place which the Scotch and the great body of the Americans who think on these subjects are occupying. We invite you to throw down your arms, and come up to the peaceful height which we occupy. Hither you may bring all the wealth you have laid up in your separate positions, and here it will be safe. You have here primitive rocks strong and deep as the granite on which to rest it, and here you may add to it riches gathered from as wide regions as your ken can reach, and establish a city which can never be moved or shaken.

III

A CRITICISM OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.

In this work, which is a criticism of Kant's Philosophy, there is no need of giving a detailed account of his life. The biographies of him are now numerous and accessible.[1]

He was born at Königsberg, in Eastern Prussia, toward the Polish border, April 22, 1724. His father, a saddler, was of Scotch descent from some emigrant, who had gone over to Memel, probably from Forfarshire, on the east coast of Scotland, where I have noticed the name Cant (changed in German into Kant), often occurring on tombstones in the parish church-yards, and in old records some of which show that there were Cants engaged in the working of leather. His mother, whom he unfortunately lost at the age of thirteen, was a woman of fervent piety, and the family attended a church where the evangelical faith was preached. At the age of sixteen he entered the university of his native town, and for six years he was employed in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences in going over the branches belonging to the Department of Philosophy. His father having died in 1746 he was thrown on his own resources, and had a hard enough struggle. For a time he was tutor in a private family and from 1755 to 1770 he was *Privat-Docent* in the University of Königsberg, where he taught Logic, Ethics, and Physical Geography, in the last of which he always felt a special interest. He early showed a taste and talent for mathematics and physics, but

[1] We have a clear account of Kant's simple and retired Life in Wallace's "*Kant*," in Philosophic Classics; a graphic account in Sterling's *Text-Book to Kant;* and a full account in *Stuckenberg's Life of Immanuel Kant.*

in the end philosophy became his favorite study. In the years from 1760–65 he became acquainted with the philosophy of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, and this gave a new turn to his thoughts.

From 1762 to 1765 he published a number of important works:—*The false subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures; An attempt to introduce into Philosophy the Conception of Negative Quantities; Only Possible Argument for demonstrating God's Excellence; Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime;* and *Inquiry into the Clearness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals.* During this period he anticipated Laplace in his famous theory of the formation of worlds from star-dust.

In 1770 he was made full professor, with a salary in the end of about a hundred pounds sterling, and henceforth he devoted himself to the teaching of logic and metaphysics, and the construction of his philosophic system. His introductory lecture was on *The Form and Principles of the Sense World, and the World Intellectual.* In 1781, at the mature age of 57, he published his great work, *The Kritik of Pure Reason*, in which his avowed aim was a search for the proper method of metaphysics. The book laid hold at once on certain thinking minds, and has ever since had a powerful influence on thought. A second edition was demanded in 1787, and in it he labored particularly in a new Preface to deliver his system from misapprehensions and answer objections.

In 1785, he published *The Foundation for the Metaphysic of Ethics;* and *The Metaphysical Rudiments of Natural Philosophy;* in 1788, *The Kritik of the Practical Reason*, and in 1790 *The Kritik of the Judgment*, in his old age, *Religion within the Boundaries of Pure Reason.*

His biographers all describe his person and his simple

bachelor habits. He was scarcely five feet in height, and, strange as it may seem, had a very small brain. Every morning about five minutes before five his servant Lampe, an old soldier, entered his confined and darkened bedroom with the cry, "It is time," and his master rose immediately and took a cup of tea and a pipe of tobacco. Till seven he prepared his lecture and delivered it between seven and nine. For the rest of the forenoon he gave himself to his literary work, in which he wrote laboriously, and read the works he could procure in that remote city. At a quarter to one, he called out, "It is three quarters," and sat down to a simple meal with a little liquor, and always with a few, from two to six, invited guests. The dinner, with the conversation, which ranged over almost every subject except metaphysics, lasted till four, when he went out to his constitutional walk, still shown to all who visit Königsberg. In this walk he commonly distributed alms to some beggars who waited for him. Returning to his room, he revolved his philosophy in his mind till about half-past nine, when he retired to his couch, covering his head with the blankets, and taking pains to breathe only through his nose, which he thought prolonged life.

In all his writings he takes an attitude of profound reverence toward religion and its fundamental truths, of God, good, and immortality. After the spirit of his age, he was a rationalist, subjecting all the doctrines of religion to the dictates of reason. He does not seem to have gone to the worship of God in any church. He was annoyed in his declining life by Fichte, who had been at one time his pupil, carrying out the principles which his master had laid down to prove idealism. As his years advanced his faculties began to decay, and he scarcely understood the system which he had so carefully elaborated. He died February 12, 1804.

A CRITICISM OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.[1]

LOCKE was the most influential metaphysician of last century; Kant is the most influential metaphysician of this.

Locke's great work, "An Essay on Human Understanding," published in 1690, came into notice immediately. The age was ripe for it. Younger men, rejoicing in the advance of physical science, were becoming wearied of the logical forms of the schoolmen which had kept their hold till the close of the sixteenth century, and of the abstract metaphysical discussions which still prevailed in the seventeenth century. Locke met the want of his age. His fresh observational spirit, his shrewdness and sagacity, his independence, and his very phraseology, which carefully avoided all

[1] I had an article in the *Princeton Review* Nov. 1878, entitled *A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy*. Prof. Sidgwick has stolen my brand by giving the same title to his very acute articles in MIND, beginning 1883. I am quite willing that he should use the title, and I refer to his employment of it simply in order to claim that I have a right to my own property which I acquired by a prior possession. Kant seems to me to have reached the climax of his influence at his centenary in 1881. These papers of Dr. Sidgwick's are an indication that Kant will now have to undergo a searching criticism, such as Locke was subjected to, at the end of last century and the beginning of this. It is clear that Dr. Stirling is about to start a rebellion against Kant in favor of realism. I may be allowed to express a hope that Dr. Sidgwick and his friend Mr. Balfour having filled the air with doubts and difficulties, will now show as much acuteness in defending truth as they have done in opposing error. Unless they do so the tendency of their philosophy, following the spirit of the times, will be toward an agnosticism which they do not mean to support.

hack and technical phrases, recommended him to the rising generation. He called attention to internal facts, even as Bacon and Newton had to external; and if he did not himself notice and unfold all the delicate operations of our wondrous nature, he showed men where to find them. But philosophy, like faith—as the great Teacher said, like physical science—as Bacon showed, is to be tried by (not valued for) its fruits. The influence exerted by him has been and is of a healthy character. But there were serious oversights and even fatal errors in his principles; and these came out to view in the systems which claimed to proceed from him—in the sensationalism of Condillac, the idealism of Berkeley, and the scepticism of Hume.

By the second half of the eighteenth century thoughtful minds began to see the need of a reaction against the extreme experientialism which had culminated in the Scottish sceptic; and there appeared two great defenders of fundamental truth—Reid in Scotland (1764) reaching in his influence over his own country, over France, and over the United States; and Kant in Germany (1781) laying firm hold of his own land, and then passing over into France, Britain, and America, and latterly penetrating into Scandinavia, Greece, Italy, and Spain. Kant's power, like Locke's, has been on the whole for good. He has established fundamental mental and moral principles, which are seen to be fixed forever. He has taken us up into a region of grand ideals, where poetry, led by Schiller and Goethe, has revelled ever since. But there were mistakes in the philosophy of Kant as well as in that of Locke. These have come out like the dark shadow of an eclipse in the idealism of Fichte, the speculative web woven by Hegel, and in the relativity and nescience theories elaborated by Hamilton and applied by Herbert Spencer. Our errors as well as our sins will find us out. Providence allows specu-

lative mistakes to go on to a *reductio ad absurdum*, and the exposure corrects them. There is need of a rebellion against Kant's despotic authority; or rather of a candid and careful examination of his peculiar tenets, with the view of retaining what is true and expelling what is false. This is the more needed, as all the agnostics and the materialistic psychologists when pushed fall back on Kant. Prof. Mahaffy acknowledges,[1] "Of late the Darwinists, the great apostles of positivism, and the deadly enemies of metaphysics, have declared that he alone of the philosophers is worthy of study, and to him alone was vouchsafed a foreglimpse of true science." I believe that we can not meet the prevailing doctrine of agnostics till we expel Kant's nescient theory of knowledge, and that it is as necessary in this century to be rid of the *Forms* of Kant as it was in the last of the *Ideas* of Locke, both being officious intermeddlers, coming between us and things.

I wish it to be understood that I do not mean to disparage the great German metaphysician. I place him on the same high level as Plato and Aristotle in ancient times, and as Bacon and Descartes, Locke and Leibnitz, Reid and Hamilton in modern times. His logical power of ordination

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[1] I may mention that in an article in the *Princeton Review* for January, 1878, I ventured on a short criticism of Kant. It was meant to be a challenge. It called forth an able champion in Prof. Mahaffy who wrote a criticism in the same *Review* for July, 1878, to which I replied in an article for November, 1878, referred to in last note. I am not to carry on the controversy in this paper, but I may occasionally use the remarks I then made. Dr. Mahaffy has studied Kant profoundly, and has written valuable fragmentary volumes which I hope he may complete, and thus give us fully his view of the Critical Philosophy. The University of Dublin, of which he is so distinguished a member, having for nearly a century and a half followed Locke, seems in this last age to have gone over to Locke's great rival, Immanuel Kant.

and division is not surpassed by that of Saint Thomas, the Angelical Doctor, or the greatest of the schoolmen. He did immeasurable good by counteracting the sensationalism which was coming in like a flood in France under the influence of Condillac, of Voltaire, and the encyclopedists. He accomplished this in the right manner (so far) by showing that there are other and deeper principles in the mind than sensations and transformed sensations. He did a like service to philosophy by resisting the undermining process of Hume, who proposed to carry out to its legitimate consequences the experimental method of Locke, and landed in scepticism. He effected this by showing that there are in the mind profound laws, or forms, which are prior to experience and independent of it. He carries out his principles in a proper way and proposes to give us an inventory of what is *à priori* in the mind: "For this science (of metaphysics) is nothing more than an inventory of all that is given by pure reason, systematically arranged" (First Preface).[1] These dicta of reason had been appealed to constantly by the school of dogmatists, but there had been no careful inquiry into their nature, and their mode of operation. Kant did great good by attempting an arrangement of them—though I believe the system which he constructed was far from being successful. He introduced clearness and definiteness into metaphysics by drawing the famous distinction—of which there had been previously only vague anticipations—between analytic and synthetic judgments, the former simply evolving in the proposition what is involved in the subject, as when we say that "an island is surrounded with water," and the latter involving something more, as when we say, "Sicily is an island in the

[1] Except when stated otherwise I use Meiklejohn's Translation in Bohn's Library.

Mediterranean." Farther on I may have something to say about these synthetic judgments; but I think he is right in maintaining that the problem of the possibility and existence of metaphysics depends on the circumstance that there is in the mind a capacity of pronouncing judgments embracing more than is in the subject, and that there are such judgments *à priori*, as that every effect has a cause. His classification in the categories of the relations which the mind can discover is taken largely from Aristotle and the scholastic logicians, and contains a considerable amount of truth, and should be carefully weighed by all who would construct a logic.

He has laid a deep and immovable foundation for ethics in the Practical Reason, and his phrase, "the Categorical Imperative," has always appeared to me to be the most expressive ever employed to designate the office of the conscience. We should also be grateful to him for his defence of the freedom of the will. These are only the chief of the high excellences which I find in the Kantian philosophy which sets before youth a high ideal, intellectual and moral. The grand principles which he has expounded and defended must have a place (it may be a somewhat different place from that which he has allotted to them) in every system of high philosophy.

But, while he has thus been powerfully promoting the cause of truth, it may be doubted whether he has given the correct account of fundamental principles. He was more distinguished as a logical thinker and systematizer than a careful observer of what actually passes in the mind. His system, as a whole, seems to me not to be a natural one—that is, according to nature—but an artificial one, constructed by a powerful intellect. He has shown amazing dexterity and skill in forming his system, in supporting it by buttresses where it is weak, and defending it against

attacks. He has certainly raised a massive structure, with imposing bulwarks; but, in these times, people trust more in earthworks than in stone castles, which are exposed to attack from their height; and I believe the time is at hand when we shall have a philosophy of a lowlier but surer kind, based on the facts of our mental nature, carefully observed.

In the examination which I am to undertake I am not to proceed on any disputed points in Kant's writings. I look only to the broad features of his philosophy, as seen both by those who approve of and those who oppose him. My criticisms are all advanced on what is admitted by all his disciples and interpreters. I do not mean to inquire whether, as some maintain, there is an inconsistency between the Preface to the second edition and the first edition; or what he means by the "I think" which he represents as running through all the exercises of the *à priori* reason, and what we are to understand by the *schematismus* and the "*à priori imagination*." On some of these points I have views which I may intimate as I advance. But there are others far better fitted than I am to discuss these subjects, and my criticism does not apply to any controverted doctrine. My objections are directed against deeper and more essential parts of his philosophy on which all are agreed as to his meaning. I object to three fundamental positions of Kant.

I.

I OBJECT TO HIS CRITICAL METHOD.

It seems that in the school of Wolff, in which he was trained, he was led, first, to favor the Dogmatic method of Descartes and Leibnitz. But the inquiring spirit of the

times and his own reflection convinced him that this method was very unsatisfactory, as each man or school had set out with his or its own dogma, and people were now unwilling to accept, on any authority, dogmas which had not been sifted by an accredited test. Following the manner of the matter-of-fact age, he then turned to the "empiricism," as he calls it, of the "celebrated Locke." But he drew back when he saw what consequences were drawn from it by Hume.[1] Dissatisfied with these methods, he elaborated, expounded, and illustrated a method of his own—the Critical Method.

There may be a legitimate use of each of these methods if it is kept within proper limits. All inquirers have to assume something, which may be called a dogma; but they must be ready to show grounds for making the assumption. A narrow empiricism may miss, as certainly Locke did, some of the deepest principles of the mind; may not notice first or intuitive principles. There is need of a criticism to distinguish things which are apt to be confounded in hasty assumptions and generalizations. But surely the true method in all sciences which have to do with facts, as I hold that all the mental sciences have, is the inductive, care being taken to understand and properly use it.

The agent, the instrument, the eye, the sense employed in the induction of the facts, is self-consciousness. By it we notice the operations of the mind, directly those of our own minds, and indirectly those of others as exhibited in their words, writings, and deeds. What we thus notice is

[1] It does not appear that Kant ever read Hume's first and greatest work, *The Treatise of Human Nature;* but he was acquainted in a translation with the *Enquiry into the Human Understanding,* which was a second form of the first, and translated into German by Sulzer, 1755, and also with a translation of some of the Essays into which Hume broke down his greater works.

singular and concrete, like the facts perceived by the external senses. But we may proceed to abstract and generalize upon what we observe, and in this way discover laws which are to be regarded as the laws of our mental nature. In pursuing the methods we find laws or principles which are fundamental and necessary. Aristotle called them first truths; others have called them by other names: Kant designates them as *à priori* principles, and represents them as pronouncing synthetic judgments *à priori*. I hold that they perceive objects and truths directly and immediately, and hence may be called intuitions. They act prior to our observation of them; they act whether we observe them or not. It is the business of the metaphysician to look at their working, to determine their exact nature, their rule of action, and the authority which they claim. His inspection of them does not make them operate, or determine their mode of operation. He can watch them because they act and as they act, and his special business is to determine their laws. When he has done so he has found a metaphysical, what indeed may be regarded as a philosophical, principle. A system or systematized arrangement of such principles constitutes metaphysics or mental philosophy.

Kant was altogether right in saying that the end aimed at in metaphysics is to furnish an "inventory" or "compendium" of *à priori* principles. But he proceeded to attain this end in a wrong way—by the method of Criticism. Surely criticism must proceed on acknowledged rules or tests. On what principles does Kant's criticism proceed? Kant answers, "Pure speculative reason has this peculiarity, that in choosing the various objects of thought it is able to define the limits of its own faculties, and even to give a complete enumeration of the possible modes of proposing problems to itself, and thus to stretch out the entire system of metaphysics" (Pref. to 2d Edition). But must

there not in that case be a prior criticism of reason to find out whether it can do this? And must not this criticism imply a previous one from higher principles *ad infinitum?* Certain it is that from the time of Kant we have had a succession of critical philosophies, each professing to go deeper down than its predecessors, or to overtop them. Fortunately—I should rather say wisely—Kant takes the forms of common logic, which are so well founded, as his criticising principles, and has thus secured valuable truth and much systematic consistency; only, these forms have helped to keep him from realities.

Professor Mahaffy asks with amazement whether we are to accept without criticism the saws of the common people, or the dogmas of speculators—no one of whom agrees with his neighbor. To this I reply that it has always been understood that there is criticism in the inductive method. Bacon would have us begin induction with the "necessary rejections and exclusions." Whately and logicians generally speak of the necessity of "analysis," and Whewell enjoins "the decomposition of facts." But this analysis, or criticism, if you choose to call it so, must be applied to facts, in the case of mental science as made known by internal observation. It must aim at separating the complexity of facts as they present themselves, and this in order to discover the law of each of the elements, and to keep us from making assertions of one of these which are true only of another, and of the whole what are true only of some of the parts. Our aim in metaphysics is to discover what truths are intuitively known, and for this purpose we must distinguish them from their concomitants, in particular from all mere contingent or empirical truths. All professed metaphysical principles are attempted generalizations of our intuitive perceptions and judgments. But these generalizations are in the first instance apt to be crude, by

reason of mixing up other things with primitive intuitions. Even in more advanced stages of philosophy metaphysicians are apt to lay down imperfect and mutilated principles to support their theories. There is therefore need of a criticism to distinguish things that differ, but which are mixed together in experience, or are put in one category by system builders. But in our examination we are not to put ourselves above the facts. We must be at special pains not to override or mutilate them, still less to twist or torture them. Our single aim should be to apprehend and express them accurately, and to apply them only to the objects on which they bear. Kant speaks (Pref. to 2d Edition) of "purifying the *à priori* principles by criticism"; whereas the proper office of the metaphysician is simply to discover what they are, and to formulate them without addition or diminution.

It is not to be understood that our observation of them, of these first principles, gives them their being, and still less that it gives them their authority. Our notice of them does not give them existence. We notice them because they exist. By observation we can discover that they exist, and find the extent and limits of their jurisdiction and authority. Truth is truth, whether we observe it or no. Still, observation has its place, and without a very careful induction, metaphysics are sure to be nothing else than a system of arbitrary dogmas. The induction does not give them their title. They have their authority in themselves, but observation makes their title known to us. Kant is constantly asserting that metaphysics are independent of the teaching of experience, and that they must not call in experience. They are independent of experience as that mountain is independent of my eye. Still, it is only by my eye that I can see the mountain.

A metaphysical philosophy can be constructed only by

the induction of the operations of our intuitions. We can give the marks and tests of these intuitions. Their primary and essential character is not necessity, as Leibnitz held; nor necessity and universality, as Kant maintained; but self-evidence: they look immediately on things, and contain their evidence within themselves. Being so, they become necessary, that is, have a necessity of conviction, which is the secondary test, and universal—that is, entertained by all men, which is their tertiary corroboration.

After, but not till after, having discovered and co-ordinated intuitive principles, we may then, if we are determined, inquire whether they are to be trusted. Such an investigation can not, I fear, be very fruit-bearing; the result must be mainly negative. It is an attempt to dig beneath the ground on which the building rests, to fly above the air. Still, by such a process we may be able to show that our intuitions confirm each other, and thus yield not a primary, but a secondary or reflected, evidence of their trustworthiness. It can also be shown that they do not contradict each other; that there is nothing in them to countenance the alleged antinomies of Kant, Hegel, Hamilton, or Spencer, all of which are contradictions, not in things or our intuitive convictions, but simply in the mutilated propositions drawn out by these men. But in the first and last resort we are to rest on the circumstance that these first principles are of the nature of intuitions looking directly on things. As this is the first, so it is also the strongest evidence that the mind can have. It is the strongest which it can conceive itself to have. When it has this it is always satisfied, and it does not seek anything more; and if more be offered, it will be felt to be a superfluity, and if it be pressed, it will be apt to resent it as insult.

II.

I OBJECT TO KANT'S PHENOMENAL THEORY OF PRIMITIVE KNOWLEDGE.

Hume opens his Treatise of Human Nature: "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I call impressions and ideas." The difference between these consists in the greater liveliness of the impressions. Under impressions he includes such heterogeneous mental states as sensations, perceptions, emotions, and I should suppose resolutions. Under ideas he has memory, imagination (often as lively as sensation), judgment, reasoning, moral convictions, all massed together.

Kant's aim was to meet the great sceptic. In doing so he wished to make as few assumptions as possible. Let us assume, he virtually says, what no one can deny. Hume had said, "As long as we confine our speculations to the *appearances* of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties." At this point Kant starts: Let us assume the existence of *appearances*—Hume's very words; of Erssheinungen, of Eindrücke—that is, impressions. This is his first and perhaps his greatest mistake.

Kant, as it appears to me, should have met Hume's very first positions. The mind does not begin with *impressions*. The word is vague, and in every way objectionable. It signifies a mark made by a harder body, say a seal, upon a softer body, say wax. Taken literally, it implies two bodies—one impressing, the other impressed; applied metaphorically, it indicates a body to impress and a mind impressed. As applied to our perceptions by consciousness, say of self as thinking, and our purely mental acts, as our

idea of moral good, it has and can have no meaning for there is nothing without impressing, and the operation has nothing whatever of the nature of an impression. Kant should have met these primary positions. But he concedes them. In doing so he has broken down his walls of defence, and admitted the horse fashioned by the deceit of the enemy, and is never able to expel him or counteract the evil which he works.

An impression, if it means any thing, means a thing impressed. An appearance, if we understand it, means a thing appearing, and it seems to imply a being to whom it appears. An impression without a thing impressed is an abstraction from a thing impressed. An appearance is an abstraction from a thing appearing. As all abstractions imply a concrete thing from which they are taken, so all appearances imply a thing known as appearing. In physics a phenomenon means a thing, a reality presented, to be referred to a law.

It has been commonly allowed, since the days of Locke, that man's two original inlets of knowledge are sensation or sense-perception, and reflection or self-consciousness. Kant speaks everywhere of an outer and an inner sense. Now, I hold that by both of these we know things. By sense-perception we know our bodies and bodies beyond them; and Kant says correctly, "Extension and impenetrability together constitute our conception of matter" (Trans., p. 379). There may be disputes difficult to settle—as what are our original and what our acquired sense-perceptions, whether of our bodily frame or of it with objects affecting it; but our acquired imply original perceptions, and both in the first instance and in the last resort contemplate objects as extended, and exercising some sort of energy. It is, if possible, still more emphatically true that self-consciousness reveals not mere appearance, but self as a thing, say as thinking or feeling.

But what, it may be asked, is the proof of this? To this I answer, first, as an *argumentum ad hominem*, that we have the same proof of it as we have of the impression, of the presentation, of the phenomenon. Whatever those who hold these slippery theories appeal to, I also appeal to; and I am sure that the tribunal must decide in my behalf. I have the same evidence of the existence of a thing impressed as I have of the impression, of the thing appearing as I have of the appearance. But secondly, and positively, the position I hold can stand the tests of intuition. It is self-evident; we perceive the very things, say the nostrils as affected, or self as reasoning. We do not need mediate proof; we have immediate. It is also necessary: I can not be made to believe otherwise that I do not exist, or that there is no body resisting my energy. It is, farther, universal, as admitting no exceptions, and as being held by all men, young and old, savage and civilized. It can thus stand the tests used by Kant, which are the two last.

Let us now turn to the account given by Kant. According to him, we know mere appearance; and his definition is, "the undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called an appearance or phenomenon." Speaking of the rainbow, "not only are the rain-drops mere phenomena, but even their circular form, nay, the space itself through which they fall, is nothing in itself, but both are mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of our sensuous intuition, while the transcendental object remains for us utterly unknown" (Trans., p. 38). This is his account not merely of material objects, but of space, time, and self. "Time and space, with all phenomena therein, are not in themselves things. They are nothing but representations, and can not exist out of and apart from the mind. Nay, the sensuous internal intuition of the mind (as the object of consciousness), the determination of which is represented

by the succession of different states in time, is not the real proper self as it exists in itself, not the transcendental subject, but only a phenomenon which is presented to the sensibility of this, to us, unknown being" (Trans., p. 307).

Professor Mahaffy calls on me to define what I mean by *thing*. I answer that it is one of those simple objects which according to all logicians can not be logically defined; not because we do not know it, but because we know it at once, and can not find anything simpler or clearer by which to explain it. All that we can do positively is to say that *it* is what we know it to be; or to express it in synonymous phrases, and call it a being or an existence. But we may, as logicians allow in such cases, lay down some negative propositions to face misapprehensions, and to distinguish *it* from other things with which it may be confounded. 1. *It* is not an abstract or general knowledge, say of a τὸ ὄν or essence or being; or of a quality, say form or thought; or of a maxim, say that a property implies a substance. Our primary knowledge is in no sense a science, which is knowledge systematized. But the knowledge thus arranged is real knowledge, and because it is so, science is to be regarded as dealing with realities, and gives no sanction to agnostics or nihilism. 2. This thing is not a mere appearance. What appears may be known very vaguely—it may be a cloud, a shadow, or the image of a tree in a river. Still it is a reality—that is, a real thing; it consists of drops of moisture, of a surface deprived of light, or of a reflection. 3. Man's primary perception is not of a relation between objects, but of objects themselves. When I see a round body I see it as a round body. I may also be conscious of myself as perceiving it. Having these two objects I may discover a relation between them, and find that the round body affects me. But I first know the round body and the self, and as ex-

isting independent of each other. The round body may be seen by others as well as me, and the self may next instant be contemplating a square body. Holding by these positions we are delivered from both the phenomenal and relative theories of knowledge of body and mind, and find that we have real things, between which we may discover relations which are also real. A relation without things has always appeared to me to be like a bridge with nothing to lean on at either end.

The thing which I thus posit is, I admit, not the same as that of which Kant speaks. We are told that Kant had two kinds of sensible knowledge—things as phenomena, and things *per se*. I have been asserting that we know more than phenomena. I allow that what I assume is not the thing in itself—the *Ding an sich*, as Kant expresses it; the thing *per se*, as Mahaffy translates it. I confess that I do not understand what is meant to be denoted by this phrase, which seems to me to be of a misleading character, as seeming to have a profound meaning when it has no meaning at all. If I have the thing, I do not care about having the *in itself*, as an addition—if, indeed, it be an addition. It is enough for me that I know the thing, the very thing, and I may wish to know more of the thing; and this I may be able to do, but only by making additions in the same way as I have acquired my primary knowledge. As to *the thing in itself*, it always reminds of the whale that swallowed itself.

I do believe that Kant, like Locke, wished to be a realist, but both had great difficulty in getting a footing on *terra firma;* Locke by making the mind perceive only ideas, and Kant because he made it perceive phenomena, which are only a more fugitive form of ideas. He opposes idealism, and maintains that the internal implies the existence of the external—by a very doubtful argument, as it appears to

me, unless we give the internal the power of knowing the external. He is quite sure that there is a *thing, a Ding an sich.* But then he admits that we can never reach it, can never catch it. The thing does exist, but then it is a thing unknown and unknowable, and we land ourselves in contradiction if we suppose that we know it. Kant is thus the true founder and Hamilton the supporter (both without meaning it), and Herbert Spencer the builder of the doctrine of nescience or agnostics, underlying so much of the philosophic and physical speculation of the present day.

We can avoid these consequences only by making the mind begin with a reality. If we do not begin with it we can not end with it. If we do not assume it we can not infer it. "How can we reason but from what we know?" And if there be not knowledge and fact in the premises, we can not, as Kant knew well, have it in the conclusion without a gross paralogism.

Kant holds that the mind has the power of Perception, of Anschauung. But let us carefully note what this Perception is. He argues that there is a thing, a thing in itself without the mind, but this is unknown and unknowable, and is known simply by what it produces in the mind. In the perception itself there is both an *à priori* and an *à posteriori* element—a sensation of color, or feeling, or taste caused from without, but perceived under the form of space in the mind. Now all these are in the mind itself. I may quote from *The Reproduction* in the *Text-Book to Kant* by Dr. Stirling, who surely understands his author: "We know only our own affections. What we call things are only these affections themselves variously combined, manipulated, and placed." "All our knowledge consists of two factors and both are subjective." "We have always to recollect that what we call things are but aggregates of our own sensations and nothing really

without." This is true even of space and time. "Whether we look on space or time, it is only our own states we know in either" (p. 42). This seems to me to be a very artificial and altogether a very unnatural account of perception—a process of which we are all conscious. It certainly takes us away altogether from external things and issues logically in agnosticism.

I am aware that in maintaining the reality of things within and without we have to draw certain distinctions. There is the distinction between our original and acquired perceptions. It is only in the first of these that we know the thing directly; the others we know only by a process of gathered experience in which error may creep in. We now know approximately what are our original perceptions by the various senses. By the eye we know primarily only a colored surface. By the muscular sense we know bodies as solid or impenetrable. By the senses of taste, smell, and feeling we seem to know only our organism as affected. These distinctions were unknown to Kant and his immediate followers, and have only been revealed to us by the experiments wrought on the senses, such as those of Chiselden and Franz, showing that we do not know distance by the eye.

It may be noticed, also, that in the school of Kant there is not so much attention paid as in the school of Locke and Reid to the distinction often ill-expressed between the Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter. The Primary are such as extension and potency, found in all bodies, whereas the Secondary are organic affections, such as colors, heat, sounds, tastes, implying an external cause. Thus heat is felt as an affection of the bodily frame, but it has a cause in molecular motion. Carrying these distinctions with us, we can and should maintain that in our original sense-perceptions we know matter and its primary qualities directly and immediately.

III.

I OBJECT TO KANT'S IDEAL DOCTRINE OF THE MIND IMPOSING FORMS ON THINGS APPEARING.

This error connects itself with the previous ones. Man is supposed to perceive not things, but appearances, and he calls in forms to give unity to scattered appearances. These forms are void in themselves; they need a content, and they are applicable to objects of possible experience, but to nothing else. The language is meant to express a truth, but it fails to do so. Would it be correct to represent the law of gravitation, as a form, void in itself, and capable of being applied to matter and its molecules? The correct statement is that gravitation is a property of matter. In like manner, the original endowments of mind are powers in the mind itself, enabling us to know things.

Kant maintains that it must either be the external that determines the internal, or the internal that determines the external. The experientialist makes the external determine the internal, makes the mind simply reflect what passes before it. Kant maintains in opposition that the internal determines the external, and he would thus raise a breakwater in the mind itself against materialism and scepticism. But surely the natural and rational supposition is that the internal perceives (not creates) the external, and it should be added, the internal also. The primitive intellectual exercises of the mind are perceptions looking at things. By sense-perception we perceive external objects in our body or beyond it as they are presented to us, and we know them as extended and resisting our energy. By self-consciousness we know self as thinking, imagining, hating, or loving. These exercises are all singular, but we can generalize them

and thus discover the laws of our perceptions—be it observed, perceptions of things, and not impressions or appearances—and these form an important department of metaphysic, which becomes a positive department of true science, and not a mere police, as Kant would make it, to preserve us from error. We have here in the mind principles which, looking to things, give us fundamental truths.

But Kant gives to these principles not a mere perceptive, but a formative power. Our intuitions are not perceptions, looking at things and the relations of things, but moulds imposing on phenomena what is not in the phenomena. Our primary knowledge thus consists of two elements, one *à posteriori* from experience, the other *à priori* from the stores of the mind.

This may be the appropriate place at which to call attention to the phrases *à priori* and *à posteriori*, so constantly employed in all philosophic works. In the philosophy of Aristotle, by proceeding *à priori* is meant going from cause to effect or from antecedent to consequent; by *à posteriori*, arguing from effect to cause or from consequent to antecedent. Hume occasionally uses the phrases, but gives them a somewhat different signification. By *à priori* he designates what is known, independent of experience; by *à posteriori*, what is gathered by experience. It is in this sense the terms are used by Kant, and in all the philosophies that have ramified from, or been influenced by him. These phrases are so universally used that we can not discard them. But in employing them let us understand what is meant by them. We are not to interpret them as implying that there is *knowledge* or *notions* in the mind prior to experience. Nor are we to use them as implying that the mind in its perceptions gives to the object a quality not in the thing as known.

By *à priori* we denote principles which are in the very

nature and constitution of the mind[1]—to use language favored by Butler and the Scottish school. But in some connections the phrase is liable to be misunderstood, and may lead into serious error. It may mean that we are entitled to start with a favorite principle without previously inquiring whether it has a place in the mind, and what is its precise place; and then rear upon it or by it a huge superstructure. I use the phrase as one universally adopted, but I employ it only as I explain it. I denote by it those principles, intellectual and moral, which act in the mind naturally and necessarily. But I do not allow that we can use them in constructing systems till we have first carefully inducted them. I believe in *à priori* laws operating spontaneously in the mind, but I do not believe in an *à priori* science constructed by man. There is a sense indeed in which there may be an *à priori* science—that is, a science composed of the *à priori* principles in the mind. But then they have to be discovered in order to form a science, and their precise nature and mode of operation determined by *à posteriori* inspection. Like the Scottish school, I am suspicious of the lofty systems of ancient, mediæval, and modern times, which have been fashioned by human ingenuity. Acting on this principle, I reject, with the majority of thinking people, and with metaphysicians themselves, more than half the metaphysics that have been constructed. At times I am grateful when I discover a native principle woven into these webs, only considerably twisted. In rejecting these speculations I am not to be charged with rejecting *à priori* truths in the mind. I am simply sceptical of the use that has been made of them by the ingenuity of man. With me, philosophy consists in a body of first

[1] They are the REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES spoken of under the Threefold Aspect of Intuition at the opening of No. V. of this Series.

principles in the mind, carefully observed and expressed. This may be as firm and sure as any system of natural science.

But in employing them, let us understand what we mean by them. We are not to understand them as implying that there is *knowledge* or *notions* in the mind prior to experience. They are to be understood as simply denoting that these laws are in the mind prior to any exercise of them and regulating our exercises, intellectual and moral, and guaranteeing great fundamental truths. Of this description is the law in our mind which leads us to decide that an effect proceeds from a cause.

Here I may remark that there is an ambiguity in the term 'experience,' which has seldom been noticed. It may denote an individual experience or it may signify a gathered experience or induction. In the former sense, everything which passes through the mind is an experience—say the experience of ourselves in pain or of ourselves as knowing and deciding. In this sense every exercise of intuition or of *à priori* reason is an experience. These individual experiences, it is evident, do not reveal anything beyond themselves. But when we talk of experience making known truth we mean a gathered experience or an inductive process leading to a law. It is in this latter sense that we draw the distinction between truth discovered *à priori* and truth discovered by experience. or *à posteriori*—the better phrase would be 'inductive experience.'

He admits that there is an *à posteriori* matter furnished by the senses. I confess I have had a difficulty in finding what this *à posteriori* matter is. In the Introduction he tells us what belongs to "sensuous experience,"—"color, hardness or softness, weight, impenetrability, etc." In the opening of the Transcendental Æsthetic he gives us as belonging to sensation, "impenetrability, hardness, color," etc. It

is rather strange to find impenetrability here, as it implies both extension and force, which, in his system, are supposed to be imposed *à priori* by the mind itself. This shows in what difficulties he is when he would refer some perceptions to sensation or experience and others to forms in the mind.

But while he holds that we get so much from sensation and experience, he maintains that we have a more important *à priori* element imposed as a form on objects. Phenomena present themselves through the senses as manifold and scattered. I perceive a rose to have unconnected phenomena, as particles, colors, odors, shapes, and the mind combines them into a unity of object. Now, we have to meet Kant at this second point as we have met him at the first. I have been arguing that the mind begins with the knowledge of things existing; and I now affirm that this knowledge is of things in the concrete, of substances with their properties, of body as at once having form and color, of this stone at one and the same time with the form of a cross and of a brown color. The unity is not given to it by the mind, it is in the object, say the rose or stone; but is perceived at once by the senses. At this point he introduces his first ideal element and in doing so he gives an entirely erroneous view of what the senses disclose.

He carried this distinction into every exercise of the senses, there being always an *à posteriori* part but a more powerful *à priori* element imparted by the mind. He uses this latter part as a rock to beat back the waves of scepticism. But in all this, he has, in fact, allowed the entrance of a more subtle scepticism than that of Hume. In all cases the subjective joins on to the objective, and we can not tell what the object as a thing is as distinguished from the subject. For if the formative mind may add one thing, why not two, or ten, or a hundred, till we know not what reality is left us?

Thus we have a door opened for the entrance at one and the same time of idealism and agnosticism; both of these have, in fact, come in. We have an ideal element contributed by the mind, an element giving no objective reality and an empirical element, implying it may be a reality, which, however, must forever remain unknown. We shall see that higher minds, such as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, used the ideal factor and raised imposing structures, of which we are not sure whether they are solid mountains or cloudland. While more earthly minds took the other factor and drove it to an agnosticism which seeks a basis in materialism Hume said that "if we carry our inquiry beyond the appearances of objects to the senses, I am afraid that most of our conclusions will be full of scepticism and uncertainty." But we have seen that when we make what are commonly regarded as things to be mere appearances, we are certainly landed in these issues with nothing left to deliver us from them.

I have already referred to the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and to the circumstance that metaphysics consist in synthetic judgments *à priori*. I maintain that metaphysics have to look first to things before they compare things, and have to treat of primitive cognitions before they treat of primitive judgments. But so far as judgments are concerned, the distinction is a valid and an important one. But Kant's account is not accurate. There are undoubtedly synthetic judgments *à priori*. But what is their nature? They are not judgments apart from things, they are judgments about things; that two straight lines can not enclose a space is such a judgment, but it is a judgment about lines. From what we know about straight lines, we perceive and are sure and decide that they can not enclose a space. The same is true of the innumerable other primitive synthetic judgments. Such

are those we pronounce in regard to space and number and time, as that two straight lines which have gone on for an inch without coming nearer each other will go on forever as straight lines without being nearer; that equals added to equals must be equals, and that time is continuous and has no breaks in it; we perceive these propositions to be true from the nature of the things as known to us. Such are all mathematical axioms, and all deep ethical maxims, such as that we should keep our word.

In order to prevent his philosophy from rising into total idealism, he is forever telling us that the forms which he calls in have a meaning only as applied to objects of possible experience. Here, as in so many other cases in Kant's philosophy, there is truth involved, but it is not accurately expressed. What propriety would there be in saying that gravitation has a meaning only when applied to objects of possible experience? The true statement is that gravitation is a law of all material things. So we would say of the primitive judgment of causation that every effect has a cause; that it is not a judgment applicable to all objects of possible experience, but to all objects known to us as real.

I am now to apply these principles in the examination of Kant's "Kritik of Pure Reason" in detail, simply avoiding those topics in which his meaning is disputed. The forms which the mind is supposed to superinduce on objects fall into three classes: I. In ÆSTHETIC, that is, the senses, the Forms of Space and Time. II., In ANALYTIC, the Categories of Quantity, Quality, Relation, Modality, each including three subdivisions, in all twelve; and III. In DIALECTIC, the three Ideas of Substance, Interdependence of Phenomena, and God.

Transcendental Æsthetic.

In treating of the doctrine that the mind knows only appearances, I have indicated my objections to Kant's account of the senses. It keeps us away altogether from things which it is the very object of the senses to make known to us. He maintains resolutely that there is a world existing external to the mind, but on his principles there can be no evidences of this. He left himself no means of meeting his quondam pupil Fichte, when he argued that the mind which could create space and time might also create the objects in space and time; that the mind which could give extension to this ball might give it everything else which it has. This external thing is represented, quite inconsistently with his theory, to be unknown and unknowable. If an appeal be made to sense and experience to testify that the external thing exists, these will testify farther, that we know something of it—in fact, we know it to exist because we know so far what it is.

He tells us that "all intuition possible to us is sensuous" (Trans., p. 90). The word "sensuous" is apt to leave a bad impression, and has, in fact, left such an impression, as it seems to represent all intuition as being of the external senses. But he evidently means to include in the phrase our internal sense or self-consciousness. Both these senses perceive only phenomena. Even self-consciousness gives us nothing more. "The subject intuites itself, not as it would represent itself immediately and spontaneously, but according to the manner in which the mind is internally affected, consequently as it appears, and not as it is" (Trans., p. 41). I may give another passage or two as translated by Mr. Mahaffy: "The internal sense by which the mind intuites its own internal states gives us no intuition of the soul as an object." "Our self-consciousness does not present to us

the ego any more distinctly than our external intuition does to us foreign bodies; we know both only as phenomena." He does not seem to ascribe much to this internal intuition. "The notion of personality though *à priori* is not an intuition at all," but "a logical supposition of thought." At this point, that is, at his account of our internal intuition, our higher British and American metaphysicians are most inclined to leave him.

Kant's whole account of self-consciousness is complicated and confused. Dr. Stirling, in his *Reproduction*, in explaining Kantism, tells us "that inner sense is, as a sense, to be strictly distinguished from self-consciousness or the perception of the ego. The contents of the former are all the transient states of the empirical subject when under sentient feeling; whereas those of the latter are but the simple I, a mere intellectual act; the bare thought, I, I, I, or *I that am here and now thinking* (*das 'ich denke.'*)" We shall see as we advance that he brings in an "I think," which gives a unity to all our thinking. All these are unnatural and perverted accounts of the one thing, self-consciousness, or the internal sense. It is the power which perceives—that is, knows—self in its present state. It runs through all our states, giving us a continuous self, and the various states of self, say, as thinking or willing.

Kant argues that in getting rid of many appearances about what is revealed by the senses, such as color, odor, feeling, we can never put away or get rid of space in the external, or time in the internal sense. These he represents as forms imposed by the mind; space being the form of material, and time of mental phenomena. There is some little foundation of truth in all this, but the statement is, after all, utterly perverse, and it is made to give currency to error. Certainly space is involved in all the exercises of the external senses; but this, properly interpreted, means

simply that we know matter as extended. It is true that time is bound up with the exercise of the internal sense, or self-consciousness, but by this we are simply to understand that all events are remembered in time. It does not follow that they are creations of the mind, or that they are properly represented when they are spoken of as forms imposed on phenomena. It is not true that extension and duration are superimposed on objects; they are in the very nature of the objects and events as made known to us.

There are other things besides space and time that we can not be rid of in thought, as we contemplate things perceived. For example, we know both matter and mind as having being. The old Eleatics were right in giving τὸ ὄν a deep place in their philosophy, though they erred in making so many affirmations about so simple a thing. I believe farther that we know all objects disclosed by the senses as having power, as acting and being acted on. I think we might farther represent them as in a sense having independence and permanence, that is, they are not created by our minds as we observe objects, nor do they cease to exist when we cease to notice them. They exist independent of us, and whether we notice them or not. They are as much entitled to be called forms as space and time. Being, potency, permanence, are not *à priori* forms imposed on substances; they are in the substances. Just as little is extension added to matter or duration added to events; they are in matter and discerned to be in matter or mind.

Kant represents space and time as having an existence, but it is merely a subjective existence, that is, in the mind as contemplating objects and events. But I affirm that intuitively and necessarily all men look on them as existing, and as existing independently of our noticing them. I am quite as sure of the reality of space and time independent of my mind as of the objects in space and

time. By making space and time merely subjective, Kant introduced an ideal element into his philosophy which he could never expel. We have only to carry out the same principle a step farther to be landed in the thorough idealism of Fichte, and make the mind create the objects in space and the occurrences in time. Then when men come to perceive that an ideal existence is no existence, but merely an imaginary or ghostly existence, the creed they adopt will be nescience. We find extremes meeting in the present day in a pretentious idealism joined with a deadly agnosticism.

But what is space? and what is time? The answer is, that we can not explain them so as to make them conceivable to one who did not already know them. But we all know them in the concrete in objects and events, and we are sure that they are what we know them to be. We do not need any explanations as to what they are, we perceive them directly, and are satisfied without feeling it necessary to put any farther questions.

From what we know we can make many affirmations regarding them. The axioms and demonstrations of mathematics proceed upon them. The Kantians labor to show that they can explain by their forms the certainty and the necessity of mathematical truths, which are just the evolution of what the mind imposes on appearances. "Kant found that he could not trace out and learn the properties of an isosceles triangle from what he saw in it, or from mere thinking about it, but rather from what he had added to the figure in his own mind *à priori*, and had them represented by a construction. He also found that all the safe *à priori* knowledge he could obtain about it was merely the necessary consequence of what he had introduced into it according to his own concepts" (Mahaffy's *Crit. Phil. for English Readers*, p. 12). But surely this leaves it

utterly uncertain whether what we thus bring out of our minds can be asserted of veritable things; whether, so far as things are concerned, we can say that the angles of a triangle must be equal to two right angles; or whether parallel lines can not meet. We have a much simpler and more rational way of accounting for the apodictic certainty of mathematics. We perceive lines and surfaces as realities; we agree to look solely to the length of lines and the length and breadth of surfaces; and as we do so we discover that they have certain properties involved in their very nature, and that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, and that parallel lines can not meet. The properties of the ellipse, as demonstrated by Apollonius, were ready to be applied to the planetary bodies when Kepler showed that they moved in elliptic orbits. On the other hand, we may put many questions regarding space and time which we can not answer. Affirmations are often made of them which are altogether meaningless, and which we can neither prove or disprove. There may be assertions made in regard to them which are contradictory, and this not because there is anything inconsistent in the things themselves, but because we make rash statements which contradict each other.

While we have a knowledge of space and time we should allow that this is somewhat indefinite. We know them as realities; but do we ever know them apart from other things? We know this body as occupying space, we know this event as occurring in time, and we know the space and time to be realities quite as much as the body and the event is; but do we ever know space and time as separate things, or capable of a distinct and independent existence—as a tree is distinct from an animal? Space and time look as if somehow or other—we may not be able to tell how—they were always connected with something else, as if they were

dependent on something else for their manifestation. I believe them to be dependent on God, who inhabits all space and all time.

In following our intuitive convictions as to space and time, we are constrained to regard both as having no limits. This gives rise to a difficulty which Kant has powerfully pressed. It seems to make two infinites, that of space and time, each embracing all things, while we are also constrained to believe in a third infinite, in God the Almighty, the Eternal. But there is a misapprehension involved in this objection. We do not hold that space and time are infinites; infinity is merely an attribute of both. We do not say of their infinity that it embraces all things—we would never propose to make the infinity of space embrace morality. When we say that space is infinite we mean simply that there are no limits to its extension. There is not even an apparent inconsistency between this and the infinity of time and the infinity of God. It can not be proven that the infinity of space or time is inconsistent with the infinity of God; more probably they are embraced in His infinity.

Transcendental Analytic.

We now rise from the Senses to the Understanding, der Verstand, from Intuitions to Notions or Conceptions. The understanding pronounces judgments. He gives an inventory of these judgments and calls them Categories. The phrase is taken from Aristotle, who has ten Categories, being the heads under which our predications regarding things may be ranged. The aim of Kant, as has been shown again and again, is somewhat different: it is to give us the forms which the mind imposes on our intuitions or perceptions in the judgments which it pronounces. They are four in number, each subdivided into three, in all twelve.

I. QUANTITY.	II. QUALITY.
Unity.	Reality.
Plurality.	Negation.
Totality.	Limitation.
III. RELATION.	IV. MODALITY.
Inherence and Subsistence.	Possibility and Impossibility.
Causality and Dependence.	Existence and Non-existence.
Reciprocity of Agent and Patient.	Necessity and Contingence.

There has been an immense amount of discussion in Germany about these categories. The first two of the four are evidently taken from Logic, of which Kant was professor, and are found in all treatises of formal logic. The remarks of Kant upon them have helped to make the ordinary logic more clear, consistent, and philosophical. They are represented as mathematical, whereas the other two are dynamical and certainly imply ideas of being, of force and causation. These last are metaphysical rather than logical and do not now appear in the treatises of formal logic which treat of the laws of discursive thought.

It appears to me that Kant should here have given us not the forms of logic, but the relations which the mind can discover. It is the province of the psychological faculty of judgment to discover relations. This was perceived by Locke, who gave an excellent classification of the relations, making them, however, relations between ideas which we are capable of discerning, and not things. Hume also gives the mind a power of discovering relations, and gives a good enumeration of them, endeavoring all the time to explain them away by showing that the relations are simply between impressions or ideas which imply no realities.[1] It was in this way that Hume carried out his

[1] Locke speaks of relations as being innumerable, and mentions Cause and Effect, Time, Place, Identity and Diversity, Proportion and Moral Relations (Essay II. 28). Hume mentions Resemblance, Identity,

scepticism. As he began with impressions and ideas implying no object perceived or mind perceiving it, he goes on to make the understanding to deal entirely with these. Kant, as the professed opponent of scepticism, should have met Hume at this point. But he has not. He first gave the sceptic an entrance by the senses; he now allows him a place in the understanding, and it will be found difficult to expel him.

Equally with space and time the categories are forms. They have their seat and power in the mind. The forms of sense were imposed by the mind on appearances; the forms of the understanding—this is, the categories—are imposed on, and give them their unity. The question with me, what is the reality implied in the judgments of the understanding? Already the reality has very much disappeared. In the intuitions of the senses there had been so much of a reality as is implied in the appearances which, however, have always *à priori* forms imposed on them. Now, the judgment is pronounced on this complex of appearance and intuition, and the reality has all but vanished. The categories are "nothing but mere forms of thought, which contain only the logical faculty of uniting *à priori* in consciousness the manifold given in intuition. Apart from the only intuition possible for us, they have still less meaning than the pure sensuous forms, space and time; for through them an object is at least given, while a mode of connection of the manifold, when the intuition which alone gives the manifold is wanting, has no meaning at all" (Trans., p. 184).

This is not, as it appears to me, the natural or the true

Space and Time, Quantity, Degree, Contrariety, Cause and Effect. Keeping these lists before me, I make them Identity, Comprehension Whole and Parts, Resemblance, Space, Time, Quantity, Active Property, Cause and Effect (*Intuitions*, P. II. B. III.).

account. I hold that the mind, first by its cognitive power of sense, external and internal, knows things, and then by the understanding or comparative powers discovers various kinds of relations between things. Of course, if the things be imaginary the relations may also be imaginary. Thus we may say that Venus was more beautiful than Minerva, and both the terms and the propositions are unreal. But when the intuitions are of realities, when I am speaking of Demosthenes and Cicero, and declare Demosthenes a greater orator than Cicero, there is a reality both in the terms and the propositions.

Here it will be necessary to correct an error into which the whole school of Kant has fallen. They deny that the understanding has any power of intuition, der Verstand can not intuite. I maintain, on the contrary, that it has, the statement being properly explained and understood. The comparative powers presuppose a previous knowledge of things by the senses and consciousness, and they give us no new things. But having such a knowledge, the mind, by barely looking at the things apprehended, may discover a relation between them, and this intuitively by bare inspection, without any derivative, mediate, or discursive process. Thus understood, we may have intuitive or primitive judgments as well as perceptions. These constitute an important part of the original furniture of the mind, and should be included in our inventory.

Taking the category of cause and effect as an example, let me exhibit the difference between the view elaborated by Kant and that which I take. We affirm that the cause of that rick of hay taking fire was a lucifer-match applied to it. What have we here? According to Kant, a rick or an appearance, partly *à posteriori* with a certain color, and partly *à priori* with a form given it. We have also a lucifer-match with a like double character, *à priori* and *à*

posteriori. We unite the two by means of an *à priori* category, that of cause and effect, and declare the lucifer-match to be the cause of the conflagration. Is this the real mental process? Let me give in contrast what I believe to be the true account. We have first the rick as a reality, and then the match as a reality, both known by the senses and information we have had about them. On looking at the rick and discovering a change, we intuitively look for a cause, and on considering the properties of the lucifer-match, we decide that it is fit to be the cause. We have thus realities throughout, both in the original objects and the relations between them.

Kant is constantly telling us that the function of the categories is to give a unity to the perceptions compared. But let us understand what is or should be meant by this. It ought not to signify that the unity is an identity—this was the conclusion to which Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel sought to drive the doctrine of Kant on this subject. What we should understand is simply that the unity is one of relation, say of space, of quantity, of causation. Little or no information is given us by saying that intuitions or notions are brought to a unity unless it is told us in respect of what they are one, that is, by what relation, say by resemblance by time or whatever else. It should be understood that the oneness indicated is merely one in respect of that relation, which should always be expressed.

I announced at the opening of this paper that in my criticism I was to proceed only on what is admitted by all as to the meaning of Kant. At the part of his great work to which we have now come there are several disputed points, and, however tempted, I do not mean to discuss these. In treating of the categories he brings an *à priori* 'I think' called an apperception—as running through all our judgments and imparting a unity to them. There is truth

here, but it is not accurately unfolded. The correct statement is: By self-consciousness we know self in its present state, say as thinking, and this knowledge of self goes on with all our states, and, among others, the acts of the understanding in judgment.

He calls in an *à priori* use of imagination and a *schematismus*. Both are meant to bridge over gaps in his system. It is true that if an object be absent and we have to think of it, we must have an image, or what Aristotle calls a phantasm of it, and the mind can put these phantasms in all sorts of forms. Kant brings in an *à priori* imagination to represent to the judgment the manifold of the senses in unity. I regard it as an important function of the phantasy to represent absent or imaginary objects to the understanding to judge of them. The office of the schematism is to show how the categories, which are *à priori* forms, are applicable to the empirical intuitions of sense. I do not need such an intermediary, as I hold that the mind can at once know things and the relations of things.

At the close of the Analytic, Kant lays down a number of principles which follow from his theory and seem to confirm it. We have Axioms of Intuition, Anticipations of Perception, Analogies of Experience, The Postulates of Empirical Thought. These are not essential parts of his system, and have no value to those who do not adopt them. I think it expedient, therefore, to omit the discussion of them, as in no way helping, in one way or other, the controversy about the idealism of Kant.

He is now prepared to give us a division of all objects into Phenomena and Noumena. His account of each and of the relation between them is very unsatisfactory. Of the first it is supposed that we know only appearances which do not correspond to realities. Of the second we know that they exist, but then they are unknown and unknowa-

ble. Nothing but agnosticism can issue logically and practically from such a doctrine. How much more natural and reasonable to regard the phenomenon as a thing appearing and so far known, as in fact a noumenon implying intelligence.

Transcendental Dialectic.

Dialectic was a method introduced by Zeno, the Eleatic, and followed by Socrates, who established truth by discussion, in which division, definition, and the law of contradiction played an important part. Aristotle used the phrase to describe the logic of the probable as distinguished from the apodictic. The dialectics of Kant estimate the reality to be found in the exercises of reason. He arrives at the conclusion that these all end, not just in deceit, but in illusion. He has been laboriously building a mighty fabric; but he now proceeds to pluck it down with his own hands. At this point he is guilty of intellectual suicide. He is described by Sir W. Hamilton as the dialectical Samson, who, in pulling down the house upon others, has also pulled it down upon himself.

The professor of Logic at Königsberg was nothing if not logical. Beginning with intuition he has gone on to the Notion and Judgment, and now rises to Reasoning beyond der Verstand to die Vernunft. All his critics think that, strange as it may seem of one who has studied Reason so profoundly, he confounds what most of our deeper philosophers have distinguished, reason and reasoning—the first of which perceives certain truths—such as the axioms of Euclid immediately, whereas the other deduces a conclusion from premises. As the forms of space and time give unity to the manifold of the senses, and the categories give unity to our perceptions, so reason or reasoning gives a unity to the judgments. The form which gives this unity is called by him an Idea. All human cognition begins with intui-

tion, proceeds from thence to conceptions, and ends with ideas. This word Idea is one of the vaguest terms used in metaphysics. Introduced into philosophy by Plato, who signifies by it the παράδειγμα in or before the mind, it had a different meaning attached to it by Descartes and Locke, the latter of whom makes it the object of the understanding when it thinks; and now it embraces in popular use nearly every mental apprehension, and in particular two such different things as the individual image or phantasm, say of a rose, and the general notion as the class rose. Kant employs it in a sense of his own to denote the form which gives unity (a vague enough phrase, as we have seen) to the Categories.

Reason, according to Kant, takes three forms—Categorical, Conditional, Disjunctive. This may be true of reasoning, but is certainly not true of Pure Reason. As to reasoning, I hold that it is always one and the same. But it does take the three forms spoken of by Kant, and I look on the division of Kant as founded on fact. But I reckon the use of it by him as artificial in the extreme.

THE FORMS OF REASONING.

Categorical, Conditional, Disjunctive.

THE BINDING IDEAS.

Substance, Interdependence of Phenomena, God.

It is hard to discover how the Ideas as forms give the Reasoning, or how the Ideas are given by the Reasoning. In particular, his derivation of God from Disjunctive Reasoning seems to me very constrained. No doubt Disjunctive Reasoning, which proceeds by Division, implies a unity in the thing divided. But it is scarcely reverent to designate it God. This may seem pious, but it is not so; I wish he had called it by some other name. The God who is the issue of this logical process is not the living and the

true God. Certainly no one could cherish love towards such a product. It turns out that this God is discarded and cast out as peremptorily as he has been brought in.

But my search is after the reality, supposed to be in these ideas. What reality remains, except, indeed, a subjective reality implying an objective existence? Is it not virtually gone? The light has been reflected from mirror to mirror, till now nothing definable is left. There was a sort of reality, phenomenal and subjective, in the intuition; this had still an attached reality in the judgment. But it is difficult to detect it, and impossible to determine what it is in the third transformation—a reality or an illusion, a something or a nothing, a shadow or a reflection of a shadow. Kant acknowledges, "The categories never mislead us, object being always in perfect harmony therewith, whereas ideas are the parents of irresistible illusions" (Trans., p. 394). These illusions are like the concave shape we give the sky; like the rising, rounded form we give the ocean when we stand on the shore; like the foam made by the waters, which we may wipe away, only to find it gather again. Kant is still pursuing the reality, the *Ding an sich*, but it is as the boy pursues the rainbow, without ever catching it. He argues powerfully that if we suppose these ideas to be realities we fall into logical fallacies.

Substance.—If from the intuitions of sense or the categories of the understanding we suppose substance to be real, we have a paralogism—that is more in the conclusion than is justified by the premises. This is undoubtedly true if we regard our primitive intuitions as appearances and not things, and the categories as having to do solely with appearances. Kant examines the *cogito ergo sum* of Descartes. If the *ego* is in the *cogito* we have no inference, but merely a reassertion. If the *ego* is not in the *cogito*, then the con-

clusion does not follow—we have a paralogism; we have only an appearance and not a thing. I have a very decided opinion that we should not try to prove the existence of self, or of body, by mediate reasoning. We should assume the existence of *ego cogitans* as made known by self-consciousness, and also of body as extended and resisting our energy by the senses. We know both mind and body as having Being, Potency, and as having Objective Existence, and not created by our contemplating them, and this makes them substances.

INTERDEPENDENCE OF PHENOMENA.—Under this head he maintains that we are landed in contradictions or antinomies, that is, if we look on the Ideas as implying things. He resolves the contradictions by showing that we are not to imagine that what we can affirm and can prove to be contradictory in phenomena is necessarily so of things. Those of us who hold that the mind knows things have to meet these contradictions. This we do by showing that the counter propositions in some cases are not proven, and that in other cases the alleged contradictions are merely in our own mutilated statements, and not in the things themselves, or our native convictions about them.

FIRST ANTINOMY.

The world has a beginning in time and is limited as to space.	The world has no beginning in time, and no limits in space, but is in regard to both infinite.

Now upon this I have to remark, first, that as to the "world" we have, so far as I can discover, no intuition whatever. We have merely an intuition as to certain things in the world, or, it may be, out of the world. Our reason does declare that space and time are infinite, but it does not declare whether the world is or is not infinite in extent and duration.

Second Antinomy.

Every composite substance consists of simple parts, and all that exists must either be simple or composed of simple parts.	No composite thing can consist of simple parts, and there can not exist in the world any simple substance.

Our reason says nothing as to whether things are or are not made up of simple substances. Experience can not settle the question started by Kant in one way or other. We find certain things composite; these we know are made up of parts; but we can not say how far the decomposition may extend, or what is the nature of the furthest elements reached.

Third Antinomy.

Causality, according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality operating to originate the phenomena of the world; to account for the phenomena we must have a causality of freedom.	There is no such thing as freedom, but everything in the world happens according to the laws of nature.

Here I think reason does sanction two sets of facts: One is the existence of freedom; the other is the universal prevalence of some sort of causation, which may differ, however, in every different kind of object. These may be so stated as to be contradictory. But our convictions in themselves involve no contradiction; it is impossible to show that they do by the law of contradiction, which is that, "A is not Not-A." "There is some sort of causation even in voluntary acts," and "the will is free"; no one can show that these two propositions are contradictory.

Fourth Antinomy.

There exists in the world, or in connection with it, as a part or as the cause of it, an absolutely necessary being.	An absolutely necessary being does not exist, either in the world or out of it, as the cause of the world.

Our reason seems to say that time and space must have ever existed, and must exist. When a God is found, by an easy process, the mind is led by intuition to trace up these effects in nature to Him as the underived substance. No contradictory proposition can be established either by reason or experience.

A little patient investigation of our actual intuitions will show

that all these contradictions, of which the Kantians and Hegelians make so much, are not in our constitutions but in the ingenious structures fashioned by metaphysicians to support their theories.

It is often urged as a powerful argument in favor of Kant's phenomenal theory that it enables us to see that there may be no inconsistency between the universal reign of causality and the freedom of the will; for both are to be regarded as laws of the phenomenal and not the real world. But all this shows, not that the will is free in the real world, but merely that it may be free; while we are obliged to look upon it as not free in this world of appearances in which we live. It is surely much more satisfactory to show that in the real world it is free and that it can not be proven that there is a contradiction between this fact and the law of causation properly explained.

THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS.—He has a well-known threefold classification of them: the Ontological, the Cosmological, and the Physico-Theological. I have no partiality for the first two. The first is, that from the idea of the perfect in the mind we may argue the existence of a perfect being. I am not sure that the idea of the perfect implies the existence of a corresponding being, though it prepares us for receiving the evidence and enables us to clothe the Divine Being shown on other grounds to exist, with perfection. In regard to the second, which infers from the bare existence of a thing that it has a cause, I am not prepared, from the bare existence of a handful of sand, or a piece of clay, to argue that it must have had a Divine Cause. But I hold that the third, more frequently called the Teleological, the argument from design, is conclusive if properly stated. Kant can not acknowledge its validity, simply because it implies the principle of cause and effect, which he regards as applying only to appearances, and having merely a subjective value. But when we hold that the things in the world are real, and discover so wonderful an adjustment among them to produce a good end, say of rays of light, muscles, coats and humors, cones and nerves to enable us to see, then we are entitled to argue a real cause in a designer, whom the idea

of the perfect in the mind constrains us to clothe with infinity.

The objection taken to all this, is that from a finite effect, say of a wonderful combination of things to accomplish an end, we can not argue an infinite cause. I believe no man ever said that we can. All that the design proves is a designer, and it is from the idea of the infinite in the mind that we clothe him with infinity, just as it is from our moral nature, as Kant admits, that we clothe him with moral perfection.

The Practical Reason.

The part of the Kantian philosophy which is the strongest and healthiest is the ethical. No writer in ancient or modern times has stood up more resolutely for an independent morality. There may, he thinks, be legitimate disputes as to what things are, and the speculative reason may lead to illusions, but the moral power comes in to save us from scepticism. He finds here a moral reason by which the good is perceived, not as a phenomenon by superimposed forms, but directly. This reason takes the form of a Categorical Imperative, which seems to me a most admirable designation, bringing into view at one and the same time the affirmative and obligatory character of morality. The law which it sanctions is a modification of the supreme ethical law laid down by our Lord, and is: Act according to a rule applicable to all intelligences. This implies that man is free and responsible, and as a corollary, that he is responsible, that there is a judgment day and a future life, and a God to guarantee the whole. Morality, immortality, and God are thus indissolubly bound together.

I confess I should like to have this whole connected argument expressed in language not involving any peculiarly

Kantian phraseology and principles. In particular, great good would be done by a psychological account of the Practical Reason, and by an explanation and defence of the precise nexus between the moral law and the existence of God. This is eminently needed in the present day, when the common sentiment is sensitively averse to the nomenclature and abstractions of high metaphysical philosophy.

It was argued at an early date after the publication of Kant's great work, that if the speculative reason may deceive by leading us into illusions, the moral reason may do the same. I believe that the phenomenal and illusory principles of the Kritik of the Pure Reason, if carried out in a Kritik of the Practical Reason would undermine morality. It seems to me very clear that we must proceed on the same principles in expounding intelligence and truth as we do in defending morality. I am convinced that the principles of his ethics, if carried into the region of the speculative reason, would establish positive truth, without illusions of any kind. Surely the Practical Reason, according to Kant, has a power of intuition: it at once perceives moral good. I think that on like evidence he should have called in, and appealed to, certain intuitions of intelligence which look at things and guarantee reality. Had he done so, we should have had as firm a foundation for truth as he has furnished for morality.

I believe that Kant has substantially established his moral positions. They can not be assailed, except on grounds which Kant himself unfortunately furnished. Kant admitted, in fact argued, that the speculative reason led to illusions, indeed to contradictions, on the supposition that we know things, and then brought in the moral reason to bring us back to truth and certainty. The risk in all such procedure is, that those led into the slough may be caught there and go no farther. For if the speculative

reason may gender illusions, what reason have we for thinking that the practical reason gives us only truth? I do not admire the wisdom of those who first make men infidels in order to shut them into truth—as they feel the blankness of nihilism.

It was in mockery that Hume, after showing that reason leads into contradictions, allowed religious men to appeal to faith. There was far less shrewdness shown by those philosophers in the age following, who, after allowing that the intellect leads to scepticism, fell back with Jacobi and Rousseau (who was a favorite with Kant) on an ill-defined faith or feeling. The pursuing hound which had caught and torn to pieces the understanding, having tasted blood, became more infuriated, and went on to attack and devour the belief or sentiment. It is of vast moment, both logically and practically, to uphold the reason in discovering truth, if we would defend the reason in discovering the good. I deny that the reason ever lands us in contradictions or leads into error or even illusion. In the antinomies the mistakes are all in our own statements, and not in the dictates of our nature. The intellect does not lead to all truth, but if properly guided it conducts to a certain amount of truth, clear, well established, and sure. Beginning with realities, it adds to these indefinitely by induction and by thought. The speculative reason properly employed, so far from conflicting with and weakening moral reason, confirms and strengthens it.

Proceeding in our inductive method, with criticism merely as a subordinate means, we keep clear of that heresy into which the Kantians have fallen of making a schism in the body—which in this case is not the church, but the mind. I can not allow that one part or organ of our nature leads to error, and another to truth. I hope we have done with that style of sentiment, so common an age

or two ago, which lamented in so weakly a manner, often with a vast amount of affectation, that reason led to scepticism, from which we are saved by faith, and which was greatly strengthened by Kant's doctrine of the practical reason coming in to counteract the illusion of the speculative reason. The account I have given above makes every part of our nature correspond to and conspire with every other. It does more—it makes every faculty of the mind yield its testimony to its Divine author. The understanding collating the facts in nature and observing the collocations therein, and proceeding on its own inherent law of cause and effect, which I represent as having an objective value, furnishes the argument from design for God's existence. Then our moral nature comes in, and reveals a law above us and binding on us, and clothes the intelligence which we have discovered with love. I admit that the finite works of God do not prove God to be infinite. I repeat, no one ever said that they did. But this circumstance has made Kant and his school insist that thereby the theistic argument is made invalid. But as we call in our moral nature to clothe God with rectitude, so we call in that idea of the infinite, the perfect, which the mind has, and which was fondly dwelt on by Anselm, Descartes, and Leibnitz, to clothe him with infinity. Our nature is thus a harmoniously constructed instrument, raising a hymn to its Creator.

The Kritik of the Judging Faculty.

Kant brings in this power (Urtheilskraft) in a very awkward manner. He had previously spoken of Judgment in the ordinary logical sense, and shown that it is regulated by Categories. He now brings in an entirely different kind of Judgment. Its office is to mediate between the Reason and the Understanding, as if they had had a quarrel. It is brought in to fill up a gap, not in the mind, but

in his system, which had overlooked certain very prominent exercises of the soul. It is one of the abutments which he is ever adding to enable him to give a place to all the mental phenomena and to support his edifice. In this work he treats of Final Cause and Beauty in nature. He advances some views as true as they are beautiful. I do not mean to criticise his theories, as they form no essential part of his philosophy. He follows his old tendencies and makes final cause and beauty to be imposed on objects by the mind. The true account is that they imply qualities in the objects which the mind perceives.[1]

Having taken this general critical survey of the philosophy of Kant, it may serve a good purpose to compare and contrast it with the Scottish. Sir James Mackintosh and Dr. Chalmers, who were trained in the Scottish school, upon becoming somewhat acquainted in mature life with the German system, were greatly interested to notice the points of resemblance between the two philosophies. The two—the Scotch and the German—agree, and they differ. Each has a fitting representative: the one in Thomas Reid and the other in Immanuel Kant. The one was a careful observer, guided by common sense—with the meaning of good sense—suspicious of high speculations as sure to have error lurking in them, and shrinking from extreme positions; the other was a powerful logician, a great organizer and systematizer, following his principles to their consequences, which he was ever ready to accept, avow, and proclaim. The two have very important points of agreement. Reid and Kant both lived to oppose Hume, the great sceptic, or, as he would be called in the present day, agnostic.

[1] I may state that I have expounded my views of Final Cause in No. II. of this *Series*, and of Beauty in *The Emotions*, B. III., c. 8.

Both met him by calling in great mental principles, which reveal and guarantee truth, which can never be set aside, and which have foundations deep as the universe. Both appeal to reason, which Reid called reason in the first degree, and the other pure reason. The one presents this reason to us under the name of common sense—that is, the powers of intelligence common to all men; the other, as principles necessary and universal. The one pointed to laws, native and fundamental; the other, to forms in the mind. The one carefully observed these by consciousness, and sought to unfold their nature; the other determined their existence by a criticism, and professes to give an inventory of them. All students should note these agreements as confirmatory of the truth in both.

The Scotch and German people do so far agree, while they also differ. Both have a considerable amount of broad sense, and, I may add, of humor; but the Scotch have greater clearness of thinking, and the Germans of attractive idealism. Scotland and Germany, in the opinion of foreigners, are not very far distant from each other. But between them there roars an ocean which is often very stormy. I proceed to specify the differences of the two philosophies.

First, they differ in their Method. The Scotch follows the Inductive Method as I have endeavored to explain it. The German has created and carried out the Critical Method, which has never been very clearly explained and examined. It maintains that things are not to be accepted as they appear; they are to be searched and sifted. Pure reason, according to Kant, can criticise itself. But every criticism ought to have some principles on which it proceeds. Kant, a professor of Logic, fortunately adopted the forms of Logic which I can show had been carefully inducted by Aristotle, and hence has reached much truth.

Others have adopted other principles, and have reached very different conclusions. The philosophies that have followed that of Kant in Germany have been a series of criticisms, each speculator setting out with his own favorite principle,—say with the universal *ego*, or intuition, or identity, or the absolute,—and, carrying it out to its consequences, it has become so inextricably entangled, that the cry among young men is, "Out of this forest, and back to the clearer ground occupied by Kant." The Scottish philosophy has not been able to form such lofty speculations as the Germans, but the soberer inductions it has made may contain quite as much truth.

Secondly, the one starts with facts, internal and external, revealed by the senses, inner and outer. It does not profess to prove these by mediate reasoning: it assumes them, and shows that it is entitled to assume them; it declares them to be self-evident. The other, the German school, starts with phenomena—not meaning facts to be explained (as physicists understand the phrase), but *appearances*. The phrase was subtilely introduced by Hume, and was unfortunately accepted by Kant. Let us, he said, or at least thought, accept, what Hume grants, phenomena, and guard the truth by mental forms—forms of sense, understanding, and reason. Our knowledge of bodies and their actions, our knowledge even of our minds and their operations, is phenomenal. Having assumed only phenomena, he never could rise to anything else. Having only phenomena in his premises he never could reach realities in his conclusions except by a palpable paralogism, which he himself saw and acknowledged. We human beings are phenomena in a world of phenomena. This doctrine has culminated in the unknown and unknowable of Herbert Spencer, implying no doubt a known, but which never can be known by us. We all know that Locke, though himself a most

determined realist, laid down principles which led logically to the idealism of Berkeley. In like manner, Kant, though certainly no agnostic, has laid down a principle in his phenomenal theory which has terminated logically in agnosticism. We meet all this by showing that appearances properly understood are things appearing, and not appearances without things.

Thirdly, the two differ in that the one supposes that our perceptive powers reveal to us things as they are, whereas the other supposes that they add to things. According to Reid and the Scottish school, our consciousness and our senses look at once on real things; not discovering all that is in them, but perceiving them under the aspect in which they are presented—say this table as a colored surface perceived by a perceiving mind. According to Kant and the German school, the mind adds to the things by its own forms. Kant said we perceive appearances under the forms of space and time superimposed by the mind, and judge by categories, and reach higher truth by ideas of pure reason, all of them subjective. Fichte gave consistency to the whole by making these same forms create things.

Our thinking youth in the English and French speaking countries having no very influential philosophy at this present time, and no names to rule them, are taking longing looks towards Germany. When circumstances admit, they go a year or two to a German university—to Berlin or to Leipsic. There they get into a labyrinth of showy and binding forms, and have to go on in the paths opened to them. They return with an imposing nomenclature, and clothed with an armor formidable as the panoply of the middle ages. They write papers and deliver lectures which are read and listened to with the profoundest reverence—some, however, doubting whether all these distinctions

are as correct as they are subtle, whether these speculations are as sound as they are imposing. All students may get immeasurable good from the study of the German philosophy. I encourage my students to go to Germany for a time to study. But let them meanwhile maintain their independence. They may be the better of a clew to help them out of the labyrinth when they are wandering. The children of Israel got vast good in the wilderness as they wandered: saw wonders in the pillar of cloud and fire, in the waters issuing from the rock, and the manna on the ground; but they longed all the while to get into a land of rest, with green fields and living rivers. We may all get incalculable good from German speculation, but let us bring it all to the standard of consciousness and of fact, which alone can give us security and rest.

I am quite aware that a large body of speculators will look down with contempt on the sober views I have been expounding, and not think it worth their while to examine them. Metaphysical youths from Britain and America, who have passed a year or two at a German university, and have there been listening to lectures in which the speaker passed along so easily, and without allowing a word of cross-examination, such phrases as subject and object, form and matter, *à priori* and *à posteriori*, real and ideal, phenomenon and noumenon, will wonder that any one should be satisfied to stay on such low ground as I have done, while they themselves are on such elevated heights. But I can bear their superciliousness without losing my temper, and I make no other retort than that of Kant on one occasion, "that their master is milking the he-goat while they are holding the sieve." I am sure that the agnostics, whether of the philosophical or physiological schools, will resent my attempt to give knowledge so firm a foundation. I may not have influence myself to stop

the crowd which is moving on so exultingly; I may be thrown down by the advancing cavalcade; but I am sure I see the right road to which men will have to return sooner or later; and I am satisfied if only I have opened a gate ready for those who come to discover that the end of their present broad path is darkness and nihilism.

Some good ends may be served by explaining here those correlative phrases which are passed on so readily in German metaphysics, but under which the errors I have been exposing lurk. By *Real* is meant a thing existing; by *Ideal* what is created by the mind. *Subject* signifies the mind contemplating a thing; *Object* a thing contemplated. This distinction does not imply that the subject adds to the object what is not in it. When the two phrases are together they should be used as correlative. In common language the phrase *Object* is often employed to denote a thing, whether it be contemplated by the mind or not. In this latter sense subject does not imply an object, nor object a subject. *Phenomenon* in science means a fact to be explained. In German philosophy it means a mere appearance which is an abstraction. The mind is conscious not of an appearance, but of a thing appearing. By *Noumenon* is meant a thing known or apprehended, which Kant regards as unknowable by human intelligence. But in our realistic philosophy we claim to know things which in that sense are noumena. By *à Priori* is meant the regulative principles which are in the mind prior to experience; but this does not imply that there are ideas in the mind prior to experience. By *à Posteriori* is signified truth obtained by a gathered or inductive (not an individual) experience. *Form* and *Matter* are such metaphorical phrases that they might be expediently abandoned in philosophy. By Form, in German metaphysics is denoted something imposed by the mind on things; by Matter the

things, commonly unknown, on which the Form is imposed. If the terms are to be retained, by Form should be meant the law by which things act, Matter the things as obeying the law. All these phrases as commonly used in metaphysics have an ideal tendency.

IDEALISM in thought and language runs through and through the philosophy of Kant. It appears first in making the mind give a unity to the manifold perceived by the senses, say to a stone, whereas the unity is in the stone itself. Secondly, it supposes space and time not to be things, but to be forms superinduced on things. Thirdly, the relations between objects are imposed on them by the Categories of the understanding. Fourthly, substance, interdependence of things, and God himself are regarded as ideas without a real objective existence. Fifthly, Final cause and beauty are a mere halo cast around things by the imagination.

It has been shown again and again how, according to the doctrine of development, which can be traced in the history of philosophy as well as in the natural sciences, Fichte was evolved from Kant, and Schelling from Fichte, and Hegel from Schelling. Kant made the mind create space and time, and all the forms imposed on things; Fichte, who was a pupil of Kant at one time, following out his principles, made the mind also—greatly to the annoyance of Kant, who disowned his disciple—to create the things in space and time. It was felt that Fichte's egoistic theory left out one side of the actual world, and many rejoiced that Schelling took up the other side, making the two halves one in a doctrine of absolute identity. In the construction of his theory, he and those swayed by him (for example, Principal Shairp) pointed out many beautiful correspondences between the subjective mind and the actual world. But the system of Schelling was so evidently visionary, and apparently pantheistic, that a demand was made to

have it shown that the prevailing idealism has a ground in reason; and this was the work of Hegel.

At more than one period of my life I have toiled hard to master the system of Hegel. But I have failed, and am willing to acknowledge it. On a very few occasions I have ventured to criticise the great thinker—as he is reckoned; but I was told instantly that I did not understand him, and I was restrained from prosecuting the controversy by the possibility that this might be true. It was at one time reported that Hegel had said, that "no man understands me but one, and he does not understand me." This is now denied. But as it is said of Shakespeare's pictures of Henry V. and the English kings, that if not true they might have been true; so it may be, that if this story about Hegel is not true it might have been true. His system seems to me to be beyond measure unnatural, and artificial. His constant threefold divisions which in the end he identifies with the threefold distinctions of the Divine nature, might be carried on as far as speculative intellect sees fit to prosecute it, but with no correspondence in things external or internal. No two of his followers understand him alike, and each charges his neighbor with misinterpreting him. Scarcely any of them do now profess to believe in his system throughout; but they adhere to his dialectic method and expect that what he has left incomplete may be finished by themselves or others. To me a number of his favorite maxims, as that Being and Not Being are identical, that Being and Thinking are the same, and that contradictories may be true, seem to me to be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole system. It has been my aim in this paper to undermine the Kantian principles on which the whole fabric has been reared.

I am aware that many revel with intense pleasure in idealism. I believe that all minds may be elevated by cer-

tain forms of it. The great constellation of genius—including Herder, Schiller, and Goethe, with those poets influenced by them in Great Britain, which appeared at the end of last century and the beginning of this, got a portion of their light and power from the subjective German philosophy. But to keep ourselves steady in the flight of the imagination, let us have a clear perception of the difference between the ideal and the real. When we rise to the ideal let it ever be from the real, to which we should always return for stability and rest. It is good for us to ascend from time to time our great mountains, and we may thereby get life and health as well as a larger prospect; but it might not be so good always to dwell on these heights which may become over-stimulating and dizzying. The mind has the capacity of imagination, which is a very lofty one, but it has also a power of judgment, meant to steady the flights of the fancy. We all wish to see pictures of high ideal scenes, but we do not regard these as realities—we distinguish between portraits and historical paintings. Let us clearly see that poetry is not philosophy.

AGNOSTICISM.—It is proverbial that extremes meet—just as West and East meet at lines on our globe. Strange as it may seem, while there is idealism throughout Kant, agnosticism has also its roots deep in his philosophy. It maintains resolutely—I believe without sufficient proof—that there are things, but it makes them unknown and unknowable. Its very idealism, regarded as a philosophy, favors nescience. It makes a large portion of what we naturally believe, to be phenomenal and illusory. Following it out logically, people argue that if the mind can add one quality to things out of its own stores, it may add ten or a hundred, till at last we can not tell what is in things, or whether there are any things. Hence we find all the

positivists and agnostics, and even the materialists of the day, when pressed by their adversaries falling back on the forms and ideas of Kant.

"Back to Kant" is the cry in our day of the younger German school, re-echoed by the speculative youths of England and America. The cry is a healthy symptom on the part of those who utter it. It shows that they are becoming somewhat anxious as to where recent speculation is leading them; as to whether it is carrying them up into an ethereal region where they have difficulty in standing or breathing, or dragging them down into a swamp where the air is malarial and lethal.

Yes, I say, "Back to Kant," who was a wiser man, and held more truth than those who have been following out his principles. But when we go back to Kant, let it not be to take his fundamental positions on trust. In particular, we should, I think, in the exercise of our criticism abandon his critical method. If this is not done we shall have—as we have had for the last hundred years—a succession of systems, each laying hold of and devouring its predecessor. We may cut down the tree to its roots, but if we allow the roots to remain, a new tree, or new trees of the same kind, will spring up. How often have we had a new philosophic treatise opening with the statement: "At this point Kant has not followed certain principles to their logical consequences; let us do this for him." Or, "Here is a principle which Kant has overlooked; let us introduce it and build it into the system."

For the present there is a reaction against the building of new systems of philosophy. The world has become weary of them. The tendency now rather is, in the lectures of the German universities, and in the books written in the English language, to give us histories of the opinions held in the past; and we have thereby been gainers, as at-

tention has been called to the truth to be found in all our higher philosophies from the time of Plato and Aristotle in ancient times, and that of Descartes and Locke in later times; and at the same time to the errors both of an extravagant dogmatism and of a low empiricism, which it is hoped may be kept from ever appearing again by the way in which they have been exposed.

Yes, "Back to Kant," but do not stop there. Back to Reid with Hamilton, back to Locke, back to Leibnitz, back to Descartes, back to Bacon, back to Saint Thomas and Abelard, back to Augustine, back to Marcus Aurelius, back to Cicero, back to Aristotle, back to Plato. All these have taught much truth; let us covet the best gifts and accept them wherever they are offered: in ancient Greece and Rome, in Germany, in France and Italy, in Great Britain and America. Here the method of induction with criticism may guide us in the selection—may give us the magnet wherewith to draw out the genuine steel from the dross mixture.

"Back to Kant," but back beyond him to what he looked to, or should have looked to, and by which his views and ours are to be tested, to the facts of our mental nature.[1]

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[1] I should be sorry to find our young American thinkers spending their whole time and strength in expounding Kant or Hegel. Depend upon it, the German philosophy will not be transplanted into America and grow healthily till there is a change to suit it to the climate. By all means let us welcome the German philosophy into this country, as we do the German emigrants; but these emigrants when they come have to learn our language and accommodate themselves to our laws and customs. Let us subject its philosophy to a like process. Let it be the same with the Scottish philosophy: let us take all that is good in it and nothing else, and what is good in it is its method.

I have rather been advising our young men not to seek to transplant the German philosophy entire into America. But as little do I wish them to transplant the Scottish philosophy. It is time that America had a philosophy of its own. It is now getting a literature of its own, a poetry of its own, schools of painting of its own; let it also have a

Of the existing philosophies the German is at this present time the most powerful. If the others, if the Scottish, the English, the French, are to regain their influence, they will have to strike out some new courses fitted to raise enthusiasm, and hold out hope of discovery to encourage research. They may study the dependence of mind on body, and thereby connect their inquiries with the science of the day. They may also apply psychology to the art of education, and show how the mind is to be trained. But whatever else they do, they must take up and enter into the spirit and life of those great questions which have been discussed in philosophy since reflective thought began. It is because they have done this, that the philosophy of Kant and the Germans has been found so attractive to inquiring youths. Let us notice and ponder the grand truths which have thus been brought before us, but let it be to give a clear account of their nature and separate them from the error with which they have been combined. Let us believe and acknowledge

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philosophy of its own. It should not seek, indeed, to be independent of European thought. The people, whether they will or not, whether they acknowledge it or no, are evidently the descendants of Europeans, to whom they owe much. They have come from various countries, but on coming here they take a character of their own. So let it be with our philosophy. It may be a Scoto-German-American school. It might take the method of the Scotch, the high truths of the German, and combine them by the practical invention of the Americans. But no: let it in fact, in name and profession, be an independent school. As becometh the country, it may take, not a monarchical form under one sovereign, like the European systems, let it rather be a republican institution, with separate states and a central unity. To accomplish this, let it not be contented with the streams which have lost their coolness from the long course pursued and become polluted by earthly ingredients, but go at once to the fountain, the mind itself, which is as fresh as it ever was, and as open to us as it was to Plato and Aristotle, to Locke and Reid, to Kant and Hamilton.

with Plato, that there is a grand, indeed a divine Idea, formed in our minds after the image of God and pervading all nature; but let that idea be carefully examined and its forms exactly determined; and it is for inductive science, and not speculation, to ascertain what are the laws and types which represent it in nature. We should hold with Aristotle that there are formal and final as well as material and efficient causes in our world; but it is for careful observation to find out the nature and relation of these, and to show how matter and force are made to work for order and for special ends. We may be as sure as Anselm and Descartes, that in the mind there is the germ of the idea of the infinite and the perfect; but we should claim the right to show what the idea is, so as to keep men from drawing extravagant inferences from it. Let us see as Leibnitz did a pre-established harmony in nature; but we may argue that it consists not in things acting independently of each other, but in their being made to act on and with each other. We can not err in attaching as much importance to experience as Locke did; but let us maintain all the while that observation shows us principles in the mind prior to all experience. We should be grateful to the Scottish school for using principles of common sense and fundamental laws of belief; but we should require them to show how these are related to experience. We may allow to Kant his forms, his categories, and his ideas; but let us determine their nature by induction when it may be found that they do not superinduce qualities on things, but simply enable us to perceive what is in things. I believe with Schelling in intuition (Anschauung); but it is an intuition looking to realities. We may be constrained to hold with Hegel that there is an absolute; and yet hold firmly that our knowledge is after all finite, and insist that the doctrine be so enunciated that it does not lead to pantheism. We

should reject a sensationalism which derives all our ideas from the senses, and a materialism which develops mind out of molecules; and yet be very anxious that the physiology of the nerves and brain should aid us in finding out the way in which the powers of the mind operate. I turn away with detestation from the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann; but they have done good by calling the attention of academic men to the existence of evil, to remove which is an end worthy of the labors and sufferings of the Son of God. We may believe with Herbert Spencer that there is a vast unknown above, beneath, and around us; but we may rejoice all the while in a light shining in the darkness. Let us receive with gratitude the whole cabinet of gems which our higher poets have left as a rich inheritance; but before they can constitute a philosophy they must be cut and set by a skilful hand; and this must be done as carefully as it is with diamonds, and all to show forth more fully their form and beauty.

IV

HERBERT SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY AS CULMINATED IN HIS ETHICS

PART FIRST.

HIS PHILOSOPHY.

SECTION I.

THE PHILOSOPHIES WHICH HAVE INFLUENCED MR. SPENCER.

THE house which Mr. Spencer has built is a very imposing one. He has been engaged for a great many years in erecting it. He has reared it tier upon tier, and is now putting on the copestone. Many of our younger men, especially those who have been trained to look upon physical science as the main if not the only branch of true knowledge, have the most perfect confidence in its stability, and feel safe in taking up their abode in it. Others, older and professedly wiser, think they discover great oversight in the erection, and point to fractures and rents appearing as it settles.

There is no man so self-contained as not to be influenced by his surroundings—as Mr. Spencer calls it, his environment. We read of the Origines Platonicæ and that the Homerus Philosophorum, though one of the most original thinkers that ever lived, got his doctrine of the fleeting nature of matter from Heraclitus, of the permanence of things from Parmenides and the Eleatics, and his grand ideal theory from the numbers and forms of Pythagoras.

We may in like manner, without disparaging Mr. Spencer's independence, discover fountains from which the stream of his philosophy has arisen. We need not seek these far up on the heights of antiquity, for which he has not much reverence. We find them in men who lived and were honored in the age immediately preceding his own.

First, he drew his metaphysics, that is, first principles, from Sir William Hamilton and Dr. Mansel, who constituted the prime constellation in the heavens when the young thinker, at that time an engineer, began to inquire into the mechanism of the universe. Hamilton, in this respect swayed by the philosophy of Kant, argues in his *Discussions* that the mind knows only phenomena in the sense of appearances, and thus landed himself in the conclusion that all our knowledge is relative, and that we know nothing of the reality or nature of things. "All that we know is phænomenal, phænomenal of the unknown" (*Dis.*, p. 608). Mansel in his Bampton Lectures applied this doctrine to the defence of religion, and sought to undermine the pillars of rationalism—not foreseeing that the argument which overthrew knowledge would soon come to be directed against faith. The young Spencer took up the prevailing philosophy of his time, and carrying out Hamilton's principles of relativity and nescience, he evolved his unknown and unknowable, which he allotted as a grove to religion.

It so happened that when Hamilton published his Discussions, I was just issuing a new edition (the fourth) of my work, *The Method of the Divine Government*, and I felt it to be my duty in an appended note to oppose what would now be called his Agnosticism. I predicted that the nescience which he defended would lead historically, as it led logically, to consequences which he did not contemplate. He wrote me that he meant to reply, but soon after he

was oppressed with bodily infirmity which prevented this. When Mansel published his Bampton Lectures, in which he applied the principles of Hamilton to the overthrow of rationalism, I reviewed the work in the *North British Review* (1859), and showed that some of his views as to the relativity of knowledge might be used to undermine all religious truth. In these circumstances I was not surprised when Mr. Spencer drove the doctrine of Hamilton and Mansel to its logical consequences, and made God and all reality unknowable. In a private correspondence which I had with Dr. Mansel, I urged him to reply to Mr. Spencer, which, however, he never did. Had he done so he might, I hoped, though I scarcely expected, have so explained the statements of Hamilton as to show that they did not logically issue in the philosophy of Spencer. As it is, the latter professes to proceed on the principles of the Scottish metaphysician and his Oxford follower.

Secondly, Mr. Spencer received an impulse from the philosophy of M. Comte. He started as a thinker when the reputation of the founder of Positivism was at its greatest height. This Frenchman had been speculating profoundly, as he thought, in his *Philosophie Positive* on the order and progression of the sciences. He holds that we may expect, first of all, to find those objects scientifically investigated which are the simplest, the least complicated, and the laws of which may be entertained with most ease and certainty, such as the relations of space in geometry. He supposes that science would then go on to the consideration of objects more concrete and complex, rising to astronomy, and thence, in order, to physics, chemistry, physiology, and social physics. The first contemplates phenomena the most general, the most simple, the most abstract, and the farthest removed from humanity, having

an influence on all others without being influenced by them. The phenomena considered in the last, are, on the contrary, the most particular, the most complicated, the most concrete, and the most directly interesting to man; they depend more or less on the preceding without exercising an influence on them.

Mr. Spencer does not adopt this theory. He has started a rival one. Comte shows how the sciences advance; Spencer shows how nature advances. Both make the progression from the more general to the more special. When Comte published his system I admitted that there was truth in it (*Meth. Div. Gov.*, B. ii., 2), but denied that it met all the development and classification of the sciences. Few people now adopt without modification the theory of Comte. Spencer has built a more compact structure. He stands up for a transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, exhibited in the universe in all, or nearly all, its details: in the aggregate of stars and nebulae, in the planetary system, in the earth as an inorganic body, in each organism vegetable or animal (Von Baer's Law), in the aggregate of organisms throughout geologic time, in the mind, in society, in all products of social activity. This theory will fall under our notice at a later stage. It will turn out in the end that there are phenomena which modify and limit it. Mr. Spencer cites from Comte "the doctrine that the education of the individuals should accord in mode and arrangement with the education of mankind considered historically," and agrees with him in holding "an analogy between an individual organism and a social organism," a doctrine, I may add, which may be traced back to Plato. Both speak of altruism, which they would substitute for love. Both begin with data derived from material science, and think thereby to account for mind and its operations. Both are apt to start with hypotheses which they seek to

verify by an accumulation of facts. I add that both are addicted to overlook facts as well as to observe facts.'

Thirdly, Mr. Spencer avowedly owes much to the grand generalization of Von Baer, as to there being an advance in the vegetable and in the animal kingdoms, from the more general to the more special; and that there is a parallelism in this respect between the growth of the plant and animal from their seed and germ, and their progression throughout the long geological ages. Every scientific man was struck when this doctrine was first announced by its author, now an age ago. Mr. Spencer carries out this principle legitimately or (and) illegitimately to the evolution of the universe in all its departments.

Mr. Spencer has no claim to be regarded as the originator or author of the theory of development. There were anticipations of that doctrine in ancient times. The germs of it were floating through the air when Spencer began to think on these subjects, and Darwin was preparing to make extensive applications of it to brute and man. But Spencer is the organizer, the very embodiment, personification, and expression of it; and he evolves it in the confidence that it, as the fittest, will survive and will persist as a force till it brings all environment within its sphere.

It is now many years ago, and at a time when he was not known so extensively as he is now, that I had occasion to publish my estimate of him (*Intuitions of the Mind*, Part III., c. i. § 8). "His bold generalizations are always instructive, and some of them may in the end be established as the profoundest laws of the universe." I find that the American publishers of his works have been using this testimony of mine in their advertisements, and I have no objections

[1] This is my judgment on the somewhat keen controversy between Mr. Harrison and Mr. Spencer. Surely people may now see that whatever Mr. Harrison may be, he is not a philosopher.

that they continue to do so. But it is proper to state that I represented our author as a Titan making war against the gods that rule in Olympus, to which he seeks to rise not by slow and gradual steps but by heaping Pelion on Pindus. His system of science and philosophy is a vast structure, professedly and really, with broad if not deep foundations in natural, especially biological science, and towering into jurisprudence and ethics. This is its excellence, this is its defect.

SECTION II.

HIS METHOD OF PROCEDURE.

Mr. Spencer commands our respect by his terrible earnestness. He has an end to live for, and he lives for it. For it he has given up professional pursuits and profits, and for years immediate fame and popularity. For the last forty years a grand system of speculative physics, founded on the recent discoveries in biology, has been developing in his brain, and he must put it into shape; he must unfold it in spite of obstacles, with or without encouragement from surroundings.

We have seen what were his antecedents and stimuli. Let us now view him using his great powers to accomplish his end. He is distinguished for two very marked intellectual capacities. He has an unsurpassed aptitude for comparison and generalization. He can detect remote analogies and put great varieties of things into a few comprehensive groups. Present any natural object, and he will at once allot to it its place in the system of things. He has also a strong tendency to trace effects to their causes, back to their origin in the unknown. Call his attention to a fact and he will show you how it has been evolved. As a result

of all this there is a comprehensiveness, real or apparent, in all his speculations which greatly attracts young and ambitious thinkers, who are delighted and flattered by the thought that they can comprehend the whole knowable universe. His is one of those larger minds referred to by Bacon, which in observing resemblances is apt to overlook differences and exceptions. He can by his constructive intellect evolve all things out of an original star dust, and pursue its course of differentiation and integration till it is dissolved into the vapor in which it originated. But it may be doubted whether any human intellect can carry on and finish the work which he has undertaken. Of this I am sure, that it cannot be accomplished till science, as a whole, and certain departments of it, have reached a much more advanced stage than they have yet done.

His method is to set out with an hypothesis, say that of development, probably containing much truth, but, it may be, guilty of some omissions and requiring to be limited on all sides. He then gathers facts to verify his hypothesis. His method is deductive rather than inductive. He examines facts by the old Greek methods of analysis and synthesis, very sharp instruments, but somewhat perilous because they are so sharp. A great part of his work is described by him as synthetic, the synthesis being facts cut, joined, compressed, and compacted by his own comprehensive mind. His method is not just that enjoined by Bacon, who recommends us not to anticipate but follow nature, to let the facts suggest the laws (axioms, he calls them), and not to neglect noticing the apparent exceptions, which are to be entertained as Abraham entertained strangers, who turned out unawares to be angels. "We shall have good hope of the sciences," he says, "when by a true ladder and steps not broken or gaping we rise from particulars to minor axioms, and thence to

middle axioms, rising higher and higher, and thence to the highest of all." Bacon shrewdly remarks that "a cripple on the right road will beat a racer on the wrong," adding language which might at times be applied to Spencer: "This is farther evident that he who is not on the right road will go the farther wrong the greater his fleetness and ability." In his eagerness of thought, our author is not very much inclined to submit to this slow but sure procedure. Possessed of great speculative ability, he is apt to leap from mountain-top to mountain-top without even looking upon the plains or examining the valleys below, in which, after all, are to be found the connections of those lofty ranges which he is so fond of tracing. We may have occasion to call attention to some of these lower facts, obvious to the common observer, but which he has overlooked. He feels that he has a special aptitude to interpret facts. Give him facts and he will explain them. Others, however, without denying his facts, will feel themselves justified in interpreting them otherwise.

At this present time Spencer occupies much the same place among the English-speaking peoples as Hegel did among the pan-Germanics an age ago. Both are characterized by speculative abilities of the very highest order. Both would bring all nature, mind and matter, under their all-embracing systems, which are as wide as the horizon and as undefined. Both have their minds so filled with their own grand views that they are not inclined to look at the views taken by others, or at the facts which seem inconsistent with their generalizations. Both have had mighty influence over young men bent on having everything explained, by the dogmatism of their assertions and the comprehensiveness of their theories, which seem to explain what cannot otherwise be accounted for. In other respects they widely differ. Hegel had an extensive,

though by no means an accurate, acquaintance with the philosophies of ancient Greece and modern Germany; but when he criticised Sir Isaac Newton's discoveries, he simply made himself ridiculous. Spencer, on the other hand, has a large knowledge of the late discoveries which are bringing organisms under the dominion of law—more, however, as an amateur than a practical experimenter; but has not, so it appears to me, studied the actings of the human mind as revealed to consciousness. His apprehension of these and his account of them are commonly given under conceptions and in language derived from matter and motion. Hegel's sun has now set, leaving behind only the glow of a mighty reputation. I believe that you could now count all the thoroughgoing Hegelians in Germany on your ten fingers, and all the eminent Hegelians out of Germany, including those in Naples, Oxford, Glasgow, and Concord, on your ten toes. Some do not scruple to call him a pretender and a charlatan. Spencer's sun is now at its zenith. What may be the estimate of his philosophy at the end of this century I will not take upon myself to predict. As embracing so many established facts, I believe that there is much in his system which will abide, and I adhere to the opinion that "his bold generalizations are always instructive, and that some of them may, in the end, be established as the profoundest laws of the knowable universe." It is one of the offices of thinking men in this age carefully to examine the structure which he is rearing, and while they admire its massive walls they may come to discover rents in it, indicating an unsettled and unsettling foundation.

SECTION III.

HIS METAPHYSICS.

Mr. Spencer does not look on himself, and does not wish others to regard him, as a sceptic; on the contrary, his philosophy demands a large amount of faith. In particular, he admits, as all profound men do, certain truths as incapable of being proved, but which must be accepted by all. He admits, "In every case, by every school, something has to be assumed" (*Psych.* ii., 390). We cannot prove this something, but we can show that we are entitled to assume it. He started as a speculator when Hamilton and Mansel, largely following Kant, were the reigning metaphysicians of Britain, and he takes his views of the character and marks of first truths largely from them, modifying but not improving them. "The inconceivableness of its negation is that which shows a cognition to possess the highest rank—is the criterion by which its unsurpassable validity is known." "If its negation is inconceivable, the discovery of this is the discovery that we are obliged to accept it. And a cognition which we are thus obliged to accept is one which we class as having the highest possible certainty" (*Psych.* ii., p. 407).

This criterion of first principles is so far a sound one, and may serve some good purposes. But it is mutilated, and has not been put in the proper form. I cannot give in to the maxim that a man should believe a proposition simply because he cannot conceive or act otherwise. This is a kind of fatalism against which the heart if not the head is apt to rebel. I hold in opposition to the prevailing agnosticism, founded by Hume and favored without

their intending it by Kant and Hamilton, that man can so far know things and the relations of things. He knows self as thinking and feeling. He knows body as extended and resisting his energy. He perceives at once certain relations in things thus known, as, for example, that these two straight lines cannot enclose a space, and that these two things *plus* other two things make four things. He knows all this because he perceives things and what is in things. This gives us a criterion not only of "unsurpassable validity," which "we are obliged to accept," not only of the "highest class" and the "highest possible certainty" *to us*, which is avowedly all that is known to man. This is a hypothesis which supports itself on agencies which are very much unknown. We know nothing of the processes by which the virtue has come down from one individual and one race to another. The mystery of the virtue supposed to descend in apostolic succession is nothing to this. We cannot tell what was the experience laid up by the ascidian and descending down through the fish to the ape and early man. Was it conscious or unconscious in the ascidian? If not, when did it become conscious? What form did it take? It is an hypothesis which it is impossible to refute because it is an hypothesis which cannot spread out its proof. As an hypothesis it does not explain the whole phenomenon. We have, in fact, no anticipation of mathematical or metaphysical or moral truth among the lower animals.

I admit that heredity may explain so much: it may account for the formation and the action of the nervous system. But some of us deny that nervous action is mental action. I deny that mere nervous action can become moral action. The great body of our scientific men are proclaiming that bodily action and mental action are entirely different. The brain and nerves are not the mind, they are

merely the organ of the mind. It is altogether gratuitous to assume that the heredity which can fashion our nervous structure can also form our fundamental laws of knowledge and belief. It would be difficult to prove that the brain is anything more to the mind than an organ of sensation and locomotion.

Supposing that the brain or the cerebro-spinal mass is the organ of the mind, it may be able in a great variety of ways to modify mental actions. It may constrain them to go in certain ways, and restrain them in others. The mind may be led to act in a particular manner by the ready concurrence of the nerves. On the other hand, when the organism does not co-operate, the thoughts and feelings may be greatly hindered. In this way a nervous structure may give tendencies which become hereditary. But this does not prove that the primary principles of reason are the product of brain or nervous action.

All this is the more evident when we consider what is the nature of our intuitions. They are of the nature of perceptions, of perceptions of things and the relations of things. We perceive that if two straight lines go on for an inch without coming nearer each other, they will go on forever without doing so; and that from the very nature of a breach of trust, it must be evil. There is no proof whatever that there is any apprehension of such truths or any approximation towards them on the part of the dog, the horse, or the highest of the animals.

Even on the supposition that these cognitions and beliefs and judgments have been generated by the experiences of ancestral races, it might be argued that they are valid, and this on the principles of Spencer. They have all the authority of the lengthened and uniform experience. They can stand his criterion of truth. We cannot conceive that hypocrisy should be good, and so we argue that this truth

has "unsurpassable validity," and is of "the highest possible rank." I claim for it another validity. These truths, however generated, have the authority of the God who produced them, whether by development or otherwise. I feel myself at liberty to appeal to these first truths of our reason, whether speculative or moral.

Mr. Spencer adopts from Hamilton and Mansel the doctrine of the Relativity of all knowledge, that is, that we do not know things, but merely the relations of things in themselves unknown; their relations to us or the relations of phenomena or appearances to one another. I have been opposing this doctrine ever since it was expounded by Hamilton in his *Discussions*.[1] I maintain that in every act of sense perception and self consciousness we know self and things affecting self. True, we may not know things in themselves—in themselves is an unmeaning phrase; we do not know all about things, but we know them as things under the aspect in which they present themselves; in other words, we know things as presenting themselves to our senses external and internal. We have as good proof that we know things as that we know the relation of things. There is always some knowledge of things implied in order to know the relations of things to us or to one another.

SECTION IV.

THE UNKNOWABLE.

The doctrine of Relativity leads and must ever lead to that of Nescience, or, as it is now called, Agnosticism. Spencer holds, indeed starts with a very pronounced form

[1] See *Method of Divine Government*, Sup. Art., and Art. Hamilton, in *History of Scottish Philosophy*.

of the latter. The one phrase, expressive of his creed, is the Unknown and Unknowable. This Unknown is a reality, is in fact the one reality; herein he differs from most agnostics, who know no reality. He argues that the known implies the unknown. It may be doubted whether his argument is conclusive. He cannot guarantee it by an appeal to his ultimate criterion, "the inconceivableness of its negation which is that which shows a cognition to possess the highest rank," for I can easily conceive that there is nothing beyond the known. I do believe, indeed, that there are things beyond our ken. I do so because always when I inquire I find there is something beyond what I as yet know. But the argument is not apodictic or demonstrative, guaranteed by a necessity of thought. It is quite conceivable that what is unknown may not on that account be unknowable; it may be known at some future time, or by farther research. I rather think the disciples of the school will abandon this unknowable as not a logical necessity, as meaningless and an incumbrance, and thus cut off from the philosophy the religion which its founder imagines that he has.

He allots this unknowable region to religion. I am not inclined to accept the gift he so graciously offers, as I do not and cannot know what it is. A thing utterly unknown can never engage the mind in any way, cannot raise any elevated conception or call forth any elevating sentiment. In order to emotion there must be an object of some kind to which it is directed. The unknown cannot evoke any feeling, except that which darkness produces, a vague and meaningless awe in no way fitted to fill or satisfy the mind. The rudest fetish worship, that of stocks, or stones, or animals, is more elevating than this, if indeed any one would think of adoring such an object. Paul tells us that he saw an altar to the unknown God,

but he does not say that he saw any one worshipping there. The belief in it, if any one could believe in it, can have no purifying influence on the heart and character, and can tend in no way to regulate the life; as it cannot be known whether the object, if there be an object, is good or evil, has or has not love to any thing. Instead of clinging to it the heart shrinks from it. A man feels that in such a region he would breathe as in vacuum. I suspect that most of those who adopt the philosophy will be prepared to abandon the religion as having no interest to them. Certainly no one would fight for the possession of this territory.

Though the discoverer of the unknown says it is unknowable, yet it turns out that he knows a great deal about it and gives us information about it. He tells us that it exists and is a reality; and surely this is some knowledge. He knows it to be without limit and speaks of it as a force or power. "We are irresistibly impelled by the relativity of our thoughts to vaguely conceive of some unknown force as the correlative of the known force" (*First Prin.*: p. 170). I quote this, not as a valid argument, but simply as showing what he knows of the unknowable—he is sure it is a force. "The belief in a Power of which no limit in Time or Space can be conceived, is that fundamental element in religion which survives all changes of form" (p. 551). He knows that it is a cause producing an effect, that it is the cause of all that is known. Surely the known cause of a known thing is so far known. There is profound truth in the doctrine of Aristotle, that things are known in their causes.

The truth is, his whole exposition is a mistaken and perverted account of the deep truths on which religion is based and which lead us up to a belief in a God so far known, and what we know cherished as our highest knowl-

edge. We have the known before us, and we discover it to be, as Sir John Herschel expresses it, "a manufactured" article and we argue a cause, a cause of a known effect, and itself known as producing the effect. How much more philosophic the reasoning. "The invisible things of God are clearly seen from the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead." We know the nature of the cause from the effect which it produces. We know it to possess intelligence from the trace of these in the effects; to possess benevolence because the tendency of the effect is to produce happiness; and to possess rectitude because of the moral power placed by it in our nature. We thus rise to a "power" and a "godhead," who cannot be fully known to us because of his infinitude; but is so far known because we are made in his image—a God who hideth, but who also revealeth himself.

SECTION V.

ON EVOLUTION.

Mr. Spencer accounts for everything by development; by development out of the unknowable. But development is not a power, it is simply a process. I have shown that (Vol. I., No. III.) it is a combination, a corporation, an organization of causes. Take the evolution of plants and animals; it implies a combination of a number of forces, mechanical, chemical, electric, magnetic, vital—as they used to be called, cosmic as they are now called, including the panzoism of Spencer and the physiological units of Darwin; in fact so many, so varied, and complicated that science at its present stage cannot number them, or determine their nature. When we describe a plant or animal as

evolved, we mean that it comes from a combination—I believe a pre-arranged and adjusted combination—of agencies which cannot as yet be untwined and exposed individually to the view. The grand business of science in the age to which we have now come, is not to satisfy itself with statements about loose general processes, but to determine the exact nature of the powers involved in heredity, and the evolution of plants and animals. This will clear the way for settling what development can do and what it cannot do.

In conducting the investigation, two points must be carefully attended to. First, in inquiring into the development of an object we must begin with ascertaining accurately what it is, what is its present state. It is from what it is now that we argue it has passed through a certain process. If we wish to know whether the planets have been developed out of star dust, according to the theory of Kant and Laplace, we look to their present positions and movements, and find that we can show how these might have been produced by certain causes. It is of special moment that we proceed in this way to determine the generation of mental phenomena of any kind, say of mind generally, or of consciousness, or of any particular idea, say of beauty, or moral good, or infinity. We must begin the investigation with determining precisely what the phenomenon is, as it now is, and as it presents itself to us, how much there is in mind, how much in the power or idea which we expect to find developed. Without this, the theory constructed by us would be vague and valueless.

Secondly, we must see that the supposed developing causes be adequate to produce the effect. It is now generally acknowledged that the relation of cause and effect does not consist in mere invariable antecedence and consequence.

There must be some force, potency or energy in the cause. Scientists now speak of the effect being in the cause. I believe that in mundane causation, the effect consists of the agents acting as the cause in a new state. At all events, we must see that in the supposed developing cause, there is power to develop the precise product. We do not believe that a plant can generate an animal, or that thought can produce extension, or sensation give us the idea of moral good. I am to use these two principles in criticising Spencer's development theory. I am to insist on his determining what is the precise object which he is seeking to evolve, say life or sensation, or intellect or moral approbation. I farther insist that he find in the developing cause, what is sufficient to produce the precise effect.

The vulgar account of development is that it starts with atoms and rises to molecules, and masses, and plants, and animals with sensation, and thence to higher and higher intelligences; and now it is supposed to moral agents. Mr. Wallace, the co-discoverer with Darwin of the doctrine of natural selection, has been obliged in a late paper to refer this rise in a crude manner to spiritual agency. For this he has been exposed to ridicule by his school, perhaps justly. But his desire is somehow to fill the gap. Mr. Spencer, marching on with his seven-leagued boots, can step over these chasms without noticing them. Any one may see some of these fallen stitches (fa'en steeks, as Hugh Miller used to call them) in the fabric. The latest science has not been able to find that the inanimate can produce the animate, that there can be a *vivum* without an *ovum* or some kind of protoplasm. Huxley and Tyndall have honestly avowed this; Spencer, so far as I know, has uttered no sound on the subject.

Other chasms lie gaping before us. Can the unsentient produce the sentient? Can the unconscious develop the

conscious? Spencer's attempt to explain the origin of consciousness as we shall see when we come to consider his *Principles of Psychology* is about the greatest philosophic abortion of our day. He first describes the nervous system in a very elaborate manner. Then he brings in consciousness in the stealthiest way, without even attempting to explain how this mental quality can be generated out of the soft pulpy substance, the brain. He fails to notice the like difficulty as it presents itself in the rise of consciousness into the higher attributes of mind, such as judgment and reasoning, emotion and will. As might be expected, he sees no difficulty in developing morality from accumulated experiences of sensations becoming hereditary.

Those who would account for the rise of the lower natures into the higher, say the ascidians into the fish, of the fish into the monkey, and the monkey into man, are shut up between the horns of a dilemma if they follow the acknowledged principles of causation. This power to rise from the original molecules up to man was either in the original molecules or it was not. If it was in the molecules, then there must have been in it all the mechanical, the chemical, the cosmic forces; in fact, it must be a power only a little lower than the infinite,—of all which we have no evidence whatsoever. If the other alternative be taken, and it is supposed that in order to produce the higher qualities and beings new powers have always to be introduced, the question arises, Whence did these powers come? If it be said by constant small increments, it removes the difficulty only in appearance. For the increments could only give what they have, and which they have got from the original powers. In fact, the law of development with heredity is after all merely a wide empirical law. A law, as I understand, does not rise beyond the empirical state and become a rational law till the causes

operating have been determined. For the present there might be a truce in the war between religion and science as to development. The religious man believes that all the operations of nature, whether coming by development or otherwise, are from God. Let both the religionist and the scientist acknowledge that we do not know what are the causes which have brought in these higher powers, such as sensation, consciousness, intelligence which have appeared as the ages advanced.

SECTION VI.

HIS DATA OF PHYSICS.

Mr. Spencer can tell us how the universe is developed. The agents by which this has been accomplished are said to be SPACE, TIME, MATTER, MOTION, and FORCE. This is so far a good enumeration. But we shall see that the author is guilty of at least one great omission.

I believe that all these agents, or data, as he calls them, are made known to us by our native powers of knowledge or intelligence. They are perceived by us everywhere. We know objects in space by the senses—I believe by all the senses: by sight, a surface; by muscular sense, a resisting object; and by the senses of hearing, of taste, and smell, our extended organism as affected. By an easy process of abstraction we can in thought separate the space from the objects in space. We know Time in the concrete in all our memories: we recognize an object as having been before us in time past, and we separate the time from the event in time, and thus have the idea of pure time. We know Matter, our own bodies and bodies affecting them, by all the senses; these with their properties, such

as extension and resisting energy. We know Motion by the senses, always with a brief exercise of memory, recalling the past and watching the body as it goes on from one place to another. Force is also an intuitive perception—certainly by the muscular sense, probably by all the senses: by the eye we know vibrations of light; by the ear, vibrations of air; by the smell, of vaporous matter; and by the taste, of fluid substance striking on the organism. These are agents running through all Nature, in fact constituting the material world. Our author has shown that these are mixed one with another. In particular, Force is exhibited in them all. To express their relation in one sentence: Force puts Matter in Motion through Space in Time.

I admire the ability displayed in the deductions which he draws from the natural and necessary operation of these agents. He has in his *Principles* enumerated and propounded certain profound laws of the universe as the issue of the action of these Data. Starting with the Persistence of Force as the fundamental agent, he shows that there must follow the Instability of the Homogeneous and the Multiplication of Effects. As the issue "there will first be Universal Evolution followed by Universal Dissolution." "The Dissolution undoes what the Evolution has done." He shows that "the Concentration of Matter implies the dissipation of Motion; and conversely, the Absorption of Motion implies the Diffusion of Matter." "Evolution and Dissolution together make up the entire process through which things pass." (See last Chap. of *First Prin.*) These I regard as the grandest of all Mr. Spencer's generalizations. I allow that this is the tendency of the agents he calls in, and these must be the results, if there be no other powers to modify them.

It will be necessary here to inquire what is the precise nature of his Data. He describes them as "manifestations

of the unknowable" (*Prin.*, p. 143). I remark in passing that if these be manifestations of the unknown it is no longer unknowable, for a thing is known by its manifestations—the light is known by its dispelling the darkness. But I do not enlarge on this. He speaks of these Data as being known. He treats of them not under Part I. The Unknowable but under Part II. The Knowable. He speaks of them constantly as the known. It has to be added that he does not represent them as being known as things. The things known are after all unknown. They are known merely as phenomena, as appearances, of a thing unknown. They are unknowable as realities. He tells us expressly "that Space and Time are wholly incomprehensible. The immediate knowledge which we seem to have of them seems, when examined, to be total ignorance." He says the same of the others, thus: "the nature of power cannot be known" (*Psych.*, Vol. II., 103).

He insists that "the one thing permanent is the unknowable reality." But how does he know that the unknowable exists and is a reality. We can from the known rise to the unknown, and thus make it so far known; thus we can often discover the unknown cause of a known effect, and know so much of the cause from its effect. But can we logically rise from an unknown thing, or unknown things, such as matter and force, motion, space, and time, and reach a reality, and this the only reality? No doubt the thought of unknown does imply the thought of known, but it does not necessarily imply the existence or reality of the known or even the unknown. A similar remark may be made of known implying the unknown; it implies the thought but not the existence of the unknown. We have here, I think, the most confused and baseless metaphysics to be found in the history of speculation. We have the known to be no reality, and the unknown the

only reality. The known is not known, and the unknown is known to be the only thing that has being. This philosophy cannot satisfy the heart, for it has nothing to engage us. It does not satisfy the head, which is told that it has a known which yet may have no reality, and is left only with a reality which is unknowable. The mockery both to head and heart is completed when it is told that this unknowable is God and the sphere of religion.

In No. III. of this Philosophic Series I have shown that development is organized causation, or an organization of forces to produce an effect and secure progression. In evolution we are to look for causes throughout. When it is alleged that any one thing, material or mental, is developed, we are entitled, we are bound, to inquire what it is evolved from. And then we are required to ask whether the alleged cause is competent to produce the effect. Thus if any one says that mind is developed from matter we should insist on his showing that matter has in itself a causal power or a persistence of force to produce so different a thing as mind. If he says that thought is evolved out of nerves, we may demand of him to prove that there is potency in the soft pulpy substance to produce thinking, say that of Plato or Aristotle, of Bacon or Newton. If he cannot show this, we may argue that as space and time and matter and physical force are original so also is mind; some would add that so also is life.

There is thus one great omission—there may be more—in his enumeration of the original agents from which the actual phenomena of the world are developed. In this process he does not call in mind. He does admit the existence of mind fully, but he evolves it from his five physical powers. Farther on I mean to examine carefully his development of mind from nervous action. It is enough for the present to call attention to the hiatus in his pro-

cess. I hold that he should have assumed mind as well as matter as among his original data. The one is as necessary as the other if we would account for the whole action and disposition of nature. Everybody acknowledges that in this advanced geological stage psychical action plays an important part in the action of the lower animals, and, above all, in man. The great body of scientific men are not inclined to allow that mind can be evolved from matter; a large number have asserted that we cannot even conceive of it being so. If this be so there is a mighty gap in his edifice.

As there is mind in nature, I believe that it discovers traces of mind above nature, arranging and ruling nature. Mr. Spencer traces all action, and in particular all development, to the persistence of force; but force is blind like all the other physical agents mentioned. A persistence of force might be a persistence of disorder, of pain and misery. He seems to feel this, and calls in an unknown, but which I regard as so far a known, to account for what we see of law and order in the world. He knows this unknown to be a power. I insist that we further know it to be a power of intelligence and benevolence, spreading happiness and promoting virtue, and I have a soul to discover this and lead me to love the being in whom these qualities dwell. Mr. Spencer has overlooked all this, and in consequence cannot give anything like a satisfactory account of the origin or of the present state of the universe. We feel so as we follow his development; we feel that there is something left out. It is as if one would give an account of the British Constitution and leave out the crown; of a cathedral, and never speak of the architect.

SECTION VII.

BIOLOGY.

He carries out his physical data first in Biology. This is the science in which there is the brightest prospect of discoveries being made in the present day. Mr. Spencer rushes into the department with the eagerness and vigor of those who hasten to a newly discovered mine. He has a very considerable acquaintance with animal and vegetable nature—scientific men are apt to say more as an amateur and a thinker than a practical worker and experimenter. I have no very strong objections to his views on this subject, except to urge that a considerable number of them cannot be regarded as established. Many of them are eminently suggestive, and may be proven—or disproven—at some future time. So far as inductive science has gone, we have no unequivocal cases of life coming from the lifeless. *Omne vivum ex ovo* is still true, and Mr. Spencer has no right to evolve living creatures from the five physical agencies which he takes as his data. So far as I have observed, he does not decide for or against spontaneous generation. But the whole spirit and tendency of his system is in favor of life being developed from the common elements, and the powers mechanical and chemical. Like most living naturalists, he does not adhere to the old faith in a separate vital force. For this doctrine I may say I have no partiality; the business of science is now to break up whatever truth is in it into its separate parts and to determine their laws scientifically. In following out this method Darwin calls in Physiological Units, going down from father and grandfather to children and grandchil-

dren, and in this way only can he account for heredity and the likeness of the young to their ancestors. In like manner Spencer calls in a Panzoism to account for the wonderful developing powers of life. These certainly are vital powers; and they may possibly, or, if any one insists, may probably, be resolved into the physical powers with which our author starts. This doctrine, as it appears to me, in no way tends to undermine religion, and I am not inclined to fight against it. But it must be proven, which it has not yet been, before it can be employed in rearing a system.

In many cases he lays down laws—at times very dogmatically—which cannot be regarded as established. Thus, he says, without giving proof, that the cerebellum is an organ of doubly compound co-ordination in *space*, while the cerebrum is an organ of doubly compound co-ordination in time (*Psych.*, i., 61). He says this hypothesis is reached *à priori*. I cannot find any proof of it either *à priori* or *à posteriori*, and I know no physiologist of eminence who sanctions it. The same may be said of several other laws laid down by him confidently.

He has made an elaborate attempt to find out what life consists in, and to construct a definition of it. I think he has not been successful. He criticises the definitions which have been given by eminent thinkers, and shows successfully that they do not fully fulfil their end in bringing into view all the properties of life and giving us its differentia. His own definition is not more satisfactory. As he chases it, it flees before him, and escapes like the rainbow when he would catch it. In the end he makes it "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations" (*Biol.*, ii., 80). This would apply to many other things: as to the earth in its relation to the returning sun in spring; to a mother's house visited every week by a

son; to a college receiving its students in autumn; to the Capitol at Washington being occupied by members of Congress, and the Houses of Parliament in Westminster opened to the Lords and Commons. He misses the very differentia of the thing defined. What he should have brought out to view are the internal relations which are adjusted to the external relations of air, and food, and such like objects.

SECTION VIII.

HIS PSYCHOLOGY.

In his two elaborate volumes on Psychology his aim is not to give an account of the operations of the mind and to classify them, but to show how they are developed from the physical data which he has enunciated. He acknowledges that the truths here to be set down are truths of which the very elements are unknown to physical science (*Psych.*, i., 98). Still he strives to get these elements from physics. Students of mind commonly hold that mind is chiefly made known by self-consciousness or the inner sense, even as matter is made known by the external senses. But our author does not observe so carefully and intelligently the phenomena of the inner world by the inner sense as he does those of the outer world by the outer senses. He admits readily that mind exists and that it differs from matter. He treats psychology as a separate department of science. But it seems to me that he is not a master of the science of mind as he is of mechanical science. He draws mind from nerves; indeed, he identifies the two and can scarcely be made to distinguish between them. By confounding them he thinks he can generate mind out of matter.

From this place onward it will be necessary to insist on the two principles explained (Section V.), as to, first, our having it clearly defined what is the present state of the object supposed to be developed; and secondly, finding in the development a cause adequate to produce the precise effect. Mr. Spencer violates the first of these principles in his account of mind where he leaves out some of its characteristic phenomena. It is only by doing so that he is able to impart any plausibility to his theory of the evolution of mind. He does not state, and apparently does not see, that we have a knowledge of self in consciousness, of self as remembering, imagining, thinking, approving, condemning, willing. He evolves conscience, but gives it no special cognitive power or authority. He denies free-will in the most emphatic manner, and declares it to be inconsistent with the progress of the race as secured by the march of development. He does not condescend to notice the high ideas which the mind can entertain of moral good, of holiness and infinity, though he speaks of the unknowable as infinite.

He also violates the second principle and does not find a cause competent to generate mind. A large portion of his first volume is on the Nerves. I frankly acknowledge that I am not able to examine it critically as a branch of science. But this I know, that some who have studied physiology profoundly are not prepared to concur in his generalizations as to the way in which nerves and nerve-force are generated. I have no opinion on the subject, and if I had it would be of no value whatever. But I feel that I am competent, as any intelligent man is, to examine his derivation of consciousness, and all mental operations, from the soft pulpy substance, the nerves. I am ready to concur in the statement that there is a relation between the quantity of nerve-tissue and the quantity and complexity

of motion in the bodily frame. But this is a very different thing from saying that there is a like close relation between nervous force and mental force of all kinds, say literary, or mathematical, or philosophical force, or moral force—in following the good and resisting the evil. I do believe in the connection between nerve-force and certain forms of mental action, especially sensation and emotion. But certainly the two are not to be identified, but rather to be carefully distinguished. I do not look on the pulpy matter of the nerves as being the same as the force transmitted through them. But what is the nerve-force? I am not sure that Mr. Spencer or any one else can tell. All that I insist on is, that it is unwarrantable to extract mind with its endowments from such a substance as the nerves.

We must try here to ascertain what view our philosopher takes of mind. "Mind is certainly in some cases, and probably in all, resolvable into nervous shocks, and these answer to waves of molecular motion that traverse nerves and nerve centres" (*Psych.*, i., 156). There is a perpetual reference by him, and it may be added, by Prof. Bain, to nervous shocks. It is a convenient word for those who wish to conceal an ambiguity from themselves and others. A shock is defined by Webster as "Conflict; violent collision; concussion; external violence; conflict of enemies; sudden impression of fear, dread, or abhorrence; offence; impression of disgust," etc. It is scarcely a word to be used in strictly scientific discussion; it may mean a violent concussion or collision, which is entirely material and made known by the senses; or a sudden impression of fear, dread, or abhorrence, which is made known by consciousness. Surely a violent concussion is one thing, and a dread arising from the apprehension of it is a different thing. If the concussion is a purely material movement, though it

should be that of an earthquake, there is no dread in it. The dread springs up in a soul that has an idea of danger to come from the collision. But the double meaning, the one real, the other metaphorical, allures the constructor of the theory to cover over the difference and identify the two.

He passes over the gulf in his usual way, by a leap, and calls nerve and mind correlates. "Changes in nerve vesicles are the objective correlates of what we know subjectively as feelings; and the discharges through fibres that connect nerve vesicles are the objective correlatives of what we know subjectively as relations between feelings" (*Psych.*, i., 270). This does not throw much light on the subject, though it seems to do so. To say things are correlates does not clear up their nature, unless we are told what the relation is. We know what such relations as husband and wife, father and child, are; but it is not so evident what is the correlation between nerve and thought. "What is objectively a wave of molecular change propagated through a nerve centre is subjectively a unit of feeling akin in nature to what we call a nervous shock!" (i., 184). Here he juggles with the ambiguous phrases object and subject: nerve is the object, and feeling the subject. But surely nerve exists whether it is or is not contemplated by mental feeling as an object, and mind or feeling contemplates a thousand things besides nerves. Whatever the connection, it is not that of subject and object; each is after all a distinct agent.

Nor is it correct to say, as Spencer says elsewhere, and as Professor Bain says so often, that they are sides of one and the same thing. For in the first place, mind has and can have no side, being a psychical or spiritual object; and secondly, matter, say this stone, exists whether the mind views it or not, and the stone has not mind as its

side. He tells us, "what we are conscious of as properties of matter, even down to its weight and resistance, are but subjective affections produced by objective agencies that are unknown and unknowable." This is making all our knowledge subjective.

But we must look a little more narrowly into what he makes of mind. "Mind is composed of feelings and the relations between feelings" (*Psych.*, i., 163, 210). This is a meagre account of mind, which embraces not only feelings, properly so-called, but knowledge, ideas, memories, imaginations, judgments, reasonings, resolves. Every one who has but a superficial acquaintance with psychology knows that under the ambiguous phrase, feeling, there are embraced two such different things as the bodily sense of feeling, such as we have when our finger is burned, and a higher affection, such as hope and fear, arising from an apprehension of good to come or evil to come. He knows the distinction between these, and calls them the centrally initiated and the peripherally initiated; the latter being Sensations and the former the Emotions. This formidable nomenclature does not bring out the essential distinction between the two affections; and it does not bring out the essential quality of emotion, which is an excitement called forth by an idea of something good or evil. Mind is capable of both these kinds of feelings, but it is not composed of either or both; it has intellectual acts and moral acts rising above mere feeling and not generated by feeling.

Let us notice how he generates the mental faculties. We begin with Sensation. "It is an integrated series of nervous shocks, or units of feeling, and by integration of two or more such series compound sensations are formed" (i., 127). Thus a man's love for his mother or his country consists of two more nervous shocks. It should be noticed that his shocks come in, as they are ever doing, to explain what

they cannot explain unless they possess the very quality of which they are supposed to explain the rise. A disturbance in a body not possessed of sensibility is one thing, and a sensation is another thing, and the disturbance can as little raise the sensation as quiescence could.

But of all things the rise of Consciousness is felt by the whole school to be the most difficult. They often use the phrase without knowing precisely what they mean. By consciousness, as I use the phrase, I mean self-consciousness, or the knowledge which the mind has of self in its present state, say as thinking, reflecting, musing. At this point our author feels a great difficulty in understanding how mind should at the same time be subject and object. I see no mystery and feel no difficulty. It is a fact falling constantly under our notice, and the metaphysician should acknowledge and proceed upon it. Just as I know the world without me so far, so I also know the world within.

But as often understood, consciousness is a general name for all those states of which we are conscious, all that is peculiar to mind as distinguished from matter. Taken in this sense, there is surely a difficulty which every wise man will acknowledge, in showing how it can have been developed from nerve force or from any material force. There is a deep gulf fixed here which no one has been able to fill up. Any one who looks into it thoughtfully will only feel the more keenly that it is impassable. Mr. Spencer, daring though he be in his speculations, can scarcely be said to have attempted it. He is describing the nervous system, and he brings in consciousness in the stealthiest manner. He speaks of separate impressions received by the senses, and of the need of some centre of communication, so that, "as the external phenomena become greater in number and more complicated in kind, the variety and rapidity of the changes to which the common

centre of communication is subject must increase, there result an unbroken series of these changes, and there must arise a consciousness" (*Psych.*, ii., 403). *There must arise a consciousness.* From changes and a centre—which has no consciousness. A cause at all adequate even in appearance to produce the effect is not even hinted at. He does not even acknowledge the difficulty; does not seem to see it in the eagerness of his march.

His account of the Ego, or, as I prefer calling it, the Self, is equally meagre and unsatisfactory. He speaks of it as a delusion to suppose "that at each moment the ego is something more than the aggregate of feelings and ideas, actual and nascent, which then exists" (i., 500). In this he is adopting the doctrine of Hume, who has no self different from impressions and ideas, or as the same is expressed by Mill, that mind consists of possibility of sensations. "If the ego is not present in the consciousness it is something of which we are unconscious—something, therefore, of whose existence we neither have, nor can have any evidence. If it is present in consciousness then, as it is ever present, it can be at each moment nothing else than the state of consciousness, simple or compound, passing at that moment" (*Psych.*, i., 500–501). In opposition to this mistaken view, I hold that in every act of consciousness we have a knowledge of self in its present state, say as thinking, not of thinking apart from self, or of self apart from thinking (or some other exercise), but of self as thinking.

He now comes to Intelligence, of which he acknowledges the existence as much as any spiritualist does. But what does he make of it? "Mind is composed of Feelings, and the Relations between Feelings" (ii., 192). "Intelligence is generated from the Relation of Feelings." "But mind is not wholly or even mainly Intelligence. We have seen that it consists largely, and in one sense entirely, of feel-

ings. Not only do feelings constitute the inferior tracts of consciousness, but feelings are in all cases the materials out of which in the superior tracts of consciousness, intellect is evolved by structural combination." We have come to another hiatus. He has not told us how from relation of feelings intelligence should arise. Surely the discovery of relations of any kind implies power of discovering relations, as Locke and nearly every psychologist has held, and yet he can give no account of the genesis of this power.

He tells us more precisely what intelligence is, and we should carefully notice what he says. "The primordial element of all intelligence is simply change." Expanding this, "successive decompositions of the more complex phenomena of intelligence into simpler ones, have at length brought us down to, the simplest, which we find to be nothing else than a change in the state of consciousness. This is the element out of which are composed the most involved cognitions" (ii., 291–2). He proceeds to defend this position. "To be conscious is to think; to think is to put together impressions and ideas, and to do this is to be the subject of internal changes. It is admitted on all hands, that without change consciousness is impossible; consciousness ceases when the changes in consciousness cease. If then incessant change is the condition on which only consciousness can continue, it would seem to follow that all the various phenomena of consciousness are resolvable into changes." He tells us further, that "we can become conscious only through the changes caused in us by external objects" (ii., 291, 292). There is a call for criticism in every clause of these statements. A change always implies something changed; it is a new state of the substance changed, and the thing changed should have been specified, and this would have brought us to a mind undergoing the change. Surely every kind of change, say a change

in the temperature of the air, is not consciousness, or an element in cognition ; it must be a change in the conscious self. "To be conscious, is to think." I insist that to be conscious is to know self as acting. But he tells us, "to think, is to put together impressions and ideas," thus proceeding on the fundamental sceptical doctrine of Hume who put together impressions and ideas without things impressing or impressed.

I am not sure about admitting that without changes consciousness is impossible. I may be conscious of self as in pain. I believe Newton was conscious of thinking continuously for a time. So it is not true that consciousness ceases when there is no change. No doubt there are rapid changes in consciousness, but this because of the succession of ideas in the brain going on, always in the mind, or the new objects pressed on the mind from without. But it does not even seem to follow that the various phenomena of consciousness, all that I am now thinking, all that my readers are thinking when they read this, are resolvable into changes. I deny that we become conscious only through "the changes caused in us by external objects." I am glad to find *in us* appearing in spite of all efforts to repress it, and implying a self distinguishable from outward object. But in *us* there may be changes in our internal ideas, say from grave to gay, from fear to hope, from one judgment to another, without any external cause.

He speaks of Memory, but very briefly. It "pertains to that class of psychical states which are in process of being organized. It continues so long as the organizing of them continues, and disappears when the organization is completed" (i., 452). I do not understand what he means by disappearing. He acknowledges that there is a continuous thing abiding amid all individual remembrances.

I believe this, the self, may hold the acquired remembrance forever in this world and the next.

He speaks of Reason at considerable length and remarks, very truly, I think, that reason is dependent on previous intuitions and instincts which are more important than reason itself. He has a new analysis of reasoning differing from the syllogistic, and more complicated. I believe that the logic of Aristotle still holds its ground. The other theories of reasoning have had their little day and then disappeared. The two new analyses which have been given in our day, are likely to share a similar fate. That of Mr. Mill has very much passed out of sight. That of Mr. Spencer has not, so far as I am aware, been adopted by those who have followed his philosophy in other respects. According to the Stagyrite there are three terms in reasoning; it is a comparison of two terms by means of a third; (1) John Smith is (2) a man and therefore has (3) a conscience, as every man has a conscience. This is undoubtedly reasoning. But according to our author, reasoning needs four terms, which he elaborates into a very artificial and unnatural system, which would require a volume as large as this to examine, but which need not be examined till some who have studied logic come to accept it.

PART SECOND.

HIS ETHICS.

SECTION IX.

SEEKING A BASIS FOR ETHICS.

ALL his previous speculations are regarded by him as leading toward the grand end of finding "for the principles of right and wrong a scientific basis." We have now presented to us the basis of his ethics. Bacon has shown that science is to be tried by (not valued for) its fruits; and the English race have a sensitive disposition to inquire of every theory proposed to it what is its moral tendency. It was at this point that the weakness of Locke's theory of the origin of our ideas, which he derived from sensation and reflection, was first detected, and this by the grandson of his patron, Lord Shaftesbury, who showed that our idea of moral good cannot be drawn from either or both these sources. There are many inclined so far to follow Spencer's development theory as containing (as Locke's theory of the origin of ideas did) much truth, who are anxious to know what morality it has left us. Thinking men see that if development cannot meet the requirements of ethics, which are quite as valid and certain as heredity or any other laws of physiology, evolutionists will be required to modify their

theory and allow that while it can do much it cannot accomplish everything, and that it leaves many important facts to be explained by other, and, I may add, higher laws.

Our author is sensitively aware that there is great danger in a period of transition from an old faith to a new one. "Few things can happen more disastrous than the decay and death of a regulative system no longer fit before another and fitter regulative system has grown up to replace it" (*Pref.*). He assumes and asserts, without deigning to give any proof, that "moral injunctions are losing the authority given them by their supposed sacred origin." This is no doubt true of the school of which Mr. Spencer is the head, and of the *set* associated with him in London, and of his correspondents in various countries. But it may be doubted whether it is true of men in general, even educated men, or of Americans in particular, who I believe have as firm a faith in a morality prompted by an inward power and sanctioned by a Divine Power as they ever had, and are not likely to part with it readily. But there is danger—not, it may be, to our old men whose beliefs and habits are formed, but to the youth in our colleges, and especially in our scientific schools, and reading only evolutionary books and magazines, and are told that all things proceed from evolution which needs no God to guide it, that in throwing off their religion they also throw off their morality, which has been so intimately joined with it. Mr. Spencer will help them to part with their religion, which he consigns to a region unknown and unknowable, having attractions to nobody, but he would not have them abandon morality. He would not have them part with their religion too speedily; but if positive religion, that is religion with a God be found untrue, as he tells them, then intelligent young men cannot any longer believe in it and must by a

necessity of their nature part with it whether evil follows or not. He is evidently alarmed about this transition period when the old power has lost its authority and there is no one to take the place of the deposed king. So he hastens to give a new and scientific basis to morality, and this independent of God and of any inward law, both of which have been set aside. I have now to examine this new ethical theory, I trust candidly and impartially, and this, in the first instance, not upon its supposed tendency, which may be looked at subsequently, but upon the evidence advanced in its behalf.

SECTION X.

DATA OF ETHICS.

Mr. Spencer looks on all his previous inquiries as culminating in his ethics, which he regards as more important than any of them. Ethics is commonly, and I think properly, supposed to have to do with our moral nature, some giving one account of it and some another, but all agreeing that it has to deal with good and evil. When I found him calling his work *Data* I fondly wished (though I confess I scarcely expected) that he would have exhibited and expounded what we see when we look on moral or immoral actions, say on mercy or cruelty. I did hope that, using his own test of necessity or inconceivability, he would show us what "we must accept as true," as to certain voluntary acts, as, for example, that we cannot conceive deceit as good, or benevolence as evil. This would have furnished an unyielding basis to ethics, and on it the powerful builder might have erected a solid structure. But instead he reaches his data by a long inductive

and deductive process, in which he takes in the conduct of "all living creatures," even those who are not usually supposed to have any moral principles or responsibility, including the brutes, lower and higher, from the monad up to man.

By data he does not mean truths given or granted, he does not mean first truths to be tested, as I reckon, by self-evidence and necessity, but truths reached by a process. That process is, in fact, evolution. It will be expedient here to determine precisely what point we have reached in the process. We commenced with the unknown, of which, however, we somehow know so much: that it is a power, that it is everlasting, that it manifests itself in physical agents. Out of these have been evolved mind, sensation, consciousness, memory, reason, all drawn from antecedents which it seems to me have no power to produce them. It is now very generally granted that the effect is somehow in the cause; but there is nothing in nervous tissue to produce such intellectual qualities as the knowledge of human nature by Shakespeare. We are now to look at our builder developing Conscience, Obligation, Duty, Love (I prefer the word to altruisn), and Free Will, or ethical qualities all falling under the consciousness of every one. Again, we may discover the same defect, and this still more visible, of drawing a product from an incompetent cause, the defect, however, not being seen by our author, because he has not carefully looked at all that is in the cause.

SECTION XI.

VIRTUE AS CONDUCT AND A MEAN TO AN END.

He opens his work with declaring that moral good is a relation of means to end. I simply put in a caveat here. By our higher moralists virtue is represented as an end rather than a mere means. It is commonly spoken of as consisting in an affection of the mind, which is good in itself, say love according to law or benevolence, and not as a mere mean to something else, say happiness which in the system we are examining is the only good. But let this pass for the present, that we may consider his account of moral good as a means.

Virtue is conduct. I cannot accept this unless the phrase conduct has a certain meaning given to it. I would scarcely speak of the action of a wagon, a steam-engine, a balloon as conduct, at least I would not allow that it could be called virtuous. But in conduct there is commonly implied intention, more or less definite, we could talk of the conduct of a dog, or a horse. But I would scarcely call this ethical, though Mr. Spencer seems to do so. When we speak of good conduct in man, we denote intelligent action, being an act of the will having a good end in view. But let us see what our author characterizes as virtuous conduct.

"Morality," he says, "has to do with conduct," which he defines as "acts adjusted to ends, or else the adjustment of acts to ends." Conduct is good which accomplishes its end. "Always acts are called good or bad as they are well or ill adjusted to ends." A weapon is good when it inflicts an effective blow or wards off a blow. I have simply to interpose here that according to this view a robber's pis-

tol, or a burglar's key, or a draught of poison, or a forged bank-note is good. There is certainly nothing morally good in the mere adjustment of means to end. We have not yet got a scientific basis to ethics (*Data of Ethics*, c. iii.).

"If from lifeless things and actions we pass to living ones, we similarly find that these words, in their current applications, refer to efficient subservience. The goodness and badness of a pointer or a hunter, of a sheep or an ox, ignoring all other attributes of these creatures, refer in the one case to the fitness of their actions for effecting the ends men use them for, and in the other case to the qualities of their flesh as adapting it to support life." Surely we have not yet come to ethics. But he proceeds to show that from this initial adjustment, "having intrinsically no moral character, we pass *by degrees*" (mark the language) "to the most complex adjustments," which are moral.

Looking to sentient life, he shows that it is good or bad according as it does or does not "bring a surplus of agreeable feelings;" that "conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful;" and concludes that, "taking into account immediate effects on all persons, the good is universally the pleasurable." By these gradual steps he has led us up to ethics, declaring "that conduct with which morality is not concerned passes into conduct which is moral or immoral by small degrees and in countless ways."

The non-moral conduct is now developed into moral, and we see what his ethical theory is. He does not make moral good an affection or a voluntary act, or even, so far as I can see, a mental operation or state; it is whatever as a means on the whole promotes pleasure. We are not yet prepared to criticise this doctrine. It is enough for the present to indicate the objections that may be taken to it. I maintain that moral good is a mental act or state, and

that it implies intention. I admit that pleasure is a good, and that it is to be promoted as an end, but I deny that it is the only good, or even the highest end. In particular I deny that whatever as a means promotes happiness is necessarily a virtue. In order to be morally good it must be intended by the agent to promote happiness. A machine, such as a telescope, or electric telegraph, or a telephone, may greatly increase the resources and the happiness of the race. But surely we do not regard it as a virtue like honesty, and temperance, and righteousness, and self-sacrifice. But instead of pursuing this farther at present, let us notice what he makes of the progression of happiness, in regard to which he has established, as I think, a most important truth.

SECTION XII.

DEVELOPMENT PROMOTES HAPPINESS.

Under this head I have nothing but praise to bestow. He is successful in showing that as geological ages have run on there is a constant increase in the general amount of happiness. He cannot, indeed, tell us by his development theory how sensations of pleasure were produced; but having got these, he shows by that theory how they have become greater and greater, by the multiplication of the organs, as the animals become more special and more complex. Then there is the lengthening of the life of living creatures and its extension over wider regions. He thus summarizes: "We saw that evolution, tending ever toward self-preservation, reaches its limit when individual life is the greatest both in length and breadth; and now we see that, leaving other ends aside, we regard as good the conduct furthering self-preservation, and as bad the

conduct tending to self-destruction. It was shown that along with increasing power of maintaining individual life, which evolution brings, there goes increasing power of perpetuating the species by fostering progeny, and that in this direction evolution reaches its limit when the needful number of young, preserved to maturity, are then fit for a life which is complete in fulness and duration; and here it turns out that parental conduct is called good or bad as it approaches or falls short of this ideal result. Lastly, we inferred that the establishment of an associated state both makes possible and requires a form of life, such that life may be completed in each and in her offspring, not only without preventing completion of it in others, but with furtherance of it in others, and we have found above that this is the form of conduct most emphatically termed good. Moreover, just as we there saw that evolution becomes the highest possible when the conduct achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in offspring, and in fellow-men, so here we see that the conduct called good rises to the conduct conceived as best when it fulfils all three classes of ends at the same time."

I have quoted this passage for *two* purposes: one is to show how he is developing his theory of morals, which I am about to examine; and the other and present purpose, to exhibit the process by which he shows, I think successfully, how the means of happiness have been multiplying and intensifying on our earth as the ages roll on. He unfolds in his best manner the provision (he would not use the word) which has been made for securing this end, and also to prepare the way for the introduction of morality.

Physical operation tends towards this end. "To-day's wanderings of a fish in search of food, though perhaps showing by their adjustments to catching different kinds of prey at different hours a slightly determined order, are

unrelated to the wanderings of yesterday and to-morrow. But the higher animals, and especially man, display more coherent combination of motions; and all tends towards the increase of pleasure. There is produced by the advance a balanced combination of external actions in face of external forces tending to overthrow it, and the advance towards a higher state is an acquirement of ability to maintain the balance for a longer period by the successive additions of organic appliances, which counteract more and more fully the disturbing forces."

Biological arrangements have the same tendency. There is a pleasure attached to the healthy exercise of the body thus securing an attention to that exercise, which secures an increase of happiness, and with him what promotes happiness is morality.

Psychological laws have the same influence. He gives here an epitome of his psychology, making it very much a department, not of the science of mind, as revealed by consciousness, but of the physiology of the nerves. He speaks of the three controls which restrain men—the political, that is government; the religious, or fear of the supernatural; and the social, or the influence of public opinion —and shows successfully that all these lead men to subordinate proximate satisfaction to ultimate good. He here comes in sight for the first time of what is entitled to be called moral good. "Now we are prepared to see that the restraints properly distinguished as moral are unlike those restraints out of which they evolve and with which they are long confounded; in this they refer not to the extrinsic effects but their intrinsic effects." If he had said intrinsic character which makes them end in themselves and truly moral, he would have been in the region of ethics. But he merely carries us to the portal of the temple and does not enter.

Sociology brings the same issue. Here he shows that the universal basis of co-operation is the proportion of benefits received to services rendered. He concludes: "The sociological view of ethics supplements the physical, the biological, and the psychological views, by disclosing those conditions under which associated activities can be so carried on that the complete living of each consists in and conduces to the complete living of all."

I have allowed our author to expound his argument in his own way. I accept his statement of facts as to the progression of nature. I admit that he thus establishes two very important truths. The first is that nature, as it progresses, makes for happiness. The means of enjoyment become higher as animated nature advances; is higher in the period of fishes than in that of mollusks, in the period of mammals than in that of fishes, and in that of man than in the times of the lower animals. This is a very interesting point, though it is not an ethical one. But he, so I think, establishes another point equally if not more important. It is that nature prepares for the introduction of morality. I hold, indeed, that till man appears with a conscience pointing to a moral law, there is and can be nothing either moral or immoral. We do not morally approve or condemn the acts of the reptile or the bird, of the dog or the cow. But there is a preparation made for man and for morality; a scene in which man can live, with the food needful for him, and in which he has opportunities of doing good, encouragements to do good, machinery to shut him up to good, and checks laid on the commission of evil.

I believe he has done good service by establishing these two truths. But he has not in all this entered the proper domain of morality, and least of all found a scientific foundation for the principles of right and wrong; he has

merely constructed a basement, and has not laid a basis. Proceeding on his statement of facts, and interpreting them after the same manner, I discover other truths which furnish a foundation on which ethical science may rest securely.

SECTION XIII.

PHENOMENA OVERLOOKED BY HIM.

We must keep before us steadily the principle that in inquiring into the causes of things we should begin with determining precisely what the effects are of which we are seeking the causes. In settling what development can do we have to ascertain the nature of the things developed. I believe that Mr. Spencer has overlooked many of these. In particular he has no keen or steady perception of higher mental exercises, which he always identifies with material concomitants, such as nervous tissues. I proceed in this section to specify some general facts of a spiritual nature which he has passed by, though they fall directly under the eye of consciousness. These facts are as certain and as clear as any falling under the senses, and which have been specified by our author. Having supplied these omissions we will be in a position to determine whether he has explained everything by his ethical theory.

First. I discover design in these arrangements made to promote happiness and moral good. The tendency which he has so acutely detected implies very many and very varied adjustments of one thing to another, and of all things to a beneficent end. To what are we to ascribe these? Mr. Spencer is too much of a philosopher to attribute them to such meaningless things as chance and

fate. He is ready to admit that beyond the known phenomena there must be an unknown power to produce them. At this point I close in with him. This combination of adjustments producing a tendency toward an end, being an effect, implies a cause. From the effect we can argue, and so far know the cause. These arrangements toward an end point to an arranging and therefore an intelligent cause. Not only so, but as the end is happiness, they give evidence of a benevolent cause. As the effect is a reality, so must the cause, the intelligent and benevolent cause of an effect implying intelligence and benevolence. These grand laws of beneficent progress revealed in biology seem to me to argue as clearly as the special adaptations of bones, joints, and sinew adduced by Paley, that there is an intelligence organizing and guarding them toward discoverable ends. The circumstance that God proceeds by development in so many of his ways does not entitle us to shut him out from his works. It has been shown again and again, as by M. Janet in his work on "Final Cause," that in development as an organic process there is as clear proof of design as in the frame of the animal. I see purpose in the arrangements which produce the beneficent tendency which Spencer has traced, quite as much as I see it in the constitution of a good society or a good government. I carry this truth with me as I explore the various compartments of nature, always keeping it in its own place, and I find it as a torch illuminating many places which would otherwise be dark.

Second. I discover another end in nature. I discover a moral end, or rather I discover that moral good is an end. I admit that the promotion of happiness is one end, the highest among the lower creatures incapable of appreciating anything higher. But when a certain stage is reached I discover this other end, like happiness, a good in itself

and an end in itself. Mr. Spencer mixes up the two ends, and they are often mixed together in the economy of nature; nevertheless they are distinct, and should be seen to be separate. The one end, happiness, is visible from the beginning. There seem to be anticipations of the other end, preparations for it in the animal reign, just as there were preparations for man in the cattle and cereals which preceded him and made it possible for him to appear. But the other end does not actually come forth till a morally endowed agent appears on the scene. The adjustment of means to end is a good thing, but before we regard it as morally good we have to see that the end is good, and that morally. A sword may be fitted to slay an enemy, but in order that the man be good who uses the sword he must employ it in a good cause. Happiness is good, but is there not also another good, and that is the love that promotes happiness, and the justice that guides and guards happiness and secures an equal means of happiness to all and each? Misery is an evil, but so also is the cruelty or deceit that produces evil. Benevolence is good, but is there not also a right and a wrong, and a justice which demands that every one has his due?

Third. At a certain stage there is the appearance of a being to know and appreciate the moral end. We have here an advance on what has gone before: an advance on the brutes, which had a love of pleasure, but not, therefore, a love of good; an aversion to pain, but not, therefore, an aversion to sin.

For our present purpose, which is not historical but ethical, it is not needful to determine how man appeared on the scene, and how he came to have a conscience to know the good and discern between it and evil. The advance is of the same kind as that which took place in the earlier ages from the inanimate to the animate, from

the insentient to the sentient, from the unconscious to the conscious, from the uninstinctive to the instinctive. Spencer and his school will no doubt account for this by development. The old alternative immediately comes in and requires us to make our choice between the horns. If it be answered that the morality was potentially in the original matter, I answer that there is really no proof that the moral power which led to the martyrdom of Socrates and the labors of Howard or Livingston was originally in the primitive molecules, and thence passed through the flaccid mollusk and the chattering monkey. I add, for argument's sake, that even on this supposition we might infer that all this must have been arranged by a prearranging and therefore an intelligent power foreseeing, or rather planning, the end from the beginning; which power must be a moral power lending its sanction to the whole results, and so to the moral monitor with its precepts and prohibitions. If the other horn is preferred, and it is asserted that man and his moral nature have come from a superinduced power, then I claim for that power the sanction of that Higher Power who has superinduced it. Some of our savans seem to be very anxious to prove their descent from the brutes. I admit and maintain that man's body is formed of the dust of the ground, and that he is so far after the image of the lower animals, or rather that the lower animals and he are after the same type. "My substance was not hid from thee when I was made in secret, and curiously wrought in the lowest parts of the earth. Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being unperfect; and in thy book all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned when as yet there was none of them." But I am anxious to claim for man in general and for our profound thinkers in particular another ancestry. I claim that in

respect of their mind they were made in the image of God. We can discover traces of this even in the most degenerate of mankind, particularly in their capacity to ascend, as in the rise of the Britons from the days of Cæsar to their present state—a rise to which we can produce nothing parallel in any race of animals. Discovering it in the germ, even among savages, I see it taking its full form in our poets and philosophers, among our patriots and philanthropists.

It is enough for me that man has a reasonable and moral nature, no matter whence derived. Whatever may have been its historical growth, that conscience is now an essential part of my being. The higher state may have grown out of the lower, as the fruit out of the seed; but the fruit is valued for its own sake, and not because it has come from the seed. Whether man has come from the fish or no, he is no longer a fish but a man, with a moral nature containing certain perceptions and prerogatives, and if he murders a fellow-man I treat him in a way very different from that in which I would treat a fish which had seized and destroyed another fish. That moral nature declares that there is an essential and indelible distinction between good and evil. Its decisions can stand even Spencer's criterion of truth which "must be accepted." We believe that the man who suffers rather than tell a lie, that he who risks his own life to save a neighbor's, is right; and that the man who betrays a cause committed to him, or who murders a fellow-man, is wrong. I am as certain of all this as I am of the existence of an external world, as I am of my own existence; I cannot be made to believe otherwise. I am as certain that I reprobate the cheat and the seducer as I am that there is a cheat and a seducer, and that I live to reprobate him. Let speculators, I may say, wrangle about the historical antecedents of all this as it

suits them. I know what I perceive, and I follow, and must follow, my conviction, or rather I follow it not because of any external compulsion, but because I perceive it. Having such a moral nature, I inquire into its data and find it declaring that happiness is an end to be aimed at, but also declaring that moral good, love, and reverence for what is good is an end and a higher end.

Fourth. There is an intuitive principle prompting to the performance of moral good. It has been shown again and again that the utilitarianism under all its forms—and Spencer's ethics is a form of utilitarianism—requires an intuitive principle and motive to carry it out. It proceeds on the principle not only that I may but that I *ought* to promote the happiness of others as well as my own, that I am bound to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. There is no need of an intuitive moral principle to lead me to look after my own pleasures; though our sense of duty comes in to strengthen my purpose to sacrifice present pleasure for greater ultimate happiness. But why am I bound to promote my neighbor's good as well as my own? So far as I can see, the utilitarian theory, and the development theory as a form of it, has no answer to this question. You may prove to me that, upon the whole, there would be a greater sum of happiness in the universe were I to content myself with being the husband of one wife, but there would be a greater pleasure to me, so I think, to have another whom I love more: what is there in the theory of development to lead me to lay restraint on myself? But at the stage at which morality comes in there comes in an intuitive conscience which insists that this ought to be done because it is right, and points to a God who sanctions the whole. We have thus and here a motive which leads us to promote the happiness of all, and prompts us to do good as we have opportunity.

Fifth. It should be further noticed that intuitive morality requires us as a duty to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This is as much a precept of the intuitional as of the utilitarian or hedonist theory of morals, with this very important difference that the former carries within itself and with it a motive to induce us to do good to others.

It should be noticed of this intuitive conscience that it looks to a law above it, and to which it is subordinate. This law is, "Do unto others even as ye would that others should do unto you." It follows, that love is the grand, the essential virtue—being always regulated by law. I prefer the phrase "love" to altruism, the Comtean one, which the school is seeking to introduce, inasmuch as the former demands an inward affection, whereas the latter might be satisfied with the outward act. Now, the possession of love is the best, the only certain means of promoting happiness. Being a fountain, it will be flowing out and watering all. It prompts to the promotion of the happiness of all sentient beings, including the lower animals. Being regulated by law, it will flow out in furthering the happiness of those with whom we come in contact, by pleasing manners, by obliging acts, by honoring all men, by sympathy with distress, by relieving the wants of the poor, by securing the education of the young, and the spread of literature and the arts, and the propagating of truth and love all over the world. The greatest-happiness principle is as much a part of intuitive as of utilitarian morals. My inward law and the God who planted it there require me to labor to promote the good of all mankind. But the intuitive theory requires other duties. It enjoins that we love and revere and worship God, and that we promote the moral excellence as well as the felicity of our fellow-men.

Sixth. It is needful to expose a fallacy running through his whole argument that moral good has respect to happiness as its end. It is that of making the conclusion wider than the premises, that of supposing that he has established the whole when he has proven only a part. He proves that happiness is an end and a good end, but not that it is the only end or the highest end.

SECTION XIV.

HIS GENERATION OF ALTRUISM OUT OF EGOISM.

Here I may repeat that I do not like the phrase Altruism, introduced by Comte, adopted by Spencer, and favored by their disciples, so that we know at once to what school a writer belongs when he uses it. We had an old word, Love, much more full of meaning, and with many pleasant associations, and I prefer using it, only I have to use our author's phraseology in explaining his meaning.

He argues with great ingenuity and power, and with a superabundance of illustrations, that altruism can be evolved from egoism. I am not sure that he has succeeded. He shows how altruism comes to be identified with egoism. I will allow Mr. Spencer to illustrate this in his own language. He shows how parents bequeath part of their bodies to form offspring at the cost of their own individualities, and how generally throughout the insect world maturity having been reached and a new generation provided for, life ends. When a part of the parental body is detached, in the shape of gemmule, or egg, or fœtus, the material sacrifice is conspicuous; and when the mother yields milk, by absorbing which the young one grows, it cannot be questioned that there is also a material sacrifice.

The agitation which creatures show when their young are in danger, joined often with efforts on their behalf, as well as the grief displayed after loss of their young, make it manifest that in them parental altruism has a concomitant of emotion. Self-sacrifice, then, is no less primordial than self-preservation. He shows that there is an advance by degrees from unconscious parental altruism to conscious parental altruism, and farther, an advance from the altruism of the family to social altruism. Rising higher, personal welfare depends on due regard for the welfare of others. The bodily ill-being of a man's neighbors, say in the form of infectious disease, may come to affect the man himself. Each has a private interest in public morals and profits by improving them. Evils are suffered by those whose behavior is unsympathetic, and benefits are brought to self by unselfish conduct. Then there is an egoistic aspect of altruistic pleasure; for, whether knowingly or unknowingly gained, the state of mind accompanying altruistic action being a pleasurable state, is to be counted in the sum of pleasures which the individual receives. Then, a society, like a species, survives only on condition that each generation of its members shall yield to the next benefits equivalent to those it has received from the last. This dependence of egoism upon altruism ranges beyond the limits of each society and tends ever toward universality, and throughout the whole community the internal welfare of each becomes a matter of concern to the others. I have allowed Mr. Spencer to speak for himself. He has certainly shown how egoism and altruism may strengthen each other, supposing each to exist independently. When a work comes to be written, as I anticipate that there will sooner or later, on final cause as exhibited in evolution, the cases adduced by Spencer will be brought forward as eminent examples of design.

I can conceive altruism as mere outward action or conduct proceeding from egoism. But I see no evidence that self-interest can generate altruism in the sense of love. Any man can see that he who would make friends must make himself friendly. This may lead to kind acts, but not necessarily to kind dispositions; to beneficence, but not to benevolence. The acts done may proceed merely from a far-sighted selfishness, which is not virtue. But in human nature there are disinterested social feelings with not the slightest taint of selfishness. I believe that the love of self and the love of others are wells down in the depths of our nature which have sprung up simultaneously, being fed from on high, created, or if any prefer it, developed, which is simply a continuance of the creation. Only thus have we the true virtue. "Charity suffereth long and is kind; charity envieth not, charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up: doth not behave itself unseemly; seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil; rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things."

SECTION XV.

ETHICAL PRINCIPLES REJECTED BY HIM.

He rejects those theories which look (1) to the character of the agent; (2) to the nature of the motives; (3) to the quality of his deeds; (4) he also rejects free-will. In doing this he has set himself against the great body of our moralists in ancient and modern times. These maintain that the one or the whole of these should be looked at in approving an action as morally good, or disapproving of it as morally evil. According to the generally accepted doc-

trine a morally good action is the act of a (so far) good agent, swayed by a good motive, and doing a good deed, of his free-will. In judging of moral acts we look and feel that we ought to look to the agent, the actuating principle, the act, and the willingness of it. We declare that act to be good which is done by a man good at least for the moment, from a loving motive, just in itself, and from the heart.

The Character of the Agent.—We look to this so far in judging of the deed, and always in having any confidence that good will arise. If the man is a robber swayed by revenge, doing a deed bad in itself, but of an immediately useful tendency, say murdering another and a more formidable robber, we do not give our approbation.

The Motive.—However we may admire his talents, we do not regard that man as specially virtuous who, for the purpose of securing money, invented a machine which may add immeasurably to the resources of humanity. We do not give credit to one who does alms to be seen of men.

The Act.—We look to the deed considered in itself. It is not enough that it be well meaning, we must see whether it be conformed to the eternal principles of justice, and be fitted to further the best interests of the race. Every one acknowledges that there may be a weak charity, which promotes the evil which it is intended to remove.

Free-Will.—Mr. Spencer argues against the existence of free-will; the will of man is as little free as that of the brutes. Free-will is utterly inconsistent with his evolution theory. If it did exist it would be an evil. Every independent will, and much more such a will on the part of the hundreds of millions of human beings on the face of the earth at every given moment, might seriously interfere with that development which is going on so beneficently under the underground control of the unknown "Freedom

of Will," did it exist, would be at variance with the beneficent necessity displayed in the evolution of the correspondence between the organism and its environment (*Psych.*, i., 503). I confess I do not look forward with lively interest to the generation by development of a concrete in which the highest advance is without free-will and without love.

SECTION XVI.

HIS CRITICISM OF ETHICAL THEORIES.

He tries hard to prove that all theories of virtue show that happiness is their final end. With this view he examines the theory of perfection. It is supposed to have been held, in a general way, by Plato, and more distinctly by Jonathan Edwards. I am not sure that he has a very accurate idea of the view of either of these men. Plato held that the highest excellence consisted in the contemplation of the idea of the one, the true, the good, an opinion carried to an extreme by the Neo-Platonists of Alexandria. According to Edwards, virtue consists in love to being, according as being has claims upon it—a theory which implies an affection and a law of its distribution. Neither of these theories can aid him in constructing a theory which rests on happiness, for they both look to something above happiness.

He also examines the theory of those moralists who suppose themselves to have conceptions of virtue as an end underived from any other, and who look on virtue as not resolvable into simpler ideas. He thinks that Aristotle holds this view. Again I am in doubts. Aristotle's definition of virtue (ἀρετὴ) is a somewhat complex one: "It is a habit (or tendency) founded on, and exercising deliber-

ate preference in a measure relative to ourselves, defined by right reason, and according to the definition of a man of moral wisdom." It would take a dissertation to unfold all that is embraced in this. But there are two most important elements, altogether overlooked by Spencer, the one, that in virtue there is Will, even deliberate preference (προαίρεσις), and the other, Reason. But there are many moralists who think that virtue is not resolvable into simpler ideas, such as the Scottish School, Kant, and M. Cousin. Taking the virtues of courage and chastity, he argues, on the supposition that virtue is primordial and independent, no reason can be given why there should be any correspondence between virtuous conduct and conduct that is pleasurable in its total effects on self or others or both; and if there is not a necessary correspondence it is conceivable that the conduct classed as virtuous should be paingiving in its total effects. The answer is easy and at hand. Virtue being regulated love, or, at least, containing love as its highest element, the effect of it as a whole cannot be paingiving. In the case of the two virtues named, they need a more powerful motive than merely the promotion of happiness, and this is to be found in a rule like the Christian one, of doing to others as we would that they should do unto us. We thus see that in the end we should contemplate there is not only happiness but a further end —an end in itself—which promotes and so secures happiness.

He next examines, with the same view, the intuitional theory of morals. This has often been stated so as to make it indefensible. Properly enunciated it contains a truth which must have a place in a true theory of morals. Mind, I hold, has a power of knowing and discerning things. In particular its moral sense, or rather perception, has a power of perceiving good and evil in certain

voluntary acts—good in gratitude and evil in ingratitude. Specially it sees good in love under its various forms, such as sympathy, compassion. This love does look to the happiness of sentient creation. The law to which the conscience points guides and guards this love. It points to the objects and qualities toward which it should flow, and also to those from which it should turn away. It contains within itself a motive to the performance of the act, a compulsion—not a physical, but a moral one—to act.

SECTION XVII.

HIS UTILITARIANISM.

His theory is avowedly a form of the utilitarian. But he thinks he has given it a better form than it takes in the systems of Bentham and Mill. He calls his own system rational utilitarianism, as distinguished from empirical. He sees how vague and uncertain are the principles of the common utilitarianism and the uselessness for practical purposes of the precepts derived from them; it being difficult to decide as to many acts whether they are or are not, upon the whole, fitted to produce a greater amount of happiness or misery. He tells us, however, "I conceive it to be the business of moral science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct" (*Dat. Eth.*, 57). We will look forward with interest to his promised work, the *Principles of Morality*, to see if he is able to accomplish this.

It is important to be able to put what is sanctioned by

general utility into the form of laws. This is done imperfectly in the advices which parents give to their children, in the saws, proverbs, and wise maxims which pass from mouth to mouth in society, such as "Honesty is the best policy," "The truth wrongs no one." But these are loose in themselves and in the expression of them. A more definite enunciation of them, constituting a jurisprudence, might accomplish some important ethical ends. It would help to bring intuitive morals and utilitarian into closer correspondence. But it would not provide what is the great want of utilitarianism under all its forms. It has been shown again and again that the common utilitarianism has no sanction to authorize it, and no motives to constrain attention to what it recommends. The rational form is quite as powerless in this respect as the empirical. In the first place, the great body of mankind would not comprehend these laws, drawn out in scientific form, say by Mr. Spencer. Conceive a child, a savage, a laborer, a busy business man, a gay lady, a naturally frivolous boy obliged, in order to get ground for morality, to read ponderous volumes, drawing duty from "the laws of life and the conditions of existence." Suppose some one should succeed in all this, what would prevent him from setting all these laws at defiance, and rushing on to the gratification of his pride, his lust, his passion? "These are to be recognized as laws of conduct;" but where is the power to make this obligatory?

SECTION XVIII.

SPECIAL EXAMINATION OF HIS MORAL THEORY.

We are now in a position to understand and to judge of this new and considerably pretentious theory which is to give a scientific basis to ethics. Conduct is acts adjusted

to ends. Conduct is good when it accomplishes its ends. Conduct is morally good when it promotes the greatest happiness. There are passages which leave upon us the impression that mechanical acts may be regarded as good when, on the whole, they favor the production of pleasure, and this without at all looking to an agent. "Beyond the conduct commonly approved of or reprobated as right or wrong, there is included all conduct which furthers or hinders in either direct or indirect ways the welfare of self and others." According to this view there may certainly be good in organic acts, in all vital acts. The lower animals commit good acts when they do deeds which add to happiness. "There is a supposable formula for the activities of each species of animal which, could it be drawn out, would constitute a system of morality for that species!" Surely we have here a new ethical code. It seems the doctrine of the whole school. Darwin speaks deliberately of its being the duty of the hound to hunt. The morality of animals is supposed to rise insensibly and by degrees into that of man.

He makes the biological progression with its controls generate the conscience. "The intuitions of a moral faculty are the slowly-organized results of experience received by the race." In fact, the conscience seems to be merely a nervous structure. "I believe that the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race have been producing corresponding nervous modifications which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition." *Our moral intuitions are thus nervous modifications become hereditary!* Is this the highest product of development? this the copestone of the new philosophy?

He gives to this conscience a certain impulsive and

guiding power. "That the intuitions of a moral faculty should guide our conduct is a proposition in which truth is contained, for these intuitions of a moral faculty are the slowly-organized results received of the race while living in presence of these conditions." The conscience thus generated evidently cannot furnish a standard or an ultimate criterion. In different circumstances and with a different heredity its decisions might have been different. In opposition to all this, I hold that conscience is an intuition looking into certain voluntary acts and declaring them to be good or evil in their very nature. This conscience can stand the tests of intuition, even those of Spencer. It is self-evident, and its negation is inconceivable; we cannot conceive that hypocrisy, say religious hypocrisy, should be good. The culmination of our philosophy is thus Hamilton's favorite maxim: "On earth there is nothing great but man, in man there is nothing great but mind;" and I might add, in mind there is nothing great but love guided by law.

This carries with it Moral Obligation. Spencer takes much the same view of obligation as Bain. He supposes it to arise from a restraint imposed by force, such as a ruler, a government, or supernatural agency—in which last Spencer does not believe. Interpreting the revelations of conscience as an intuition, I claim for it a higher place. It is an obligation to obey a law involving, as Kant powerfully argues, a law-giver, being evidently the very governor who has presided over organic development, as it contends with its environments, and causing it to make for happiness. The obligation is laid upon us to do what is right, and in doing so to give every one his due, and as much as within us lies to promote his welfare. This gives the idea of justice, and our obligation to attend to it.

Of the same character is the idea, the sense, and the

obligation of Duty. Spencer argues that as morality advances from an act to a habit, the feeling of duty becomes less and less, and may disappear. There is some truth here, but it is only partial truth. When the habit of good is completed, the work is done without restraint. But then the felt obligation of duty is necessary to form the habit. It is best when the sense of duty and love go together in the performance of an act. When the feeling of obligation is withdrawn, the feelings will be apt to waver and the conduct to become inconsistent. It is not necessary that people should always be thinking of the restraint; the habits and sentiments will often act best when they follow their own generated nature. But it is important that the law should ever be there, even as the horse will go all the steadier because of the curb in his mouth, though the rider may not always be using it.

SECTION XIX.

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS.

He has an Absolute Ethics, and thinks it of great moment that he should have. But it is like the meeting of the asymptotes of an hyperbola at an infinite distance. It will be reached when the external circumstances are brought into harmony with the internal life. "The coexistence of a perfect man and an imperfect society is impossible" (p. 179). I hold, on the contrary, that it may be, nay, that it has actually been, the work of a perfect man to labor to make society perfect. He tells us, farther, that "conduct which has any concomitant of pain or any painful consequence is partially wrong" (p. 261). With my views of morality I cannot coincide with this. I do not know that

it is partially wrong to cut off a limb when by doing so life is preserved, still less to conquer a vice by an exertion which may be painful. "Actions of a kind purely pleasurable in their immediate and remote effects are absolutely right," and "they only." It is allowed that it must be unnumbered ages before there can be such actions. "Ethics has for its subject-matter that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of evolution," "these last stages in the evolution of being when man is forced, by increase of numbers, to live more and more in presence of his fellows." We are told "that the conduct to which we apply the name good is the relatively more evolved conduct; and that bad is the name we apply to conduct which is relatively less evolved." It is clear that his absolute ethics can be reached only when development has advanced hundreds of thousands or millions of years. An old fisherman who lived eighteen hundred years ago knew somehow that this world was to be burned up with fire; and it is a part of Spencer's philosophy that this must be so, and I suspect that this conflagration may be kindled before his perfect ethics are reached,—and then will not be reached, for then there will be intolerable pain. And, after all, what interest have the men and women now living, and anxious, it may be, to know what is their present duty, in this inconceivably remote state of things? After all, his perfect ethics do not consist in love, or in any voluntary acts or dispositions, but, to all appearance, simply in an advanced zoological concretion in which there will indeed be no pain (though how it is to be got rid of is not explained), but at the same time no room for heroism, self-sacrifice, and devotion.

He has also a Relative Ethics, but not, so far as I can see, of a high character. "It is the least wrong which is relatively right." His statements on this subject leave

morality in a very uncertain and loose state, and might open the door to all sorts of excuses for the neglect of what is, after all, paramount duty. "Throughout a considerable part of conduct no guiding, no method of estimation enables us to say whether a proposed course is even relatively right as causing proximately and remotely, specially and generally, the greatest surplus of good over evil." How much room is left here for the crooked casuistry of the heart! "As now carried on, life hourly sets the claims of present self against the claims of future self, and hourly brings individual interests face to face with the interests of other individuals, taken singly or as associated. In many such cases the *decisions can be nothing more than compromises.*"

What an encouragement in all this to compromises, to favor personal aggrandizement or sensual gratification! He gives the case of a farmer whose political principles prompt him to vote in opposition to his landlord. "The man in such a case has to balance the evil that may arise to his family against the evil that may arise to his country. In countless such cases no one can decide by which of the alternative courses the least wrong is likely to be done" (p. 267). Is this safe morality? And yet I believe it is the only morality that can result from the balancings of pleasures and pains. Call in a moral law, and it will decide the question at once, and declare that the man ought to follow his principles and leave the issues to God.

Mr. Spencer has an ideal. All great men have. He thinks that there is a development now going on which must produce a better state of things. In this respect his system is, in my view, superior to that still more pretentious one of pessimism which has been gendered in disappointed and diseased minds as in a marsh, and after which some speculative youths are wondering. But I have doubts

whether the agencies which he calls in can effect the end he is expecting—the removal of all evil. Hitherto the advance of intelligence and civilization, while it has removed certain evils, has introduced others, and apparently must continue to do so. Amidst all ameliorations of outward estate moral evil abideth—sin which Spencer has never ventured to look at. The happy close to our world's history which so many are looking for will not be brought about except by causes that remove the moral evil. I do expect that "at evening time it will be light." But I believe that it is to be brought about by a higher power superinduced on all that has gone before.

I confess that I am not able very clearly to see what is to be the precise state of this world millions of years hence, when the powers at present acting are fully developed, and before it is burned up by fire. Certain vices will have disappeared, but others, I fear, may have increased. I can see no way in which pain, in which disease is to be altogether removed. In the condensed and crowded state of society there must be struggles for existence, competing interests, clashing rivalries, and wars. In the presence one of another, certain evils will be restrained, but others will be kindled in the collision—human nature remaining as it is. The evil will not be removed except by some power which ameliorates human nature, embracing man's affections and will.

In an earlier Number of this Series, in speaking of "What Development can do, and what it cannot do," I have shown that new powers, natural or supernatural have appeared as the ages advanced. I believe in all that Spencer has established as to progression in nature: of the animate being superinduced upon the inanimate; of the sentient upon the insentient; of the conscious upon the unconscious; of the intelligent upon the unintelligent, and of the moral upon

the intelligent; but I may, and I do cherish the expectation of a higher advancement rising above all that has gone before. Agassiz perceived in the frames of the lower animals the anticipations of man's more fully developed body, so in man's intellectual and moral nature I discover a prognostic of a higher and a spiritual character.

I have written the paper which I am now to close with a deep sense of responsibility, being awed at once by the masterly ability of my opponent, and the vast interests, speculative and practical, at stake. I have endeavored to examine Mr. Spencer's philosophy, as in former years I did that of Mr. Mill (when his fame was the highest), fairly and candidly. My labor has been stiff because the work I review is a stiff one and is developed in so many elaborate volumes. I see no difficulty in answering our author, provided I understand him. I believe I see his meaning and can estimate the drift of his speculations. I have followed the development of his system from his "*First Principles*" onward to the beginning of the consummation of his work. I have cheerfully accepted his scientific statement of facts and some of his interpretations of them, but have superadded others quite as important and quite as certain. I am aware that the little work published does not unfold his full ethical views, and if, in further unfolding his plan, he brings in truth fitted to fill the wide gaps which we see yawning before us, I will have more pleasure in withdrawing the objections I have taken than I have had in advancing them.

I am constrained to conclude that the work does not furnish a scientific basis to ethics. Had it been described as a *Preparatio Ethica*, I might have something to say in its behalf. He does show that in the earlier animal ages there was an advance in happiness, and that there was a preparation for morality to appear, and that there are aids

to human virtue in prearrangements to call it forth and sustain it. This is what he has succeeded in. But he has not entered the subject of ethics, which has to look to character and to voluntary acts of human beings.

The system propounded implies a morality without a God, or at least without any God known or knowable. There is no obligation provided requiring us to love, to revere and worship God. The morality recommended has its sanction from a long process of development which has gone on for millions of years, carrying a mysterious power with it, but this not from a guide, governor, or law-giver —of whom, I believe, nature gives evidence as conducting the development orderly and beneficently. It has sanctions from organic agencies working unconsciously (I believe for a purpose), but implying no responsibility to a ruler or a judge. It is not supposed to carry with it, as Kant maintained that the practical reason did, the necessity and certainty of a world to come and of a judgment-day. So far as I comprehend, it does not require or enjoin that virtue should be voluntary. It does not give love or benevolence a place, as I believe it ought to have the highest place, in all good conduct. It declares that morality is that which promotes happiness, but it has no constraining motive, such as the intuitive conscience supplies, for leading men to feel that they ought to labor for the welfare of others.

Our new ethics thus withdraws many of the motives which were supplied by the old morality. And it does not supply others likely to take their place and to sway the great body of mankind: men, women and children, civilized and savage, in joy and in sorrow, in prosperity and in adversity, in the hour of temptation and at death. I can conceive that some persons who have mastered the development theory, who believe in it enthusiastically, may be moved by it to high exertion, as feeling that they are

thereby falling in with the whole evolution of nature. But what motive does it supply to the peasant, the laborer, the young man and maiden, to lead them to resist evil and follow the good? And what are we to do with our reading youth entering on life who are told in scientific lectures and journals that the old sanctions of morality are all undermined? What are we to do for them, and what are they to do in that transition period which Mr. Spencer acknowledges to be so perilous? You may say, Read Spencer's elaborate volumes and fill your mind with his system. But this is what the great body of mankind will not and cannot do, and if they did would any one thereby be interested or moved? Our author does not believe that "his conclusions will meet with any considerable acceptance." I believe the deluge of fire will come before they cover the earth. In these circumstances it is surely wisdom to rest on the old foundations, on an inward monitor guaranteed by God, till new ones are supplied on which we and others can rest.

In this age we have had two men of powerful intellect, who have sought to construct the universe without calling in God, an independent moral law, or the immortality of the soul. The one of these, J. S. Mill, I had the courage to oppose when his reputation was at its greatest height. His influence has diminished and is now chiefly in the spheres of Induction and Political Economy, on both of which he has thrown considerable light. The other has not so clear or acute a mind, but he is a more powerful speculator, and is more thoroughly conversant with biology, the promising science of the day. I place the two together in order to remark, that they both have brought thinking to a very blank issue. The one making matter "a mere possibility of sensation," and mind "a series of feelings aware of it-

self," and giving us no morality, but merely pleasure. It is felt, especially since the publication of his posthumous work, that his philosophy as a whole is a failure. The other starts with the unknown and unknowable, sets agoing a mechanical development out of physical data, in which there is no requirement of moral law and no free-will; the whole ending in a conflagration, leaving as the ashes only the unknown and unknowable, with which it started. I am sure that neither meets the demands of our intellect, nor the cravings of our heart.

The sphinx is still propounding the riddle of the universe. There are two very powerful men in our day who have tried to solve the problem and have failed. We know what, according to the fable, their fate must be.

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